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This dissertation addresses a well-known but vast topic: Morality. Previous research 
has revealed that it is important for people to be moral. Nevertheless, they may 
sometimes commit immoral acts. In this dissertation, I take a social psychological 
perspective from which I examine when and why people become motivated to do 
what is right. I study whether people tend to adhere to their own moral values, and 
whether their moral behavior is affected by the presence of others. Moreover, by 
borrowing research methods from neuroscience, I aim to unravel some of the brain 
processes involved in this motivation to be moral.  
Previous Research on Morality 
Researchers across scientific disciplines, who examine different aspects of 
morality, work on the assumption that people have an innate sense of what is right 
and wrong. In fact, some of these researchers even argue that moral behavior is not 
unique for humans, but reflects a more basic concern for the well-being of others, 
that we share with some animals. For example, De Waal studied aspects of morality 
in chimpanzees, bonobos and capuchin monkeys. Results of his studies revealed 
that such animals show fairness concerns: When precious goods – such as 
attractive food items – are not equally distributed, they show signs of resentment 
(Brosnan & De Waal, 2003). Moreover, they comfort each other in distress and 
cooperate with other individuals in need of help, even if there is no immediate gain 
for the self (De Waal & Berger, 2000; see also De Waal, 1996). The fact that such 
indications of cooperation and empathy are found in primates (as well as other 
animals, such as elephants) is often interpreted as evidence that moral behavior 
represents a very basic and almost instinctive tendency – also for humans.  
In the study of human behavior, developmental psychologists have theorized 
about how morality is established in childhood and develops through adolescence 
and adulthood (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965). More recently, neuroscientific 
researchers have examined the effects of damage to (prefrontal) parts of the brain 
and have shown that such impairments are associated with immoral conduct and 
unethical decision making (e.g., Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 
1999; for a review see also Moll, Zahn, De Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 
2005). These approaches thus also suggest that people have an intrinsic sense of 





















moral behavior seem to stem only from differences in the extent to which morality 
is developed in childhood or impaired due to physical restraints in the brain. 
One could thus argue that people do not need explicit guidelines for what is 
the right thing to do, as they know this intuitively. This resonates with the 
consensus among researchers that moral principles are universal and fundamental 
to who we are. Yet, we are confronted with people’s immoral acts on a daily basis: 
Every news website and –paper contains examples of people lying, stealing and 
cheating. Knowledge of the person who committed such an immoral act may 
surprise us. The people who are known for their good intentions, can still decide to 
act immorally. Likewise, research shows that the same individuals may show moral 
as well as immoral behaviors at different points in time (e.g., Monin & Miller, 
2001). Why is this the case? 
  A Social Psychological Perspective on Morality 
Prior attempts to answer this question have mainly investigated why people 
transgress moral norms. In line with the assumption that moral behavior is a 
natural tendency, such transgressions can be attributed to deficiencies in personal 
moral development or to cognitive limitations preventing people from showing 
‘regular’ moral behavior. In this dissertation, I take a social psychological approach. 
I work on the notion that it is ‘normal’ for individuals to shift their moral behavior 
across situations or over time. I explicitly study these variations, focusing on 
situational features that induce moral behavior, as a starting point to increase our 
understanding of why and when people adhere to moral norms. Thus, the central 
aim of my research is to uncover which social mechanisms enable people to behave 
in line with their (and other people’s) moral values, and how this affects the way 
they approach different situations. I argue that, by using this approach, we will gain 
a better understanding of how moral behavior can be stimulated by situational 
features. This can help bring out the best in people, regardless of their individual 
differences. To achieve this goal, I address three questions in the current 
dissertation: (1) Do people tend to act in ways that are considered moral? (2) How 
important is it for them to be perceived as moral by others? (3) How much do they 

















Examining these questions from a social psychological perspective means that 
I take into account the impact of how people see themselves, how they are judged 
by others, and to which social group they belong. In addition to examining social 
psychological factors in explaining displays of moral behavior, I use neuroscientific 
and psychophysiological indicators that may reveal the cognitive and affective 
mechanisms underlying such behavior. Combining these different approaches 
makes it possible to go beyond self-reported statements about what people say they 
will do. This also allows me to examine any discrepancies between the way people 
actually behave, and what they explicitly report. Going beyond prior work, my aim 
is to reveal whether and how people act upon their moral values by examining 
cognitive processes associated with moral behavior.  
Diverging Perspectives on Morality 
To examine what motivates people to be moral, we first must know what 
“being moral” actually means. In books of law or religion, morality is often defined 
by specifying what is not moral. The origin of current notions about human rights 
and general behavioral guidelines (‘though shall not steal’) can thus be traced 
throughout history and converges across national contexts, cultures, and religions. 
When moral standards are not made explicit, we may however still be guided by 
our moral intuition: An undefinable but certain intuitive state that indicates that 
something is right or wrong (Haidt, 2001).  
The central goal of moral behavior thus seems quite obvious: Doing what is 
right. However, how this takes form in a concrete manner or in a specific situation 
is much more ambiguous. You may have noticed that what you consider the right 
thing to do may differ, depending on particular circumstances, or the presence of 
other people. For example, you know that helping others is generally considered 
moral. Nevertheless, you may be more motivated to help your friends or family 
members than some stranger in the street. In a similar vein, you are likely to care 
whether others perceive you as a moral person. At the same time, opinions of 
others you consider relevant to yourself – such as your friends or family – are likely 
to matter more than opinions of people you do not know. As a consequence, 





















on who is affected by your behavior, or who are present to observe and evaluate 
your behavior. 
Individuals deliberate about what would be the right thing to do, but so do 
groups, institutions and countries. To give an example, let us consider the Olympic 
Winter Games of 2014. Ever since the Olympic Committee announced that these 
Games would be hosted by Sochi –Russia, one could hear objections around the 
world. Several countries objected to the organization of an event that promotes 
peace and international cooperation through sports, by a country that is associated 
with limited civil rights such as rights of freedom of assembly and freedom of 
speech. Also in the Netherlands, there were fierce discussions about the decision of 
the government to send a large political delegation (in addition to members of the 
royal family) to attend the Games. According to protesters, this signaled the wrong 
message: Given the high moral standards concerning civil rights in the Netherlands, 
this country should not support an event organized and propagated by another 
country that violates such rights. Such debates thus raise questions about national 
moral values, how to (re)present those values, and how these will be perceived by 
other communities and countries. 
The above example illustrates that there can be differences between groups in 
moral values on an international level. Debates about what is right may however 
also divide different groups within the same country. For example, in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and France, discussions concerning the integration of 
Muslims invoke moral concerns. Norms posed by the Islam seem to oppose 
common societal practices in Western countries. This is the case for instance with 
the clothing habits that many Muslims endorse, such as wearing a burka or a hijab –
a headscarf– for Muslim women. Wearing a burka in public was prohibited in 
France in 2011. A similar judicial proposition was discussed in the Netherlands as 
well. Wearing such clothing may be perceived in Western societies as degrading for 
women and as morally wrong because it could strengthen the segregation of 
Muslim and non-Muslim individuals. In contrast, Muslims see this as a sign of 
modesty and high moral standards. This illustrates that the same behavior (such as 

















seen as immoral by others. In other words, it is not always easy to specify the ‘right’ 
thing to do because each group may have its own moral norms.  
In a context where members of multiple groups are present, people can 
therefore question what would be the moral thing to do. When the former queen 
of the Netherlands went to Oman for a state visit, she wore a headscarf whenever 
she visited a mosque. She argued that she did this out of respect and regard for the 
country, its people and their religion. Several members of the Dutch government 
supported her judgment. However, there were also politicians who openly 
condemned her opinion and related behavior. This example thus also illustrates 
that debates about what is moral touch upon who we are as individuals, and how 
we see ourselves in relation to our groups (e.g., a political party, ‘the Dutch’). They 
also concern our moral principles and values; how we want to portray ourselves to 
others; and how we want to be perceived by them. These are questions that are 
central to the current dissertation. 
Morality and Group Inclusion 
The importance of the people around us for how we think about ourselves 
and decide upon how to behave can be explained from a social identity approach. 
Social identity theory posits that people often perceive themselves and others as 
part of a group. Groups help people to define who they are, where they belong, 
and how they should behave (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Being part of a group with 
whom one can share his or her social identity (e.g., “the Dutch”, “social 
psychologists”) is a way to validate one’s self-views, and to establish and maintain 
one’s self-esteem (see also Ellemers & Jetten, 2013). Groups thus can help people 
to establish a distinct identity: Groups each have their own norms which make 
them different from other groups. The norms and values within a group thus 
provide clear guidelines as to how individuals should behave in order to secure 
inclusion in that group. As a result, people tend to look for inclusion in a group 
with whom they can share their moral values and principles. Alternatively, they 
adapt their own values to the groups that are important to them. It thus depends 
on whether people want to belong to and identify themselves with a particular 
group (whether they consider this their ‘ingroup’) whether they adjust their 





















behaviors are affected by ‘social pressure’ in general. People care primarily about 
adherence to norms within their ingroup, while it is less important for them to 
behave according to outgroup standards. For example, Dutch Muslim women who 
identify more strongly with their religious group than their nationality are more 
likely to adhere to the norms of their religious group (e.g., by wearing a headscarf) 
than the norms of their Dutch nationality (e.g., not wearing a headscarf).  
Group norms and standards are particularly important when these relate to 
morality. As a member of a group, people are more inclined to adhere to ingroup 
norms when these are presented as “the moral thing to do”, rather than prescribing 
what would be “the competent thing to do” (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 
2008). People do this because they think they will receive respect from their fellow 
group members when they adhere to moral group norms (Pagliaro, Ellemers, & 
Barreto, 2011). Moreover, people identify more strongly with a moral than a 
competent group and are more proud to be member of groups that can contribute 
to their morality than groups that stand out for their competence (Leach, Ellemers, 
& Barreto, 2007).  
Morality also seems to be the most important determinant of the impression 
we form of other individuals and groups. When encountering someone we do not 
know, we primarily search for characteristics indicating their morality (e.g., honesty, 
trustworthiness) rather than showing an interest in competence (e.g., particular 
skills, intelligence) or sociability (e.g., kindness, friendliness; Brambilla, Sacchi, 
Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012). 
Thus, both at an individual and a group level, people look for characteristics 
concerning morality –rather than information concerning other people’s 
competence or sociability (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011). In fact, 
research shows that we are able to determine whether another person is 
trustworthy in less than a second. This happens even faster than making judgments 
about whether that person is attractive, competent, or nice (Willis & Todorov, 
2006). In the process of gathering information about how moral someone is, 
special importance is attached to any negative behaviors. That is, we more likely to 
conclude that someone is immoral when s/he has done something wrong, than we 

















In other words, even for a person who is known for his or her moral integrity, a 
single act of immoral conduct can spoil this positive image, because immoral acts 
are perceived as more informative of someone’s true character than moral acts 
(Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).  
This is not only important when learning about someone else’s moral 
characteristics and values, but also plays a role in the concerns people have about 
themselves being seen as moral by others. That is, if one’s morality is called into 
question, then one’s identity and sense of self is negatively affected. For example, 
when there is disagreement about moral values (as compared to material interests), 
or when a person is evaluated on his or her prior immoral behavior, people report 
increased negative affect and display a physiological threat response (Kouzakova, 
Harinck, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2014; Van der Lee, 2013). 
When others question their moral intentions or behaviors, people worry that 
they may lose respect or even will be excluded from the group. However, since the 
meaning of morality differs between groups and situations, it can be impossible to 
do what is right according to everyone. People may therefore focus primarily on 
doing what is right according to their own ingroup. Such ingroup norms may 
however also concern how one should behave towards members of another group 
(e.g., treating people from other cultures with respect). The intention to adhere to 
such ingroup norms may be relatively easy as long as interactions with outgroup 
members are hypothetical. But what happens when people are faced with an actual 
interaction with a member of another group? For example, when non-Muslim have 
to collaborate with a Muslim at work?  
Morality in Intergroup Relations 
As I explained above, morality plays an essential role in regulating individual 
behavior within a person’s own group. It is however just as important in intergroup 
interactions. Accordingly, morality is often examined in such contexts. For 
example, Reed and Acquino (2003) revealed how intergroup conflict can be 
diminished by extending ingroup favoritism towards individuals representing 
different religions and ethnicities. That is, people show increased explicit moral 
regard towards outgroup members when they attribute greater importance to their 





















people’s willingness to strive towards social equality between groups is enhanced 
when other ingroup members say this is an important moral ideal (rather than 
when they say it is a moral obligation; Does, Derks, & Ellemers, 2011). Evaluating 
or presenting people’s identity or behavior in terms of moral values can thus 
enhance their moral intentions and acts. In other words, telling people that they 
should act according to what they think is the right thing to do may thus be used as 
an instrument to enhance moral behavior towards and between people. I assess the 
implications of the effects of such an emphasis on a person’s morality, in the 
current dissertation. Specifically, I examine what happens when the implications of 
behavior of native Dutch (non-Muslim) individuals towards Muslim women are 
presented as an indication of their egalitarian values. I propose that reminding 
people that their behavior conveys their morality will stimulate equal treatment and 
motivate people to avoid displaying bias towards the Muslim outgroup. 
Measuring Moral Behavior 
Thus far I have discussed why it may be important for people to adhere to 
their own moral values and the moral norms within their groups. If people indeed 
want to be perceived as moral, this could cause them to emphasize the importance 
they attach to moral behavior because they think this may reflect positively upon 
the image others have of them. This may however not necessarily reflect their 
actual behavioral preferences. Nor does it predict how they would act in a specific 
situation, for instance when they do not realize that others are paying attention to 
their moral tendencies. In other words, people may deliberately respond in a 
socially desirable fashion when they think their moral image is at stake. This is a 
relatively common concern when interpreting responses to self-report 
questionnaires. Emphasizing the implications of people’s behavior in terms of how 
moral they are could thus introduce measurement problems. Relying on self-
reported intentions to assess people’s responses may not capture their ‘true’ 
intentions, or their intentions may not correspond to their actual behavior. In this 
dissertation, I therefore used another type of measure to assess the motivation to 
be moral. I adapted an Implicit Association Test (IAT) to examine participants’ 
behavioral responses that might reveal bias favoring their own ingroup (non-

















The IAT was first developed by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998) to 
assess the strength of (automatic) associations between target concepts and 
different attributes. This test assumes that people find it easier to quickly connect 
concepts that they implicitly relate to each other. You can imagine how this works 
when you are asked to couple a concept, such as “flowers”, with words like “fun” 
or “kind” (i.e., attributes). Making such connections should be relatively easy 
because “flowers”, as well as words like “fun”, both have a positive connotation in 
our mind We thus associate one with the other, because they are what is called 
congruent. Likewise, it should be relatively simple to couple a concept such as “bugs” 
with words like “pain” or “fear”. In this case, the association is easily made because 
both the concept and the words have a negative connotation. However, things are 
likely to become more difficult when you try to couple “flowers” with “pain”, or 
“bugs” with “fun”. This is because these concepts and words do not have the same 
connotation - a positive word has to be coupled with a negative concept - and are 
thus incongruent. They are therefore not easily associated with one another.  
An IAT is based on these associative mechanisms. It is a reaction time task 
during which participants are asked to press one key as quickly as possible when 
they see a particular word or picture. In one part of the task, they are asked to 
respond with the same key to both pictures or names of “flowers” and positive 
words (e.g., “fun”). They are asked to press another key for both pictures and 
names of “bugs” and negative words (e.g., “pain”). This procedure is used to assess 
participants’ performance on congruent trials. In another part of the task, the 
pairing becomes less intuitive. Here, participants are asked to respond with the 
same key to both “flowers” and negative words. Another key has to be used to 
indicate both “bugs” and positive words. These instructions are used to assess 
participants’ performance on incongruent trials. To the extent that people are more 
inclined to associate flowers with positivity and bugs with negativity, they should 
respond more quickly to congruent trials than incongruent trials. Thus, the 
difference in their reaction times on incongruent compared to congruent trials 
reveals the strength of their implicit associations. This is what is called the IAT 
effect. It indicates the extent to which people find it more difficult to associate one 





















concept (e.g., “bugs”) with positive rather than negative words. The difficulty of 
making such associations is revealed in increased response times. In this way, the 
IAT effect can reveal people’s negative bias towards all kinds of manner of target 
concepts, including bugs. 
The example of flowers and bugs illustrates the principles on which the IAT 
effect is based. However, the test has most often been used to assess implicit 
negative bias towards different groups of people in society, in studies concerning 
prejudice. In this case, you are also asked to couple a concept with positive words. 
But this time, the concept is not “flowers”, but represents a social group, for 
instance native Dutch people. As indicated above, people are concerned with 
having a positive social identity. Hence, they are likely to think more positively of 
groups associated with the self (ingroups) than of other groups (outgroups). The 
groups to which they belong (and Dutch participants can be seen to belong to the 
group “the Dutch”) is likely to have a positive connotation. In comparison, people 
are more likely to have negative connotations with an outgroup, such as 
immigrants. When performing the IAT, responding with one key to the concept 
“native Dutch” and positive words may thus be relatively easy, as is responding 
with another key to the concept “immigrants” as well as negative words, as these 
represent congruent associations. In contrast, responding with a single key to the 
concept “native Dutch” and negative words is likely to be more difficult –and will 
therefore take more time– just as responding with another key to the concept 
“immigrants” as well as positive words (incongruent associations). The IAT effect 
(i.e., the difference in response times between incongruent and congruent trials) in 
this case reveals the extent to which it is more difficult to associate one’s ingroup 
(e.g., “native Dutch”) with negative rather than positive words, and an outgroup 
(e.g., “immigrants”) with positive rather than negative words. In other words, the 
IAT score can reveal people’s implicit negative bias (prejudice) towards immigrants. 
The target concepts “native Dutch” and “immigrants” are an example of 
concepts that can be used in an IAT. In the United States, the IAT is often used 
within a racial context. Such a ‘race IAT’ consists of stimuli (such as photographs) 
representing people with a white or dark toned skin color. Explanations for white 

















with a dark skin tone may be seen as outgroup members by people with a white 
skin tone. The differentiation between these two groups may thus reveal positive 
associations with the ingroup and negative associations with the outgroup. 
However, in the case of the ‘race IAT’ other explanations could also be offered for 
this pattern of associations. For example, stereotypes of people with a dark skin 
tone may more often be negative rather than positive. Think for example about 
stereotypes concerning criminal records and aggression. As a result, the physical 
features of a black man’s face may be perceived as more threatening than the 
physical features of a white man’s face, which could cause negative rather than 
positive associations with this type of stimulus. All these explanations could thus 
explain the emergence of negative bias on the IAT, against people with a dark skin 
tone.  
In the current dissertation I use different target concepts in the IAT because 
of two reasons. First, negative stereotypes concerning people with a dark skin color 
as well as discrimination against this group are less common in the Netherlands. 
Such a ‘race IAT’ is thus less relevant to assess in a Dutch research population. 
Second, I attempt to rule out some of the additional explanations for a negative 
outgroup bias –besides the explanation of one’s social and distinct social identity. 
The IAT target concepts I use in this dissertation are “women without a headscarf” 
and “women with a headscarf”. Women without a headscarf represent native 
Dutch, non-Muslim women. These women are similar to my research participants 
and thus are likely to be seen as ingroup members. Women with a headscarf 
represent Muslim individuals. These women are different from my research 
participants and thus are likely to be perceived as outgroup members. As I 
indicated in the first part of this introduction, the integration of Muslims is a 
current topic of debate in the Netherlands. This debate to an important extent 
addresses clothing habits, such as wearing a headscarf, in public places or functions. 
Measuring people’s negative bias against Muslim women (i.e., women who wear a 
headscarf) is thus more relevant for research in the Netherlands. Furthermore, I 
pretested the photographs of the faces of these women (i.e., the stimuli in the IAT) 
on different characteristics. Examples are perceived kindness, honesty, intelligence, 





















without a headscarf are perceived as equal concerning these characteristics (see 
Appendix A of this dissertation for more details). A negative bias against women 
with a headscarf –as revealed by this IAT– can thus not be explained by any 
negative associations (related to such characteristics) with the stimulus materials as 
such. Importantly, the Muslim women presented in the IAT were only perceived as 
different from the research participants –but not in any way more negatively or less 
positively than the non-Muslim women. If I find a difference between positive and 
negative associations with Muslim and non-Muslim women this can therefore only 
be attributed to the fact that the women with a headscarf are being perceived as 
different from the research participants – i.e. as outgroup members. In other 
words, the use of these stimulus materials implies that any negative bias against 
Muslim women that is revealed by the IAT, can only be attributed to the fact that 
these individuals are seen as representing another (out)group. 
Emphasizing the Implications of One’s Behavior 
In my research, I use the IAT as an indicator of people’s negative bias, or 
prejudice, towards outgroups. Some would propose that the associations between 
groups and positive and negative attributes that people make during the IAT, are 
made easily and quickly because they occur automatically. However, prior research 
has revealed that IAT performance is malleable: The fast elicited response to 
associate some concepts and attributes are not automatic, but can be adapted. That 
is, participants can deliberately influence their performance by using strategies that 
diminish the difference between response patterns on congruent and incongruent 
trials. This is the case, for instance, when they are informed about how their bias 
will be measured (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005). Likewise, IAT responses are adapted 
when people are explicitly motivated to enhance their self-image or to emphasize 
their positive relationship with other individuals (for an overview see Blair, 2002). 
Thus, using an IAT, it is possible to examine whether people adjust their 
performance when motivated to do so. In the current dissertation I examined 
whether participants performed differently when they were reminded of the moral 
implications of their behavior during this task. That is, I examined whether people 
showed less implicit bias against Muslim women when they thought that the test 

















moral values concerning egalitarianism and discrimination), rather than merely 
being good at quickly processing information and learning to make new 
associations.  
Because of the stimuli used in an IAT, performance on the test can relatively 
easy be seen as indicating prejudice, and thus perceived as a measure of moral 
values. However, at the same time, the test is a reaction time task in which 
participants are asked to sort different types of stimuli according to changing rules. 
The faster and more accurately participants respond, the better their performance. 
Thus, it would be equally plausible to see the IAT as a test of people’s ability to 
perform well on this task. In other words, the IAT can be perceived both as a 
measure to detect social bias against an outgroup, and as a measure of one’s 
competence. My aim is to examine whether people respond differently during the 
IAT depending on which of these task implications is emphasized. This allows me 
to investigate whether (and how) people adjust their behavior when they think their 
performance can indicate their moral values concerning egalitarianism. 
In most of the studies reported in this dissertation (i.e., Chapters 2 through 5), 
the IAT is used to assess behavioral responses. This approach extends previous 
research concerning the importance of morality for people’s self-views and social 
identity, which has mainly relied on explicit self-report measures. Since people may 
adjust their deliberate responses on a self-report questionnaire to convey what they 
think is perceived as moral by others, their answers may not necessarily reflect the 
way they will actually respond in situations where moral concerns play a role. 
Assessing people’s moral responses in a less explicit way, by using this IAT, can 
thus provide insight in whether people actually behave in line with relevant moral 
values. In addition to assessing task behavior to reveal implicit bias, I use 
psychophysiological and neuroscientific research methods to increase our 
understanding of the cognitive processes that underlie people’s adherence to their 
moral values. 
The Added Value of Cognitive Neuroscience 
An important additional aim of the research reported in this dissertation is to 
examine the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie people’s motivation to 





















explained how behavioral performance on an IAT can give us more information 
about a person’s ‘true’ behaviors. In addition, I aim to uncover how people monitor 
and adapt their behavior to achieve adherence to moral values. Understanding the 
cognitive processes that help people to behave in a moral manner may expand our 
knowledge of the mechanisms needed to behave morally. It may reveal whether 
people initiate their behavior in a different way when they think this is indicative of 
their moral values (as compared to, for example, their competence). People may for 
instance pay more attention to other people’s skin color when they have just been 
informed about discrimination rates. As a result, they may more quickly detect 
someone with a different ethnic background which will help them to act in an 
unprejudiced manner. On the other hand, the cognitive mechanisms may reveal 
increased vigilance to errors, which may help people to adjust or redirect their 
responses to avoid displaying signs of possible immoral behaviors when they want 
to appear moral. 
This type of behavioral initiation or correction is likely to occur outside of 
one’s conscious awareness. In a job interview for instance, an employer may be 
focused on the applicant’s gender because he read a report the day before about the 
under-representation of women in business organizations. At the same time, the 
employer may not be aware of his increased attention to that aspect of the 
applicant. He may not even consciously remember reading that report. When asked 
to verbalize his considerations, the employer may thus be unable to report that he 
was more focused to the applicants’ gender. In fact, even when the employer was 
aware that he was more attentive to the gender of the applicants that day, he may 
not want to disclose this for fear of revealing gender bias. In other words, people 
may not be able to tell us about the cognitive processes that they recruited in order 
to behave in a particular way. And even if they are able, they may not be willing to 
tell us about those processes. 
Neuroscientific research methods can help solve such problems. Methods 
used in cognitive neuroscience have proven to be effective in gaining insight in 
processes such as enhanced or decreased attention. Using such measures can thus 
reveal additional information about the mechanisms underlying people’s actual 

















tendencies elicited by moral situations. Additionally, such neuroscientific measures 
provide an unbiased perspective on what actually happens during task 
performance, as these indicators are not sensitive to people’s supposedly 
heightened social desirability to comply to moral expectations. 
Extending the Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Reasoning 
Cognitive neuroscientists have already begun to shed light upon the cognitive 
and neural mechanisms associated with moral reasoning and decision making. For 
instance, previous research has examined how people reason when they are 
confronted with a moral dilemma and asked to decide how they would behave in 
such a scenario. A famous example concerns the so-called ‘trolley dilemma’ in 
which people are asked whether they would sacrifice one person’s life in order to 
save five other individuals (Foot, 1978; Thomson, 1985). Neuroscientific research 
has revealed that brain networks associated with both cognitive as well as 
emotional processes are involved in such moral reasoning (e.g., Greene, Nystrom, 
Engell, Darley, Cohen, 2004). Moreover, research concerning the judgment of 
moral and immoral acts has revealed that people are highly sensitive to the 
detection of moral transgressions which may be related to the instant emergence of 
moral emotions such as disgust (e.g., Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008; Schnall, 
Benton, & Harvey, 2008). Such studies have thus focused on the mechanisms 
underlying people’s individual ability to reason about and decide what is and what 
is not moral. However, as I have explained above, social contexts may affect what 
can be considered the moral thing to do. Likewise, different situations may affect 
whether people actually behave according to what is perceived as moral. These 
social factors are often neglected in cognitive neuroscience, as much of the research 
in this tradition focuses on establishing universal response patterns. Nevertheless, I 
argue that moral behavior is likely to shift across different contexts, depending on 
the social concerns that are raised. Additionally, knowing right from wrong and 
being able to make moral judgments may differ significantly from people’s actual 
moral intentions, motivations, and subsequent behavior. Thus, to gain better 
understanding of people’s motivation to adhere to their own moral values, and how 





















moral behavior (i.e., IAT performance), and how these are affected by different 
social contexts. 
Multiple Research Methods 
Besides using self-reports and measuring behavioral responses on the 
aforementioned IAT, I used three different research methods in the studies 
reported in this dissertation: Skin conductance, EEG, and fMRI. 
Skin conductance. 
Skin conductance indicates electrodermal activity representing activation in 
the sweat glands, measured at the skin surface of our hands. Skin conductance 
relates to so-called “psychologically induced sweating” (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 
2000, p. 202). People automatically sweat when they experience emotions, when 
they become aroused, or when their attention is increased. Measuring the tonic 
level of skin conductance can thus be used as an unobtrusive way to examine 
general states of arousal and alertness. Moreover, phasic skin conductance 
responses (SCRs) can be elicited by different characteristics of an occurring event. 
In psychological experiments this may be a particular stimulus that is new, intense, 
or has an emotional impact. Skin conductance is an automatic response generated 
by the sympathetic nervous system, a process that thus cannot easily be adapted by 
the participant for self-presentational reasons. Additionally, variations in skin 
conductance can be measured while participants receive relevant information. I am 
interested in whether people care about succeeding in behaving according to moral 
norms. Skin conductance is thus a valuable measure to detect how people 
(physically) respond to information indicating that they are, or are not, as moral as 
others. 
EEG. 
EEG is the abbreviation of electroencephalogram, which is an indicator of brain 
activation measured across the scalp (e.g., Luck, 2005). EEG has a relatively low 
spatial resolution: It is usually unclear from which brain region the activity 
originates, because it is measured at the scalp. This noninvasive neuroimaging 
technique does however have a high temporal resolution: Evoked responses in brain 
activation can be measured within milliseconds after a stimulus is presented on the 

















An EEG can be used to monitor ongoing brain activation during a complete 
experiment. From this EEG, we can extract responses evoked by particular events 
–so-called event-related potentials (ERPs; Luck, 2005). Using ERPs, it is thus 
possible to gain insight in the (ongoing) cognitive processes associated with 
particular parts of the experiment. For example, ERPs around a given response can 
inform us about the preparation of and the reaction to that response on a cognitive 
level. This thus complements the actual behavioral response that can only indicate 
for instance what people decide to do, or how long it takes for a participant to 
make this decision.  
Besides examining ERP’s during task responses, we can also investigate how 
different stimuli are processed in the brain. In the IAT I developed for the research 
in this dissertation, the target concepts are presented by photographs. Specifically, 
the target concept “ingroup” is represented by photographs of women without a 
headscarf. The target concept “outgroup” is represented by photographs of women 
with a headscarf. Using ERPs, it is possible to detect that these two types of 
photographs are differentially processed in the brain. In addition, I can examine 
whether the ERP modulations associated with viewing ingroup and outgroup 
members are affected by people’s motivation to perform in line with their moral 
values. In addition to a computation of the behavioral responses on the IAT (i.e., 
response latencies and the amount of accurate responses), ERPs can thus reveal the 
attentional processes associated with such task performance. 
fMRI. 
In contrast to EEG, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is a 
neuroimaging technique that has a relatively low temporal resolution but a high 
spatial resolution – it reveals which brain areas are activated (e.g., Huettel, Song, & 
McCarthy, 2004). Although also noninvasive, MRI is used to visualize internal 
physical tissue. Moreover, within the brain, functional MRI is used as an indicator of 
brain activation during task performance. Using the blood-oxygen-level-dependent 
(BOLD) response, differences in deoxygenated blood levels are measured. 
Performing a task elicits specific cognitive demands, such as increased attention. 
For such cognitive demands an increase in energy is needed in particular parts of 





















increases the level of deoxygenated blood which can be detected using magnetic 
resonance. This is thus used as the indicator of brain activation (Huettel et al., 
2004). The whole brain can be visualized using MRI and the BOLD-response can 
be measured to localize activation in specific brain regions. It is thus possible to 
compare the degree and location of brain activation associated with different parts 
of an experimental task. This also implies that we can detect activation in 
subcortical regions of the brain (that are located deep in the brain), including 
structures associated with primary affective responses. In addition to behavioral 
and self-report measures, but also extending information gathered with ERPs, 
fMRI can thus inform us about the brain regions involved in moral task 
performance. 
Overview of the Dissertation 
With the research reported in this dissertation, I address three different 
research questions. In Part I, I examine whether people tend to act in ways that are 
considered moral. in Part II, I investigate how important it is for people to be 
perceived as moral by others. Finally, in Part III, I focus on how much people care 
whether or not they succeed in behaving according to their moral values. 
In Part I, I examine whether people tend to be more motivated to show that 
they are moral than that they are competent. To be able to make this comparison, I 
present an IAT as either indicative of one’s moral values concerning egalitarianism 
and discrimination, or of one’s ability to learn new tasks and to quickly process 
information. In Chapter 2, I examine whether participants’ task performance is 
affected by this difference in emphasis on specific task implications. Specifically, I 
test the prediction that when the moral implications of the task are stressed 
participants show a weaker negative bias against Muslims than when the 
competence implications are emphasized. Additionally (using EEG in Chapter 2, 
and fMRI in Chapter 3), I examine whether the moral test implications enhance 
participants’ attention towards different aspects of the task. In other words, these 
studies aim to reveal whether stressing the implications of one’s behavior in terms 
of one’s moral values causes people to adjust and direct the focus of their attention 

















In Part II, I examine how important it is for people that others think they are 
moral. In this part of the dissertation, the implications of the IAT are again 
presented in terms of one’s moral values or competence. Additionally, participants 
are led to believe that their performance on the IAT is being monitored and 
evaluated by someone else. In Chapter 4, I examine whether people show their 
motivation to be a moral group member by inhibiting their bias against Muslims 
when an ingroup rather than an outgroup member is evaluating their performance. 
In this chapter, the evaluator is a non-Muslim individual (who’s gender is matched 
with that of the participant). In one condition, she is presented as someone with 
the same group membership as the participant. This is achieved with very minimal 
instructions (also referred to as the ‘minimal group paradigm’; Tajfel, 1970). The 
participant is told that their evaluator has the same personality type as they do and 
that s/he is thus an ingroup member. In another condition, the evaluator is 
presented as someone representing the other minimal group. Participants in this 
condition are thus told that their evaluator has another personality type than they 
do and that s/he thus can be considered an outgroup member. As in Part I, I thus 
examine whether people adjust their behavior and increase their attention towards 
the task in case the moral implications are emphasized. In addition, I test whether 
participants are more inclined to do this when an ingroup member, rather than an 
outgroup member, is evaluating their behavior.  
In Chapter 4, participants’ IAT performance is thus monitored by a non-
Muslim individual who is introduced as someone with the same or another 
personality type as the participant. Thus, the evaluator is introduced as someone 
who is similar to or different from the participant based on an implied personal 
feature. Nevertheless, the person evaluating participants is always the same man or 
woman, and the evaluator’s visible appearance is always the same as that of the 
participant. In Chapter 5, I examine whether people’s moral behavior towards an 
outgroup (i.e., appearing unprejudiced) is affected when they are being monitored 
by someone who can be seen to represent the target outgroup in the IAT: A 
woman with a headscarf. Such an evaluator can thus be seen as an outgroup 
member. In principle, being seen as moral by outgroup members should be less 





















participants should not be motivated to appear moral towards their Muslim 
evaluator – because she is an outgroup member. On the other hand, since the 
moral behavior assessed in this research is people’s bias against Muslims, a Muslim 
evaluator (representing the target group against whom bias might be revealed) 
could still have an impact on participants IAT performance – albeit for different 
reasons (see also Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001). I thus examine the effects of 
being evaluated by a Muslim woman on moral task performance. Additionally, I 
compare the impact of being monitored by this Muslim evaluator, depending on 
whether she is presented as an ingroup or an outgroup member based on the 
previously described minimal group membership. Specifically, participants are 
informed that their evaluator either has the same or another personality type as 
they do. I thus also examine whether presenting an outgroup member (the target 
group representative) as a partial ingroup on another dimension (same personality 
type) helps people to reduce prejudice against the target outgroup.  
In Part III, I again address people’s motivation to act according to what is 
considered moral. But here I go one step further. I focus on how much people care 
whether or not they succeed in behaving according to their moral values. In Part III, 
I aim to extend the findings of Part I, in which I examine whether and how 
people’s motivation to be moral affects their performance on a measure of bias 
against Muslims. In Chapter 6, participants are provided with feedback about their 
performance on this test. They either are confronted with information indicating 
that they are less moral (or less competent) than other participants, or with 
information stating that they are more moral (or more competent) than other 
participants. I examine the emotional and psychological impact of this information. 
Specifically, I measure self-reported affect and skin conductance responses as an 
indicator of physiological arousal. If people care more about being moral than 
competent, receiving negative information about their own moral behavior should 
be more distressing than being confronted with negative information about one’s 
competence. Nevertheless, or even because of this reason, people may be more 
attentive to positive information about their morality since this may confirm their 

















and compare whether information related to one’s morality rather than one’s 
competence is processed as more self-relevant in the brain. 
In the final part of the dissertation (Chapter 7), I integrate the findings 
presented in the three empirical parts. I discuss their implications and how this 
research contributes to current insights in social psychology and social 
neuroscience, and I consider the societal implications of my findings. Note that 
Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are prepared as separate journal articles. This results in 
some overlap in the theoretical background and method sections, but also implies 
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Moral concerns  
affect implicit prejudice and  
associated cognitive processes: 











This chapter is based on:  
Van Nunspeet, F., Ellemers, N., Derks, B., & Nieuwenhuis, S. (2014). Moral 
concerns increase attention and response monitoring during IAT performance: 
















We tend to evaluate people’s personal characteristics and behavior along two 
dimensions: One concerning morality (i.e., how we should behave) and one 
concerning competence (i.e., how we are able to behave). Behaving according to 
these dimensions is differentially diagnostic for who we are and how we are 
perceived: Skowronski and Carlston (1987) showed that for morality negative 
behaviors are perceived as more diagnostic than positive behaviors, whereas for 
competence positive behaviors are more diagnostic than negative behaviors. In 
contrast to behaving incompetently, behaving immorally thus seems to be more 
indicative of who we are. 
Recent research has shown that for people’s self-views and the positive 
evaluation of the group to which they belong moral characteristics are perceived as 
more important than characteristics concerning competence or sociability (as these 
are distinct dimensions of social judgment; Leach et al., 2007; in contrast to warmth 
in which both traits concerning morality and sociability are included; Fiske et al., 
2007). Moreover, when people form an impression of a person or a group, they are 
more interested in information concerning morality traits than traits concerning 
competence and sociability (Brambilla et al., 2011; Brambilla et al., 2011). Indeed, 
when people form a first impression within milliseconds, they are more efficient in 
making inferences about trustworthiness than in making inferences about 
competence or likeability (Willis & Todorov, 2006).  
People seem to be aware that moral judgments are important. For instance, 
Ellemers et al. (2008) demonstrated that people are inclined to adapt their choice to 
increase outcomes for the self or for the group to what other group members see 
as moral than to what other group members see as competent. Moreover, people 
anticipate being respected by their group members when they adjust their behavior 
to what the group considers moral (Pagliaro et al., 2011). These findings suggest 
that morality is of great importance for impression formation and deliberate 
impression management. We argue that people might also be more inclined to 
adjust their less deliberate actions (i.e., their implicit behavior) to what is considered 
moral than to what is considered competent.  
In the current study, we examine this prediction using an Implicit Association 














IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) has been used to measure implicit attitudes towards 
particular social groups, for example people with dark/white skin or, as in the 
current study, Muslim/non-Muslim women (see Appendix A). Targets in an IAT 
consist of stimuli representing social groups that are associated with positive and 
negative attributes. When people associate stimuli that represent their own (in-) 
group with positivity and stimuli that represent another (out-)group with negativity, 
they should respond more quickly and easily to trials that are congruent with these 
implicit associations than to incongruent combinations (e.g., ingroup stimuli and 
negative attributes). The IAT assesses the degree to which this is the case, as an 
indicator of implicit bias. 
Whether IAT performance is really implicit and thus uncontrollable is much 
debated, however. There is much research showing the malleability of implicit 
attitudes, for example by repeated exposure to admired and disliked individuals 
(Dasgupta et al., 2009), emotions (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001), and several self 
and social motives (for a review see Blair, 2002). Moreover, it has been shown that 
the IAT effect is enhanced under stereotype threat (Frantz et al., 2004), but can be 
diminished when participants have a strategy that helps them to reduce their bias 
(Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005). In the current research we take advantage of the 
malleability of the IAT effect: We emphasize the social implications of participants’ 
task performance (i.e., concerning their morality or their competence) and expect 
that participants to whom the implications concerning morality are emphasized will 
reduce their negative bias towards Muslim women. More specifically, we 
hypothesize that these participants will try to inhibit their implicit associations 
between Muslims and negative attributes, resulting in increased reaction times on 
congruent trials and thus a smaller IAT effect (consistent with the research of 
Fiedler & Bluemke [2005]).  
Moreover, we are interested in the cognitive processes underlying the 
motivation to be moral and thus the inhibition of a negative bias on the IAT. Are 
intentions to behave in line with moral values associated with control of 
undesirable behavior, or do they influence selective attention that facilitates correct 













potentials (ERPs) associated with perceptual processing and conflict- and error 
monitoring. 
Perceptual Attention 
ERPs that are associated with early perceptual processing and more 
specifically, with selective attention and social categorization are the N1, the P150, 
and the N2. These components are associated with attention in such a way that 
increased amplitudes reflect the extent to which attention is directed towards a 
particular stimulus (e.g., Ito & Urlans, 2003). Moreover, research has shown that 
this attention differs between different social stimuli. For instance, the N1 – a 
negative deflection occurring around 100 ms after a stimulus is presented – is often 
larger when viewing stimuli resembling outgroup compared to ingroup members 
(i.e., black vs. white faces; Ito & Urland, 2003; Kubota & Ito, 2007; however, see 
Ito & Urland, 2005 for the reversed pattern). The P150, a positive peak that occurs 
somewhat later (approximately 150-250 ms post-stimulus, therefore also referred to 
as the P200), is also larger in amplitude for outgroup than for ingroup members 
(Ito & Urland, 2003; Kubota & Ito, 2007). In contrast to the N1 and P150, the N2 
– a negative deflection around 200 ms post-stimulus – is found to be greater for 
stimuli representing the ingroup compared to the outgroup (Dickter & Bartholow, 
2007; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005). Examination of these components can thus show 
whether the emphasis on morality attracts greater attention to the group 
membership of the faces presented in the IAT (which is of importance when the 
test is said to measure participants’ moral values concerning egalitarianism, but not 
when the test is said to measure competence). Moreover, components related to 
selective attention and social categorization can also be associated with motivated 
perception (e.g., the P150/P200; Amodio, 2010). We propose that emphasizing 
morality increases the motivation to suppress bias towards the outgroup. Although 
this could lead to diminished social categorization, we hypothesize that social 
categorization is actually enhanced: People’s focus on the different group members 
should be increased to be sure to respond in line with egalitarian values (i.e., to be 
able to control implicit bias, as is also seen in research by Amodio, 2010). In other 
words, we expect to find stronger group-related modulations of the N1, P150, and 














Conflict- and Response Monitoring 
Because we expect that emphasizing morality motivates people to inhibit their 
bias, we are also interested in ERPs associated with control. More specifically, 
conflict- and response monitoring. To assess conflict monitoring, we measure the 
N450. This is a negative modulation of the ERP signal, typically occurring around 
400 ms post-stimulus, when subjects perform incongruent trials. The N450 
modulation has been proposed to reflect the occurrence of response conflict (e.g., 
Nigam et al., 1992; Rebai et al., 1997), and is also evident in incongruent IAT trials 
(Williams & Themanson, 2011). Because the importance of trial congruency in the 
IAT may be more evident in the moral than in the competence IAT, and because 
we expect that control is increased when morality is made salient, we predict that 
the N450 modulation is larger in the morality compared to the competence 
condition. 
To examine error-monitoring, we assess the error-related negativity (ERN), 
(Gehring et al., 1993; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). The ERN is a negative peak 
occurring within 100 ms after an erroneous response. The amplitude of the ERN is 
sensitive to the significance of errors. Hajcak et al. (2005) showed, for example, that 
ERN amplitude was greater on error trials when fast and accurate responses were 
associated with a large reward, and when participants’ performance was being 
evaluated by a research assistant. In the current study, we hypothesize that subjects 
will be more motivated to prevent errors in the morality condition than in the 
competence condition, because the former might be viewed as a sign of immoral 
behavior, which is seen as more diagnostic for people’s impression formation than 
incompetent behavior (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). We therefore predict that 
erroneous responses will be associated with larger ERN modulations in the 
morality than in the competence condition. 
We conducted two studies to test these predictions. In Study 2.1, we 
examined our hypothesis that social bias in the IAT is reduced when the test is said 
to measure participants’ morality as opposed to their competence. In Study 2.2, we 
examined the cognitive processes associated with this reduced bias, as manifested 

















Sixty-six non-Muslim students from Leiden University (24 males, Mage = 20.2 
years, SD = 1.8) participated in this study for money or course credits. 
Procedure. 
After providing written informed consent, participants performed five blocks 
of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998). Stimuli representing the target concepts 
consisted of 10 pictures of women without a headscarf (i.e., ingroup pictures) and 
10 pictures of women with a headscarf (i.e., outgroup pictures; for details 
concerning the pretest of these stimuli, see Appendix A). Stimuli that represented 
positive and negative attributes consisted of 5 pictures of positive scenes, and 5 
pictures of negative scenes, selected from the International Affective Picture 
System (Lang et al., 2005). The stimuli were selected based on the scores for 
pleasure (i.e., negative pictures with scores < 4 and positive pictures with scores > 
7). 
In a block of congruent trials, ingroup pictures shared the same response key 
as positive pictures and outgroup pictures the same response key as negative 
pictures. In a block of incongruent trials, this was the case for ingroup and negative 
pictures, and outgroup and positive pictures. The order of the congruent and 
incongruent blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Training blocks (IAT 
steps 1, 2 and 4) consisted of 26 trials, test blocks (steps 3 and 5) of 156 trials each. 
Every trial started with a fixation point (with a duration that varied between 500-
1500 ms), followed by stimulus presentation (680 ms), and a feedback screen (500 
ms). This screen indicated whether participants’ response was correct (i.e., green 
check mark), incorrect (i.e., red cross), or “too late”. Participants could not correct 
their incorrect responses. 
Morality vs. competence task instruction. Participants were randomly 
assigned to an instruction condition. In the morality condition, participants read 
that the test would indicate their values concerning equal treatment of different 
people. In the competence condition, participants read that the test would indicate 














see Appendix A). All participants were instructed to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible. The test implications were repeated before the start of each 
test block. 
Checks. To check that the perceived validity of the IAT did not differ 
between the conditions, we asked participants after they finished the test to 
respond to the statement: “My test score can assess what kind of person I am”. 
Furthermore, two items measured participants’ task engagement: “I think it is 
important to perform well on this test” and “It does not matter to me what my test 
score is” [reverse coded], (r = .62, p < .001). Participants could respond to each 
statement on a 7-point scale ranging from “completely disagree” (1) to “completely 
agree” (7). The experiment took approximately one hour after which participants 
were debriefed and thanked. 
The IAT effect.  
The dependent measure was the IAT effect, indicated by the D score. Based 
on the scoring algorithm described by Greenwald et al. (2003), this was calculated 
as the difference in reaction times on incongruent and congruent trials divided by a 
pooled SD of all correct trials. We included all trials, replaced error latencies with a 
replacement value (M + 2 SDcorrect) and replaced latencies exceeding the maximum 
response time with the maximum response time of 680 ms. 
Results and Discussion 
Checks.  
As intended, participants in the morality and competence condition did not 
think differently about the perceived validity of the test; M(morality) = 3.12, SD = 
1.65; M(competence) = 3.24, SD = 1.60; F(1,64) < 1. Neither did they differ in 
their self-reported task engagement: M(morality) = 4.14, SD = 1.00; 
M(competence) = 4.24, SD = 1.16; F(1,64) < 1.  
IAT effect.  
Participants showed the standard IAT effect: A negative implicit bias towards 
the outgroup (i.e., women with a headscarf); t(65) = 4.72, p < .001. However, this 
bias was stronger in the competence condition; t(32) = 5.40, p < .001, than in the 
morality condition; t(32) = 1.77, p = .09. More importantly, an ANOVA predicting 













bias was reduced in the morality, compared to the competence condition; 
M(morality) = 0.13, SD = 0.43; M(competence) = 0.34, SD = 0.36; F(1,62) = 4.56, 
p = .04, η2 = .07. The reduced IAT effect was caused by a smaller difference 
between response times on incongruent and congruent trials in the morality 
condition: Consistent with previous research (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005), 
participants in the morality condition responded somewhat more slowly on 
congruent correct trials than participants in the competence condition; F(1,64) = 
3.24, p = .08 (see Figure 2.1)1. The percentages of errors did not differ between 
conditions; M(morality) = 8.81, SD = 6.03; M(competence) = 7.73, SD = 4.98; 
F(1,64) < 1. These behavioral results confirmed our hypothesis that task 
performance is adjusted when morality is made salient. To test which cognitive 
processes were modulated to produce the corresponding reduction in IAT score, 
we conducted Study 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Reaction times (in milliseconds) on correct congruent and incongruent trials 
(A) and the IAT effect, in which error and missed trials are included after they are given a 
replacement value (D score; Figure B). Note that the reaction times on incongruent trials 
are quite fast relative to other IAT studies. This is caused by the limited the presentation 
time of the stimuli (i.e., participants had to respond within 680ms). 
 
 
                                                 
1 We did not find decreased response times on incongruent trials (which could be 
expected based on conflict monitoring theory; e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001) because 

















Forty-four, healthy, right-handed, non-Muslim students from Leiden 
University (5 males, Mage = 20.4, SD = 4.3) provided written informed consent and 
participated in this study for money or course credits. One participant (morality 
condition) was excluded from the study due to an outlying IAT score; two 
participants (morality condition) had to be excluded from EEG analyses because of 
technical problems. Two more participants (one in each condition) were excluded 
from statistical analyses of the ERN because they did not make enough errors to 
reliably quantify this component (< 15). 
Procedure. 
Participants performed the IAT as described in Study 2.1, with the following 
modifications: We inserted a blank screen after the stimulus presentation to ensure 
that the ERN modulation occurred before the feedback. Each trial thus consisted 
of a fixation point (500 ms), a stimulus (680 ms), a blank screen (500 ms), and a 
feedback screen (750 ms). We also increased the number of congruent and 
incongruent trials from 156 to 300 to enhance the possibility that participants made 
enough errors to compute a reliable average ERN.  
Participants’ task engagement was measured with the items from Study 2.1  
(r = .59, p < .001), and we checked whether participants in the morality condition 
were – as intended – more concerned about the social implications of their 
performance than participants in the competence condition (i.e., “I am concerned 
about the impression people might get of me, if they know how I performed on 
this test”). Moreover, we assessed the internal motivation to respond without 
prejudice (IMS) scale developed by Plant and Devine (1998; 5 items, α = .73; e.g., 
”I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward women who wear a headscarf 
because it is personally important to me”; 7-point scale 1 “completely disagree” -7 
“completely agree”). Previous research has shown that this internal motivation 
influences people’s ability to regulate biased behavior by conflict-monitoring 
processes associated with the ERN (Amodio et al., 2008). Thus, to test our 













compared to the competence condition, we controlled for individual differences in 
IMS. The total experiment lasted 90 minutes, after which participants were 
debriefed and thanked. 
EEG acquisition. 
The EEG was recorded from 19 Ag/AgCl scalp electrodes, and from the left 
and right mastoids, using a 19-channel Biosemi active-electrode recording system 
(sampling rate 256 Hz). To assess horizontal and vertical eye movements, 
electrodes were placed on the outer canthi of the left and right eyes and 
approximately 1 cm above and below the right eye. EEG activity was recorded 
using ActiView software, offline data analyses were performed using Brain Vision 
Analyzer (BVA), and the experiment was controlled by E-prime (v 2.0). The EEG 
signal was referenced off-line to the average mastoid signal, corrected for ocular 
and eye-blink artifacts using the method of Gratton et al. (1983), and filtered (1-15 
Hz). Single-trial stimulus-locked and response-locked epochs were extracted, 
ranging from -300 ms to 1000 ms after the event. These epochs were subjected to 
artifact rejection, then averaged and baseline-corrected by subtracting the average 
signal value between 200-0 ms pre-stimulus or between 300-50 ms prior to the 
response. Separate stimulus-locked ERP epochs were created for correct trials with 
outgroup and ingroup pictures, separately for the congruent and incongruent 
blocks. Separate response-locked ERP epochs were created for correct and 
incorrect responses. In an initial analysis, we found no effect of congruency on the 
ERN. Because participants made few errors on congruent trials, we pooled the 
congruent and incongruent trials to increase the number of trials averaged for each 
participant and thus the number of participants included in the ERN analysis. 
ERP analyses.  
Visual inspection of the data indicated that the N1, P150, N2, and N450 
potentials were most evident at the midline electrode sites Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, and 
Pz. These ERP components were quantified as the maximum peak amplitude 
within a time window (N1, 90-110 ms; P150, 100-250 ms; N2, 200-300 ms; N450 
325-500 ms). To test the main effects of social categorization and conflict 














(picture type: ingroup/outgroup pictures) x 2 (congruency: congruent/incongruent 
trials) mixed-model ANOVA.  
Visual inspection indicated that the error-related negativity (ERN) was largest 
at electrodes Fz, FCz, and Cz. To quantify the ERN, we determined the maximal 
(peak) amplitude of the signal between -50 and 150 ms around the response, 
separately for correct and incorrect trials. All peak amplitudes were submitted to a 3 
(electrode site) x 2 (accuracy: correct/error) mixed-model ANOVA. 
Because modulations of the task effects by the instruction manipulation were 
subtle, subsequent analyses focused on the electrode at which the interaction was 
most pronounced. The resulting peak-amplitude values were submitted to a mixed-
model ANOVA with instruction condition as between-subjects variable and the 
relevant task factors as within-subject variables. Moreover, to control for individual 
differences in internal motivation to respond without prejudice, we included IMS 
score as a covariate in each analysis2. 
Results and Discussion 
Checks.  
As in Study 2.1, participants in the morality and competence condition did not 
differ in task engagement; M(morality) = 4.84, SD = 0.88; M(competence) = 4.63, 
SD = 0.94; F(1,41) < 1. Nor did they differ in their internal motivation to respond 
without prejudice; M(morality) = 4.89, SD = 0.82; M(competence) = 5.01, SD = 
0.66; F(1,41) < 1. As expected, participants in the morality condition did report to 
be more concerned about the social implications of their performance than 
participants in the competence condition; M(morality) = 3.18, SD = 1.68; 
M(competence) = 1.91, SD = 1.02; F(1,41) = 8.34, p = .006, η2 = .17. 
Behavioral results.  
Overall, participants showed the standard IAT effect (i.e., a negative implicit 
bias towards women with a headscarf); t(42) = 5.04, p < .001. Moreover, this bias 
was evident in both conditions; morality t(20) = 2.52, p = .02; competence t(21) = 
4.68, p < .001. More importantly, an ANOVA with the D score based on the first 
156 trials in each block as dependent variable, the instruction condition and the 
                                                 
2 Inclusion of the IMS score only changed the results concerning the ERN, as is 













order of test blocks as independent variables, and IMS as covariate revealed a 
difference in the IAT effect between the instruction conditions: As in Study 2.1, the 
effect was smaller for participants in the morality condition than for participants in 
the competence condition; M(morality) = 0.13, SD = 0.40; M(competence) = 0.42, 
SD = 0.36; F(1,39) = 5.86, p = .02, η2 =.13. As can be seen in Figure 2.2, this effect 
was caused by a smaller difference between response times on incongruent and 
congruent trials in the morality condition than in the competence condition. More 
specifically, (and similar to Study 2.1), participants in the morality condition 
responded somewhat more slowly on congruent trials than participants in the 
competence condition; F(1,41) = 3.06, p = .09. The percentages of errors did not 
differ between conditions; M(morality) = 12.36, SD = 7.13; M(competence) = 
14.25, SD = 9.80; F(1,41) < 1. When we included all trials from each test block (a 
doubling of trials was needed for computing ERPs), the effect of condition was 
marginally significant; M(morality) = 0.15, SD = 0.27; M(competence) = 0.29, SD 
= 0.29; F(1,39) = 3.05, p = .09. This was caused by a training effect: Participants in 
both conditions responded faster and made fewer errors on the last 144 trials of 
each test block, resulting in a similar IAT performance. Although both analyses 
showed a main effect of the order of test blocks (respectively F[1,39] = 23.28, p < 
.001 and F[1,39] = 35.73, p < .001), this factor did not interact with instruction 
condition (F’s < 1). 
ERP results. 
Social categorization. 
N1. We found the intended main effects of social categorization: The N1 was 
larger for outgroup pictures (M = -5.58 µV, S.E. = 0.32) than for ingroup pictures 
(M = -5.26 µV, S.E. = 0.30); F(1,38) = 6.86, p = .012, η2 = .15. Analyses for the 
FCz electrode confirmed the predicted interaction between instruction condition 
and picture type; F(1,38) = 4.11, p = .050, η2 = .10 (see Figure 2.3). The difference 
between the N1 elicited by outgroup and ingroup pictures was significant in the 
morality condition (F[1,38] = 4.69, p = .04, η2 = .11), but not in the competence 


















Figure 2.2. Reaction times (in milliseconds) on correct congruent and incongruent trials 
(A) and the IAT effect in which error and missed trials are included after they are given a 
replacement value (D score; Figure B). Note that the reaction times on incongruent trials 
are quite fast relative to other IAT studies. This is caused by the limited presentation time 
of the stimuli (i.e., participants had to respond within 680ms). 
 
 
P150. As anticipated, the P150 was larger for outgroup pictures (M = 5.22 µV, 
S.E. = 0.52) than for ingroup pictures (M = 4.23 µV, S.E. = 0.52); F(1,38) = 39.95, 
p < .001, η2 = .51. Analyses at Cz showed that, as predicted, there was an 
interaction effect between instruction condition and picture type; F(1,38) = 5.12, p 
= .029, η2 = .12 (see Figure 2.3). The difference in P150 amplitude between 
outgroup and ingroup pictures was more pronounced in the morality condition 
(F[1,38] = 33.75; p < .001, η2 = .47), than in the competence condition (F[1,38]= 
8.51, p = .006, η2 = .18). 
N2. The N2 was, as intended, larger for ingroup pictures (M = -5.52 µV, S.E. 
= 0.50) than for outgroup pictures (M = -4.99 µV, S.E. = 0.47); F(1,38) = 6.93, p = 
.012, η2 = .15. However, there was no interaction between picture type and 
instruction condition; F(1,38) = 1.08, p = .31. 
Conflict- and error monitoring.  
N450. Overall, the N450 was larger for incongruent trials (M = -2.22 µV, S.E. 













.001, η2 = 0.24. Analyses for the CPz electrode confirmed our prediction: 
Instruction condition interacted with congruency; F(1,38) = 4.79, p = .035, η2 = 
0.11 (see Figure 2.4). The difference in N450 amplitude between incongruent and 
congruent trials was significant in the morality condition (F[1,38] = 16.12, p < .001, 
η2 = .30), but not in the competence condition (F[1,38] = 1.20, p = .28).  
ERN. As anticipated, the ERN was larger for error trials (M = -6.83 µV, S.E. 
= 0.77) than for correct trials (M = 1.00 µV, S.E. = 0.53); F(1,36) = 129.08, p < 
.001, η2 = 0.78. Moreover, accuracy interacted with IMS score; F(1,36) = 4.03, p = 
.05, η2 = .10: A higher internal motivation to respond without prejudice was 
associated with larger ERN modulations (B = -1.46, p = .09; see also Amodio et al., 
2008). However, more relevant to our current predictions, analyses at Cz showed a 
marginally significant interaction between accuracy and instruction condition; 
F(1,36) = 3.49, p = .070, η2 = .09 (see Figure 2.5)3. The difference in ERN 
amplitude between error and correct trials was somewhat larger in the morality 
condition (M = -11.22 µV, S.E. = 1.17; F[1,36] = 94.17, p < .001, η2 = .72) than in 
the competence condition (M = -8.38 µV, S.E. = 1.08; F[1,36] = 59.74, p < .001, η2 
= .62).  
The ERP results are consistent with our expectations that stressing moral 
implications of the IAT increases social categorization of stimuli and conflict 
monitoring during the test. More specifically, the emphasis on morality moderates 
the attention towards outgroup but not ingroup faces (as indexed by increased N1 
and P150, but not N2 modulations), and increases the neural response to response 
conflict and errors in the IAT (as reflected in increased N450 and ERN 
modulations), suggesting that erroneous responses were perceived as more 
significant in the morality than in the competence condition. 
 
                                                 
3 The analysis without IMS as a covariate revealed the same pattern of moderation, but 
resulted in a non-significant interaction; F(1,37) = 2.57, p = .12. Moreover, as was put 
forward by an anonymous reviewer, the ERN results were sensitive to changes in the 
EEG processing settings. For example, shortening the baseline correction period (from 
300-50 ms to 200-50 ms prior to the response) reduced the interaction effect between the 
ERN modulation and instruction; F(1,36) = 2.72, p = .11, η2 = 07; whereas lowering the 
cutoff score for the high-pass filter (from 1 to 0.1 Hz) made this interaction significant; 
















Figure 2.3. The N1, P150 and N2 modulations for pictures of women with and without a 
headscarf at three central electrodes. The interaction with instruction condition was 
significant at FCz for the N1, and at Cz for the P150. The interaction did not reach 


















Figure 2.4. The N450 modulations for incongruent and congruent trials at three central 

















Figure 2.5. The ERN modulations for correct and incorrect trials at three central 














Previous research has shown that morality is more important than 
competence for people’s personal and social identity (e.g., Leach et al., 2007), and 
that morality guides explicit strategic behavior (Ellemers et al., 2008). The present 
studies extend prior research by showing that morality also impacts on non-explicit 
aspects of task behavior: People inhibited their negative bias towards Muslim 
women on an IAT when the test was said to be indicative of their morality (instead 
of their competence). Our findings thus reveal that participants are able to reduce 
their implicit bias when given the opportunity to reveal their moral side. This 
complements prior observations that implicit bias is exacerbated when participants 
are identified as potential racists (Frantz et al., 2004), and is consistent with 
research showing that moral appeals induce different physiological and behavioral 
responses, depending on whether these are framed as ideals or as obligations (Does 
et al. 2011; 2012). 
Importantly, the current research provides insight into the neurobiological 
mechanisms underlying the differential performance on the moral and competence 
IAT. Previous research has shown that performance on tasks designed to measure 
implicit attitudes are associated with (increased) motivated perception (Amodio, 
2010) and response monitoring (Amodio, et al., 2008). Additionally, this study 
reveals that these cognitive processes are activated or enhanced when people’s 
morality is emphasized. More specifically, when morality is emphasized as opposed 
to competence, people engage in increased social categorization of outgroup faces, 
and in enhanced conflict- and response monitoring. Because these processes have 
previously been associated with motivational states (e.g., Amodio, 2010; Hajcak et 
al., 2005) and because morality has been shown to be more important than 
competence for impression formation and -management, we interpret these 
findings as indicating increased motivation of participants in the morality condition 
to control their bias on the IAT.  
The findings concerning increased conflict- and error monitoring during a 
moral IAT also extend research showing that low levels of implicit bias (often 
revealed by people with high internal and low external motivation to avoid 














Gonsalkorale et al., 2011). The current results additionally indicate that, regardless 
of individual differences in internal motivation to respond without prejudice, 
emphasizing moral values successfully reduces displays of implicit bias. Moreover, 
our results indicate that emphasizing morality affects not only corrective processes 
like error monitoring, but affects performance through processes involved in the 
attention to social stimuli before responses are given.  
Although the current research broadens the knowledge of the importance of 
morality for people’s self-identity, we also mentioned that morality is more 
important than competence for people’s social identity, and their behavior in groups 
(Ellemers, et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2007). The question thus remains whether our 
findings would be affected by for example social evaluation. Further research could 
address this question by examining whether the emphasis on morality influences 
people’s task performance in the presence of other people and whether this differs 
between evaluations of ingroup compared to outgroup members. 
Conclusion 
Our findings extend previous research that demonstrates the importance of 
morality over competence for people’s self-view. In particular, our findings show 
that people control their implicit responses during a moral task, and reveal how 
they do that: Emphasizing morality facilitates people’s task performance by 
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Emphasizing moral task implications 
influences visual attention: 
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Morality, having the knowledge of and behaving according to what is right and 
wrong, is seen as key to human social life: It is one of the hallmarks of society since 
it is the basis for people’s individual choices, their social interactions and group 
functioning. To gain understanding of how (im)moral behavior is initiated, much 
research has focused on the development of people’s individual level of rational 
decision making: Knowing what is and what is not moral and considering what 
would be the best thing to do in particular situations. Using neuroscientific research 
methods, researchers have been able to reveal the neural networks involved in such 
moral cognition. Specifically, participants in those studies are often asked to take 
the observers perspective and judge the (im)moral content of phrases or pictures 
(e.g., Cope et al., 2010), to decide on different moral dilemmas (e.g., Christensen & 
Gomila, 2012), or to imagine behaving in line with or opposed to moral norms 
(e.g., Decety & Porges, 2011). However, as Casebeer (2003) noted, thinking about 
(doing) moral things is different from actually doing moral things –and imagined 
compared to real moral decision making is even associated with different neural 
networks (FeldmanHall et al., 2012). In the current research, we therefore aimed to 
extend previous research on moral cognition by examining how people’s 
motivation to behave morally affects their actual performance on a task said to be 
indicative of their moral values. Moreover, we investigated how such moral 
motivation affects the cognitive processes involved in this task performance. 
In neuroscientific research on moral psychology the social significance of 
morality is often underemphasized or even excluded (Casebeer, 2003). 
Nevertheless, moral choices and behaviors are inherently social: They often imply 
taking care of others or treating others well. In fact, some analyses consider 
morality and sociability as representing one evaluative domain, although they 
encompass different characteristics and behaviors (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 
2007). Indeed, judging other people’s moral integrity and trustworthiness is 
important in social interactions (e.g., Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 
2011; Delgado, Frank, Phelps, 2005). Moreover, being perceived as a moral person 
is important for one’s social identity: People experience pride in being a member of 
a group with high morality (Leach et al., 2007), and they indicate a willingness to 














expect to receive respect from their fellow group members in this way (Pagliaro, 
Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011). Being moral thus encompasses more than 
intrapsychological processes associated with cold moral reasoning. Even when we 
know the moral thing to do and certain brain regions may be associated with 
coming to that decision, it is not self-evident that such mechanisms are also 
associated with actual behavior. It is therefore important, in addition to the 
investigation of moral cognition, to increase our understanding of the neural 
processes involved in the motivation to display moral behavior.  
Prejudice Control as an Indicator of Moral Behavior  
As mentioned above, being moral often has social implications: Defining what 
is right or wrong may depend on what others value as the moral thing to do and on 
how others are affected by our actions. In the current research, we examine moral 
behavior in the context of intergroup relations and prejudice: Fairness towards and 
the equal treatment of different groups in society are seen as core moral values. 
There thus tends to be a general motivation to be or to appear unprejudiced. 
Because of those moral and social implications, prejudice is often measured on an 
implicit level, for instance with an implicit association test (IAT). The IAT 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) was first designed to assess people’s 
positive versus negative associations with particular social groups: Their implicit 
social bias. Stimuli in this reaction time test consist of target concepts –representing 
members of social groups, such as faces of Black and White men, or Muslim and 
non-Muslim women– and positive and negative attributes. On prejudice-congruent 
trials, participants are asked to categorize the stimuli representing their own (in-
)group using the same response key as positive attributes, and stimuli representing 
another (out-)group and negative attributes with another key. On prejudice-
incongruent trials they are asked to categorize stimuli representing their ingroup 
and negative attributes with the same key, as well as stimuli representing the 
outgroup and positive stimuli. To the extent that people are more inclined to 
associate their ingroup with positivity and the outgroup with negativity, they should 
respond more quickly and easily to the congruent as compared to the incongruent 
trials. The IAT assesses this difference in response latencies on incongruent 












Recent research has revealed that people are able to influence their 
performance on an IAT if they are motivated to do so. For instance, Fiedler and 
Bluemke (2005) have shown that participants can reduce their negative bias when 
they are aware of how the IAT bias is computed and when they are encouraged to 
find out effective strategies to adjust their performance. Moreover, Van Nunspeet, 
Ellemers, Derks, and Nieuwenhuis (2014) showed that people’s motivation to 
control prejudice was higher when the moral implications of the IAT were 
emphasized, resulting in a weaker bias against Muslim women.  
In the current research, we will adopt the same paradigm as used by Van 
Nunspeet et al. (2014) to create circumstances that amplify the motivation to 
behave morally (i.e., to control expressions of implicit bias). In addition, we use 
functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine the neural processes underlying 
such moral behavior.  
Neural Correlates of Social Bias Control 
In their study, Van Nunspeet et al. (2014) measured brain activation with an 
electroencephalogram (EEG) to examine the cognitive processes underlying moral 
IAT performance. Their results revealed that participants who had been reminded 
of the moral implications of the IAT (as compared to a control condition) showed 
increased perceptual attention to the different types of targets in the IAT (both in 
terms of group membership and individuating facial features, as indicated by 
increased N1 and P150 modulations in response to viewing the pictures of 
outgroup and ingroup targets; Van Nunspeet et al., 2014). The present study aims 
to further examine these processes using fMRI, by examining how the motivation 
to perform in line with one’s moral values affects patterns of brain activation 
associated with performance on an IAT. 
In fMRI research, face perception is often located in the inferior part of the 
occipital lobe. More specifically, within the inferior occipital gyrus (also called the 
occipital face area, OFA; for a review see Pitcher, Walsh, & Duchaine, 2011) and 
the fusiform gyrus (FG; but see Haxby, Hoffamn, & Gobbini, 2000; and Ishai, 
2008, for more complete overviews of the cortical network involved in face 
processing). Activation in the OFA is associated with facial recognition (i.e., the 














perception (Pitcher et al., 2011). In contrast, activation in the FG is associated with 
the subsequent and deeper processing of higher-level facial features. For example, 
activation in the FG is greater when people view ingroup compared to outgroup 
members (e.g., Kubota, Banaji, & Phelps, 2012; Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 
2011). Since previous research revealed that when the moral implications of the 
IAT are emphasized, perceptual attention towards and social categorization of 
ingroup and outgroup faces is increased (Van Nunspeet et al., 2014), we 
hypothesized that participants who performed the moral (as compared to the 
control) IAT in the current research would show increased activation in the FG 
when viewing ingroup as compared to outgroup targets. Moreover, since the 
process of social categorization was found in early event-related brain potentials 
(i.e., around 100 and 150ms after stimulus-onset), we also wanted to examine 
whether we could find any evidence for increased social categorization of ingroup 
and outgroup targets in the OFA given its association with early facial processing. 
Another finding in the EEG study was that the inhibition of social bias on the 
IAT was associated with increased modulations of the error-related negativity 
(ERN; Van Nunspeet et al., 2014). The ERN is associated with response-
monitoring (e.g., Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993; Nieuwenhuis, 
Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001) and the significance of making errors (Hajcak, Moser, 
Yeung, & Simons, 2005). Specifically, results of the research of Van Nunspeet et al. 
(2014) showed that conflict- and error-monitoring was enhanced for participants to 
whom the moral implications of the IAT were emphasized, indicating the increased 
significance of making errors on a task indicative of their moral values.  
The conflict- and response monitoring processes found by Van Nunspeet et 
al. (2014) are in line with patterns of brain activation found in fMRI studies on 
social bias: In studies using the IAT, brain activation associated with performance 
on incongruent IAT trials is contrasted to brain activation associated with 
performance on congruent IAT trials. Results reveal that performance on the 
incongruent compared to congruent trials is associated with increased activation in 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; e.g., 
Chee, Sriram, Soon, & Lee, 2000; Stanley, Phelps, & Banaji, 2008). These brain 












(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & 
Carter, 2000) and specifically, in the area of prejudice, considered as regulating 
(implicit) bias (Stanley et al., 2008). In the current research, we aim to extend the 
findings of Van Nunspeet et al. (2014), namely that participants tend to be highly 
vigilant while performing an IAT framed as a measure of their morality –as 
compared to a control condition in which the IAT is framed as a measure of their 
competence. Accordingly, we examined whether the motivation to perform in line 
with moral values affected brain activation in regions associated with cognitive 
control when participants perform incongruent versus congruent IAT trials.  
Triangulation 
Whereas cognitive processes associated with people’s concerns to behave in 
line with their moral (e.g., egalitarian) values have been revealed in previous EEG 
research, our current goal is to expand these insights using fMRI. Both 
methodologies have their advantages: EEG has a high temporal resolution, making 
it is possible to examine the onset and time course of different cognitive processes, 
including very early and immediate responses. In addition, fMRI has a high spatial 
resolution which gives us the opportunity to locate the brain regions involved in 
moral task performance. Thus, whereas previous research has revealed that 
perceptual attention to different types of faces is increased (as seen in the N1 and 
P150 potentials, measured at the frontocentral sites of the scalp; Van Nunspeet et 
al., 2014), the current research will examine whether this is also evident in patterns 
of brain activation in the visual cortex. Moreover, we can investigate whether the 
enhanced error-detection and conflict-monitoring processes found in EEG 
research are also evident in brain areas associated with cognitive control. By using 
such a triangular approach (i.e., combining insights from behavioral, EEG and 
fMRI research) we will get a better understanding of people’s motivation to be 
moral, in addition to our knowledge of brain processes and networks involved and 

















Twenty-six, non-Muslim, right-handed students from Leiden University 
participated in the study. None of the participants reported a history of psychiatric 
or neurological disorders, or current use of any medications. One participant was 
excluded from the data because of a software failure during the scanning session; 
two other participants were excluded from the fMRI data analyses because of 
technical problems. The remaining twenty-three participants (8 males, Mage = 21.0 
years, SD = 4.9) were randomly divided across the two conditions of the between-
participants design (i.e., the morality [N = 11] or control [N = 12] task domain). All 
procedures were approved by the medical ethical committee of the Leiden 
University Medical Center (LUMC) and all participants gave informed consent for 
the study.  
Morality Framing of the IAT  
While in the scanner, before the start of the IAT, half of the participants read 
that the computer task they were going to perform could indicate their 
endorsement of moral values concerning egalitarianism and discrimination (the 
morality condition). The other half of the participants was informed that the test 
could indicate their ability to process new information and to learn new tasks (the 
control condition). All participants were instructed to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible. They were reminded about the test implications before the 
start of each test run (i.e., runs 3 and 5; see also Van Nunspeet et al., 2014). 
Instruments and Procedure  
Participants performed the five steps (blocks) of the IAT as designed by 
Greenwald et al., (1998). We used an event-related block design: Each scanning run 
consisted of one IAT block, but each stimulus was preceded by a fixation cross 
creating a jittered interstimulus interval (min. = 1100 ms, max. = 6600 ms) in order 
to model the hemodynamic response function for each stimulus type. After the 
fixation cross, the stimulus was presented (with a maximum duration of 680 ms in 
which participants were asked to respond [e.g., Beer et al., 2008]; more details 












the reaction time on the stimulus; see Figure 3.1). The feedback screen consisted of 
a green checkmark (i.e., correct response), a red cross (i.e., incorrect response), or 
the words “too late” when the participant did not press a key on time. Only trials 
on which participants responded correctly and on time were analyzed.  
 
Figure 3.1. Example of an IAT trial. RT = reaction time.  
 
 
In run 1, stimuli consisted of 10 faces of Muslim women (wearing a headscarf; 
outgroup pictures) and 10 faces of non-Muslim women (not wearing a headscarf; 
ingroup pictures) which participants were asked to categorize using a right (index 
finger) or left (index finger) response key. In run two, stimuli consisted of 5 
pictures of positive scenes, and 5 pictures of negative scenes (International 
Affective Picture System; Lang et al., 2005). In run three, both picture types were 
presented and participants responded either with one key to outgroup pictures and 
negative scenes and with the other key to ingroup pictures and positive scenes (i.e., 
congruent trials). Or they responded with one key to outgroup pictures and 














incongruent trials). Run four was similar to run one except for the fact that the 
response keys for the ingroup and outgroup pictures were switched. Finally, run 
five was similar to run three: Both ingroup/outgroup pictures and pictures of 
positive/negative scenes were presented. However, when congruent trials (i.e., 
‘ingroup + positivity’ and ‘outgroup + negativity) were presented in run3, then run 
5 consisted of incongruent trials (i.e., ‘outgroup + positivity’ and ‘ingroup + 
negativity’), and vice versa. The order of the runs was thus counterbalanced 
between participants. Training runs 1, 2, and 4 consisted of 20 trials each and lasted 
approximately two minutes. Testing runs 3 and 5 consisted of 120 trials each and 
lasted approximately six minutes. All IAT instructions were presented on the 
screen in the scanner bore before the start of each run. Since the experiment was 
part of a larger study, participants spent approximately 2 hours in the laboratory, 
and received 20 euros as a compensation for their participation. 
fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis  
Scanning was performed at the Leiden University Medical Centre (LUMC) 
with a standard whole-head coil on a 3.0 Tesla Philips Achieva scanner. Using E-
prime 1.0 software, the IAT was projected onto a screen at the back of the scanner 
bore, which participants could view via a window attached to the top of the head 
coil. Participants could respond by pressing keys on boxes attached to their legs. 
The IAT consisted of five event-related runs, of which we only analyzed test runs 3 
and 5 (consisting of congruent and incongruent trials). Functional data were 
obtained using T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging ([EPI], repetition time (TR) = 
2200 ms, echo time (TE) = 30 ms, slice matrix = 80 x 80, slice thickness = 2.75 
mm, slice gap = 0.28 mm, field of view [FOV] = 220 mm). A high-resolution 3D 
T1-weighted anatomical image (TR = 9.751 ms, TE = 4.59 ms, flip angle = 8°, 140 
slices, 0.875 mm x 0.875 mm x 1.2 mm, and FOV = 224.000 x 168.000 x 177.333) 
was collected at the end of the scanning session.  
Data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM8 software (Welcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London) implemented in MATLAB 
(Mathworks, Sherborn, MA). The functional time series were realigned to 
compensate for small head movements. Translational movement parameters never 












volumes were spatially normalized to EPI templates. The normalization algorithm 
used a 12 parameter affine transformation together with a nonlinear transformation 
involving cosine basis functions and resampled the volumes to 3 mm cubic voxels. 
Functional volumes were spatially smoothed using an 8 mm full-width half-
maximum Gaussian kernel. Templates were based on the MNI305 stereotaxic 
space (Cocosco, Kollokian, Kwan, Pike, & Evans, 1997), and the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) atlas was used to refer to the coordinates. 
To analyze the data, a canonical hemodynamic response function was 
convolved at the onset of the stimulus and modeled as a zero-duration event. We 
distinguished between eight different types of stimuli: The IAT consisted of 
pictures of ingroup targets, outgroup targets, positive scenes, and negative scenes. 
Moreover, these stimuli were presented in a congruent as well as an incongruent 
run. Invalid trials were included in the model as a regressor of no interest. Two 
main contrast analyses were distinguished: To examine brain activation associated 
with visual perception of ingroup and outgroup targets, we investigated a contrast 
of viewing faces of non-Muslim women versus Muslim women, collapsed over the 
two IAT test runs (i.e., congruent/incongruent ingroup targets and 
congruent/incongruent outgroup targets, measured within participants). Moreover, 
to test whether this activation interacted with the emphasis on the moral 
implications of the task (measured between participants), we conducted a 2 
(ingroup/outgroup targets) X 2 (morality/control) full factorial ANOVA.  
To examine activity associated with the IAT effect (measured within 
participants), brain activation for the incongruent IAT run (for all ingroup / 
outgroup / positive / negative pictures) was compared to brain activation during 
the congruent IAT run (also for all ingroup / outgroup / positive / negative 
pictures). Moreover, to test whether the activation associated with the IAT effect 
interacted with the emphasis on the moral compared to the competence 
implications of the task (measured between participants), we conducted a 2 
(incongruent/congruent) X 2 (morality / control) full factorial ANOVA. 
The analyses were carried out using the general linear model in SPM8. For 
each individual, contrast parameter images were computed and the resulting 














least 10 continuous voxels that exceeded a False Discovery Rate (FDR) corrected 
threshold of p < .05 are reported. 
Moreover, since we were interested in the –perhaps quite subtle– difference 
between the emphasis on the moral compared to the competence implications of 
the task, we also extracted parameter estimates from the regions of interest (ROI) 
that were identified in the whole brain analyses to explore the pattern of the 
activation across our conditions. These regions were extracted using the Marsbar 
toolbox (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) for SPM8. 
Results 
Behavioral Results 
The IAT effect is indicated by the D score, and measured as the difference in 
reaction times on incongruent and congruent trials divided by a pooled SD of all 
correct trials (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). We included all trials, replaced 
error latencies with a replacement value (M + 2 SDcorrect; Greenwald et al., 2003) 
and replaced latencies exceeding the maximum response time with the maximum 
response time of 680 ms. The resulting positive D scores are an indication of 
people’s evaluative bias against the outgroup (i.e., Muslim women).  
To test whether participants showed an IAT effect overall, we conducted a 
one-sample t-test with D score as the dependent variable and a comparison test 
score of zero. As expected, results revealed the standard IAT effect; M = 0.18, SD 
= 0.33, t(24) = 2.66, p = .01, indicating that participants showed bias against 
Muslim women. Subsequently, we tested whether the task domain manipulation 
influenced the IAT effect. Specifically, whether emphasizing the moral implications 
of the IAT caused participants to show a smaller bias against Muslims. However, 
contrary to our hypothesis, an ANOVA with D score as dependent variable and 
task domain and the order of IAT test blocks as independent factors showed no 
main effect of task domain, nor an interaction effect between task domain and 
order; F’s < 1. There was only a main effect of order, F(1,21) = 9.52, p = .006, ηp2 
= .31, indicating that participants who performed the congruent block first showed 
a smaller bias against Muslim women (M = 0.01, SD = 0.22) than participants who 
performed the incongruent block first (M = 0.36, SD = 0.34). Perhaps, this effect is 












response latencies and thus the difference between responses on incongruent and 
congruent trials.   
Even though we observed no differences at the overt behavioral response 
level, it is still of interest to see whether different brain areas are involved in 
displaying these responses dependent on experimental conditions.   
Imaging Results  
Face perception. 
To examine the neural activation associated with viewing faces of outgroup 
members (Muslim women) and ingroup members (non-Muslim women), we first 
conducted a 2 (Target identity: ingroup/outgroup faces) x 2 (Task Domain: 
morality/control) full factorial ANOVA at the whole brain level. Results revealed 
no main effects, nor an interaction. One-sample t-tests –averaged across the task 
domain conditions– showed no significant patterns of activation for the outgroup 
> ingroup targets contrast. However, as expected, the ingroup > outgroup targets 
contrast showed a significant difference in activation in the bilateral fusiform gyrus 
(see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2A), indicating that –in line with previous research (e.g., 
Kubota et al., 2012; Van Bavel et al., 2011)– activation was greater when 
participants viewed faces of ingroup members (non-Muslim women) as compared 
to faces of outgroup members (Muslim women). 
In addition to the whole-brain analyses, we extracted parameter estimates 
from the regions of interest (ROIs) that were identified in the whole brain analyses 
to further examine the patterns of activity between participants in the morality and 
the control condition. Specifically, we localized ROIs in two area’s in the visual 
cortex known to be associated with processing faces: The fusiform gyrus (FG, 
Brodmann area 37) and the occipital face area (OFC, Brodmann area 19). Both 
ROIs were based on the contrast of ‘All faces’ (i.e., congruent/incongruent ingroup 
targets and congruent/incongruent outgroup targets) > ‘fixation’ (FDR corrected p 
< .05, 10 continuous voxels). Within this contrast, we located the FG and OFA 
bilaterally and the peaks of the activation (MNI coordinates FG: +39, -49, -26 and -
36, -43, -26; MNI coordinates OFA: -36, -67, -20 and +42, -64, -23) defined the 
centers of four 10 mm diameter sphere-shaped ROIs (Figure 3.2; see Ratner, Kaul, 














were included as the dependent variable in a 2 (Hemisphere: left/right) x 2 (Target 
identity: ingroup/outgroup faces) x 2 (Congruency: congruent/incongruent) 
repeated measures ANOVA with Task Domain (morality/control) and order of the 
IAT test blocks (congruent/incongruent first) as independent factors. Relevant to 
our interest in face perception, we did not find a main effect of, nor any interaction 
effects with task domain in the FG. Consistent with the whole-brain analysis, only 
the effect of target identity was significant indicating that activation in the FG was 
greater for viewing ingroup compared to outgroup faces, F(1,19) = 7.49, p = .01, ηp2 
= .28.  
Results concerning face perception in the OFA also showed the main effect 
of target identity, F(1,19) = 7.41, p = .01, ηp2 = .28, indicating that activation was 
greater for viewing ingroup as compared to outgroup faces. There was also an 
interaction effect between congruency and order, F(1,19) = 4.29, p = .05, ηp2 = .18: 
For congruent trials, activation in the OFA was greater when the congruent (rather 
than the incongruent) run was presented first, F(1,19) = 10.41, p = .004, ηp2 = .35. 
The other simple main effects were not significant, F’s ≤ 2.39, p’s ≥ .14. 
Additionally and more interestingly, we observed a marginally significant 
interaction effect between target identity, congruency, and task domain, F(1,19) = 
3.56, p = .07, ηp2 = .16. To interpret this complex interaction, we conducted 
separate analyses for the control and morality conditions separately. Results 
revealed that there were no main effects of target identity or congruency, nor an 
interaction effect in the control condition; F’s ≤ 2.39, p’s ≥ .15. However, in the 
morality condition, there was a significant main effect of target identity; F(1,11) = 
13.90, p = .003, ηp2 = .56, indicating greater activation for ingroup compared to 
outgroup targets. There was also a marginally significant main effect of congruency; 
F(1,11) = 4.22, p = .07, ηp2 = .28, showing that activation in the OFA was greater 
on congruent compared to incongruent trials (see Figure 3.3). This findings is 
consistent with previous research, showing that participants adjusted their 
behavioral responses on prejudice-congruent trials when the moral implications of 
the IAT were emphasized (Van Nunspeet et al., 2014). There was no interaction 












IAT effect. To examine the neural correlates of the IAT effect (i.e., bias 
against Muslim women), we examined neural activation associated with 
participants’ performance on congruent versus incongruent trials. We first 
conducted a 2 (Congruency: incongruent/congruent) x 2 (Task Domain: 
morality/control) full factorial ANOVA at the whole brain level. Results revealed 
no significant main effects nor an interaction effect. Additionally, we conducted 
one-sample t-tests, averaged across the task domain conditions. Whole-brain 
contrasts (congruent > incongruent and incongruent > congruent) revealed no 
significant differences. 
In addition to the whole-brain analyses, we again identified ROIs to further 
examine the patterns of activity between participants in the morality and the 
control conditions. Specifically, we localized ROIs based on activation in the 
contrast ‘All stimuli’ (i.e., congruent/incongruent ingroup targets; 
congruent/incongruent outgroup targets; congruent/incongruent positive scenes; 
and congruent/incongruent positive scenes) > ‘fixation’ (FDR corrected p < .05, 10 
continuous voxels). Results of this contrast did not reveal activation in the ACC. 
However, we were able to detect activation within the right DLPFC and the peak 
of this activation (MNI coordinates: +45, +32, +28) defined the center of a 10 mm 
diameter sphere-shaped ROI. Parameter estimates from this ROI were included as 
the dependent variable in a repeated measures ANOVAs with congruency (i.e., 
congruent/incongruent trials, averaged over picture type) as within-participants 
factor and Task Domain (morality/control) and order of the IAT test blocks 
(congruent/incongruent first) as independent factors. Results of this analysis 
showed however no effects of congruency, task domain, or an interaction effect, 




























Figure 3.2. Activation was found in the bilateral fusiform gyrus (FG; Brodmann area 37) 
and occipital face area (OFA; Brodmann area 19) in the faces > fixation contrast (FDR 
corrected p < .01, 20 continuous voxels). Spheres were built around peak voxels at X = 
+39, Y = -49, Z = -26 and X = -36, Y = -43, Z = -26 for the FG (Figure A). And around 




Figure 3.3. Within the ROI of the occipital face area (OFA) there was a significant 
interaction between target identity, congruency and task domain. Within the morality 
condition, activation was greater for viewing ingroup compared to outgroup faces and on 













The goal of the current study was to examine the neural correlates of the 
motivation to behave in line with moral values. Complementing research on moral 
cognition –examining the cognitive processes involved in thinking about morality 
(i.e., moral reasoning and decision making) – we investigated the neural 
underpinnings of people’s behavior on a task said the be indicative of their moral 
values. Specifically, we tested whether and how emphasizing the moral (compared 
to competence) implications of an implicit association test (IAT) would cause 
participants to inhibit their evaluative bias against Muslims. We used fMRI to study 
whether such an emphasis affects activation in brain areas implemented in visual 
attention towards facial stimuli and cognitive control – which would complement 
recent EEG research revealing enhanced perceptual attention and response-
monitoring when the moral implications of an IAT are made salient (Van Nunspeet 
et al., 2014). 
Our results revealed that visual attention towards the different facial stimuli in 
the IAT was dependent upon the emphasis on participants’ morality: Participants in 
this condition showed greater activation in the occipital face area (OFA) when 
viewing ingroup compared to outgroup targets. Additionally, OFA activation was 
somewhat increased on congruent as compared to incongruent trials. These 
findings are consistent with the expectation that emphasizing the moral 
implications of the IAT affects participants’ focus towards stimuli and perhaps 
their approach towards the task. As was shown by Van Nunspeet et al. (2014), 
participants who had read the moral test implications inhibited their responses on 
congruent trials. These are trials in which the easy (automatic) associations between 
Muslims and negative attributes and non-Muslims and positive attributes become 
evident. 
To inhibit these prepotent responses, participants may need to be even more 
focused on the facial stimuli in the congruent compared to the incongruent trials to 
respond in line with their moral values. Furthermore, the fact that there was only a 
(marginally significant) effect of emphasizing moral concerns on initial (i.e., early) 
visual attention to faces and not on later and deeper facial processing in the 














implications is associated with increased social categorization on very early event-
related brain potentials (i.e., the N1 and P150, occurring around 100 and 150ms 




Brain regions revealed by the Ingroup > Outgroup targets contrast. 
Anatomical Region L/R voxels Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
       
Fusiform Gyrus R 3161 4.71 39 -49 -23 
   4.70 36 -43 -23 
   4.17 33 -61 -20 
 L 3161 4.28 -36 -49 -20 
   4.07 -33 -73 -11 
   3.96 -36 -64 -14 
(anterior) Medial Cingulate Cortex R 486 4.42 9 5 34 
   4.17 12 -7 52 
   3.80 30 -25 46 
Supramarginal Gyrus L 160 4.76 -45 -1 10 
   3.31 -33 8 19 
   3.26 -57 2 7 
Temporal Parietal Junction L 141 4.39 -54 -25 22 
   3.56 -42 -22 16 
       
       
MNI coordinates for main effects, peak voxels reported with an FDR-corrected threshold of p < .05, with 
an extent threshold of 10 continuous voxels (voxels size was 3.0 x 3.0 x 3.0 mm). 
 
 
Although visual attention was affected by the emphasis on the moral 
implications of the task, this did not affect participants’ bias against Muslim 
women. This is different from previous studies (e.g., Van Nunspeet et al., 2014; 
Van Nunspeet et al., under review) in which participants who had read the moral test 
implications showed a smaller bias than participants who had read the implications 
concerning their competence. There it was argued that the emphasis on morality 
caused participants to inhibit their prepotent (automatic) prejudiced responses 
which resulted in the increased response times on congruent trials. However, 
compared to the study of Van Nunspeet et al. (2014) in which the interstimulus 












around two seconds. The inhibition of prepotent prejudiced responses may thus 
have occurred previous to stimulus onset or may have been undermined since 
participants had the time to prepare their response on the upcoming trial. In other 
words, the task could have become too easy to reveal implicit bias. Indeed, the 
amount of errors in the current research (4.5%) was only half of the error rates 
(8.3%) in research of Van Nunspeet et al. (2014). This explanation could also 
account for why we did not find greater activation in the neural regions associated 
with the regulation of implicit bias: The relatively easy IAT may have prevented 
participant from worrying about their performance. This is in line with research of 
Bengtsson, Lau, and Passingham (2009) who asked participants to perform either a 
significant (i.e., assessing their intelligence) or an insignificant (pilot test) 
experimental task. Their results revealed no differences in neural activation in 
prefrontal areas between the different types of tasks for correct responses. 
However, they did find that participants who performed the significant (compared 
to the insignificant) task showed increased neural activity on errors (Bengtsson et 
al., 2009). This is somewhat related to the study of van Nunspeet et al. (2014) in 
which it was shown that participants showed increased error-monitoring (i.e., 
greater error-related negativity modulations to incorrect responses) when the moral 
(compared to the competence) implications of the IAT were emphasized. It is 
therefore possible that the difference between the motivation to perform in line 
with moral values as compared to one’s competence is more evident on incorrect 
than correct responses. (Artificially) increasing the amount of errors during such an 
IAT and analyzing these events may thus reveal the differential neural activation we 
were aiming to find in the current research. Moreover, instructing participants to 
“clear their minds” when they see the fixation point may be crucial to overcome 
the effects of the increased ISIs (as was done in research by Beer et al., 2008). That 
is, to prevent participants to prepare their response on the upcoming trial. 
Although we did not find an effect of the task instruction manipulation on the 
behavioral results, participants did show the typical IAT effect: A negative bias 
against Muslims. They responded more slowly on incongruent as compared to 
congruent IAT trials, indicating that associating outgroup members with positivity 














outgroup members with negativity and ingroup members with positivity. However, 
the expected neural activation in regions associated with cognitive conflict and 
control –the ACC and DLPFC– was not evident for the incongruent > congruent 
contrast. It should be noted that not all fMRI studies that used an IAT have found 
these activation patterns. For example, Knutson et al. (2007) neither showed 
significant patterns of activation for incongruent compared to congruent trials 
when analyzing their single IATs (i.e., a gender and race IAT separately). 
Nevertheless, another experimental design (for example, in which IAT test blocks 
are presented repeatedly, alternating between blocks of congruent and incongruent 
trials) may have improved the BOLD response supposedly associated with the task 
demands.  
Another aim of the current research was to extend previous behavioral and 
EEG research on the motivation to display moral behavior, by adding insights 
from an fMRI study revealing the particular brain areas involved in that motivation. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to expand current insights concerning increased 
cognitive control in case of an emphasis on moral concerns. This may have been 
due to the restrictions of the current research design mentioned previously (i.e., 
increased ISIs needed in an event-related fMRI experiment, and analyzing only 
correct responses since errors were too scarce), and illustrates the difficulty of 
optimizing an experimental paradigm for different scientific research methods (see 
also Scheepers, Ellemers, & Derks, 2013). On the other hand, we did find some 
additional support for increased visual attention towards targets when an IAT is 
presented as a measure of individual morality. And it may be the combination of 
such findings from different scientific research methods that can strengthen our 
knowledge of the underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms of moral 
motivation. 
Conclusion 
The current research revealed that when the moral implications of an IAT are 
emphasized, participants show greater activation in the occipital face area when 
they view pictures of ingroup compared to outgroup targets. Moreover, activation 
in this region was greater on (prejudice-) congruent compared to incongruent trials. 
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According to the Oxford dictionary being moral means “holding high principles for 
proper conduct”. But what is considered ‘proper’? Of course, individuals can have 
their own principles of what is good and bad. Nevertheless, the groups to which we 
belong (teams, organizations, or societies), and the group members to whom we 
feel connected, often define relevant standards of morality (see also Ellemers & 
Van den Bos, 2012). Behaving according to those standards is perceived as 
important: People are motivated to adjust their own behavior to moral (compared 
to competence) ingroup norms (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008), as a 
way to earn respect from fellow ingroup members (Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 
2011). Moreover, people identify more strongly with a moral than a competent 
group and are more proud to be a member of that group (Leach, Ellemers, & 
Barreto, 2007). 
People’s willingness to belong to moral groups and their pride in being a 
moral group member, can be explained by Social Identity Theory which proposes 
that people’s self-views depend upon the groups to which they belong (Tajfel, 
1978). Indeed, moral characteristics convey important social information: When 
asked to form an impression about other individuals, people are more inclined to 
gather information concerning morality than concerning competence or sociability 
(Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011). Even when an impression has to 
be made within milliseconds, trustworthiness judgments are made faster than 
judgments of sociability and competence (Willis & Todorov, 2006). Moreover, 
people monitor their own behavior to maintain a moral self-image (Jordan & 
Monin, 2008). Due to the identity-defining function of morality –especially in 
group contexts, being moral is what we consider important in others and ourselves 
(Ellemers & Van den Bos, 2012). 
The motivation to be moral elicits the tendency to adjust one’s behavior to 
moral norms. This is not only evident in self-report measures (Pagliaro et al., 2011). 
For example, Van Nunspeet, Ellemers, Derks and Nieuwenhuis (2014) have shown 
that people adapt their implicit behavior when this is perceived as indicative of 
their morality: During an Implicit Association Test (IAT) participants were more 














the test measured their morality than when they thought the test measured their 
competence. 
The reasoning that the significance of morality derives from its implications 
for people’s social identity, leads to the prediction that the motivation to be moral 
should be particularly relevant in an ingroup context. Thus, we hypothesize that 
when participants are evaluated by an ingroup, rather than an outgroup member, 
they are more motivated to control their bias during performance on an IAT 
indicating morality (compared to competence). 
Event-Related Brain Potentials and Moral Performance 
The desire to be moral may elicit socially desirable answers pertaining to 
morality. This complicates the interpretation of self-reports on the importance of 
morality. Additionally, it remains unclear how people control their behavior to 
appear moral. Examining the cognitive processes involved in displaying moral 
behavior can elucidate how this is achieved.  
In prior research, Van Nunspeet et al. (2014) revealed the cognitive processes 
that were associated with performance on a morally framed IAT. When test 
implications were presented in terms of morality compared to competence, 
participants’ perceptual attention and response monitoring were enhanced during 
task performance. More specifically, event-related brain potentials (ERPs) 
suggested that participants paid more attention to the group membership of the 
photographed individuals presented in the IAT. This so-called social categorization 
was evident in modulations of the N1 and P150, two ERP components occurring 
around 100 and 200 ms after stimulus onset, that typically are larger when viewing 
ingroup vs. outgroup faces (e.g., Ito & Urland, 2003; Kubota & Ito, 2007). Van 
Nunspeet et al. (2014) argued that perceptual attention to the group membership of 
the women in the IAT was enhanced to enable participants to perform in line with 
their moral values. 
Additionally, when morality instead of competence was emphasized in the 
IAT instruction, participants showed enhanced brain responses to the difference 
between incongruent and congruent trials and to errors. Specifically, the N450 and 
error-related negativity (ERN) modulations were larger when moral test 












deflection around 400-500ms after stimulus-onset, is a component associated with 
conflict-monitoring, e.g. in language incongruencies (e.g., Nigam, Hoffman, & 
Simons, 1992), the Stroop task (e.g., Rebai, Bernard, & Lannou, 1997), and the IAT 
(Williams & Themanson, 2011). The ERN on the other hand, is a negative 
deflection within 100ms after a response is given. It is known to be larger for 
incorrect than correct responses (e.g., Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 
1993; Nieuwenhuis, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001), and for significant compared to 
non-significant errors (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005). The findings of 
Van Nunspeet et al. (2014) thus suggest that the incongruency between the 
different IAT trials, as well as incorrect responses were perceived as more 
significant when the IAT was presented as a moral test. Additionally, their ERN 
results suggested that people are more concerned to show immoral than 
incompetent behavior. 
Moral Performance in Group Contexts 
In the current research we hypothesize that participants are more motivated 
to perform in line with moral values when they are being evaluated by a self-
relevant other (an ingroup rather than an outgroup member). To examine this, we 
need to exclude alternative motivations to control bias, such as the wish to avoid 
offending the IAT target group in the presence of an ethnic outgroup member (in 
the current research, a Muslim woman; Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001; Richeson 
& Ambady, 2003). This is why we introduced minimal categories: Based on a 
questionnaire ostensibly assessing personality styles, participants were evaluated by 
a non-Muslim individual who was presented as someone with the same (ingroup) 
or another personality type (outgroup).  
We thus predict that participants will show a weaker IAT bias when the moral 
(compared to competence) test implications are emphasized, especially when they 
are evaluated by an ingroup (vs. outgroup) member. Extending the research of Van 
Nunspeet et al. (2014), we anticipate that participants who are evaluated by an 
ingroup member and to whom the moral test implications are emphasized will 
show increased perceptual attention towards pictures of Muslim versus non-
Muslim women (indexed by N1 and/or P150 modulations) and enhanced conflict- 














hypotheses in two studies; an initial behavioral study (Study 4.1) and a follow-up 
study in which we recorded an electroencephalogram (EEG) during IAT 
performance (Study 4.2). 
Study 4.1 
Method 
Participants and design.  
Ninety-five non-Muslim students (3 males, Mage = 19.2 years, SD = 2.0) 
participated for money or course credits. One participant was excluded from the 
analyses, because s/he responded too late on more than 25% of trials, indicating 
lack of attention. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in the 2 (task 
domain: morality/competence) X 2 (evaluator: ingroup/outgroup member) 
between-participants design. 
Procedure.  
After participants signed an informed consent in which it was explained that 
their participation could be recorded on video, they were seated in an individual 
room with a webcam, head phone and a camera placed in a top corner of the 
cubicle. Participants were told they would be paired with another participant based 
on questionnaire scores (ostensibly) assessing their personality styles and indicating 
whether they were either a so-called ‘P’- or ‘O’-type. After completing the 
questionnaire and a short pause, participants saw their own and other participants’ 
scores (i.e., participant numbers were presented in combination with the ‘P’- and 
‘O’-personality styles). Participants were then informed that they would cooperate 
either with a member of the same or a different group (as determined by their 
personality style). Then the IAT was introduced as a reaction time task during 
which the other person (i.e., the evaluator) would observe and give them feedback 
on every trial. After that, a webcam connection was simulated: The evaluator 
introduced him or herself and told that s/he would observe and provide feedback 
to the participant. A smile and thumbs up would follow a correct trial; frowning 
and pointing thumbs down an incorrect trial. Participants then either read about 













In reality, all participants were said to have a ‘P’-personality style and were 
introduced to a (same gender) confederate whose introduction was prerecorded. 
After the IAT, participants completed additional questions, were debriefed and 
thanked. The experiment lasted approximately fifty minutes. 
Instruments. 
The Implicit Association Test. Participants performed an IAT as designed 
by Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz (1998). Stimuli representing the target 
concepts consisted of 10 pictures of non-Muslim and 10 pictures of Muslim 
women (faces without and with a headscarf respectively). Stimuli that represented 
positive and negative attributes consisted of 5 pictures of positive and 5 pictures of 
negative scenes, selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; 
Lang et al., 2005). 
For congruent trials, pictures of non-Muslim women shared the same 
response key as positive pictures and pictures of Muslim women the same response 
key as negative pictures. For incongruent trials, this was the case for non-Muslim 
women and negative pictures, and Muslim women and positive pictures. The order 
of the (in)congruent blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Training 
blocks 1, 2 and 4 consisted of 26 trials, test blocks 3 and 5 of 156 trials each. Every 
trial started with a fixation point, followed by a stimulus, a blank screen, and a 
feedback screen (see Figure 4.1). The feedback screen consisted of a movie clip 
(1250ms) of an evaluator showing either positive or negative feedback. To ensure 
that participants were aware that the evaluator was an in- or an outgroup member, 
two text displays indicated the group memberships of the participant and the 
evaluator. In case participants did not respond in time (i.e., within 680 ms), the 
feedback screen showed the words “too late”. 
Morality vs. competence task domain. Task domain was introduced using 
the instructions described in Van Nunspeet et al. (2014). Without mentioning the 
IAT design, or how performance would be measured, participants read the test 
would indicate their moral values concerning egalitarianism in the morality 
condition, or their ability to learn new tasks in the competence condition. In both 
conditions, participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as 















Figure 4.1. An IAT trial. The feedback screen was a movie display (1250ms) in which the 




The IAT effect. The dependent measure was the IAT effect (i.e., the D 
score), which was calculated as the difference in reaction times on incongruent and 
congruent trials divided by a pooled SD of all correct trials (Greenwald et al., 2003; 
see also Van Nunspeet et al., 2014). 
Checks. To check that the perceived validity of the IAT did not differ 
between the conditions, we asked participants to respond to the statement: “My 
test score can assess what kind of person I am”. Furthermore, we asked to what 
extent participants hoped to have made a good impression on the evaluator: “I 
hope the evaluator has the impression that I am competent/kind/moral” (3 items, 
α = .90). Identification with the P-type group was checked with two items (“I 
identify strongly with the P group” and “I feel equal to the other group members in 
terms of general attitudes and beliefs”; r = .41, p < .001). Participants could 












Results and Discussion 
Checks.  
As intended, participants in the four experimental conditions did not differ in 
their ability to identify with the experimentally created ingroup (grand-average M = 
3.77, SD = 1.20); F(3, 90) = 1.37, p = .26, and did not think differently about the 
perceived validity of the test; M = 3.64, SD = 1.62; F(3,90)<1. In line with prior 
findings, participants in the morality condition indicated positive impression 
management to be more important than participants in the competence condition; 
Mmorality = 4.83, SD = 1.01; Mcompetence = 4.28, SD = 1.04; F(1,90) = 6.58, p = .01, η2 
= .07. There was no effect of evaluator nor an interaction effect; F’s < 1.49, p’s > 
.23, indicating the importance of the moral task was enhanced, independently of 
whether participants were evaluated by an in- or an outgroup member. 
IAT effect.  
Overall, participants showed the standard IAT effect, indicating a negative 
implicit bias towards Muslim women; t(93) = 6.83, p < .001. More errors were 
made on incongruent than on congruent trials; respectively M = 9.35, SD = 7.01 
and M = 6.46, SD = 5.40; t(93) = 4.50, p < .001; this was not affected by task 
domain or evaluator , all F’s < 1.87, p’s > .18. Consistent with previous research 
(Van Nunspeet et al., 2014), an ANOVA with the D score as dependent variable 
and domain and evaluator as independent factors, revealed a significant main effect 
of domain; F(1,90) = 5.57, p = .02, η2 = 0.06. Overall, participants in the morality 
condition showed a smaller IAT effect than participants in the competence 
condition, M(morality) = 0.18, SD = 0.34; M(competence) = 0.36, SD = 0.394. 
Additionally, we found the predicted interaction effect between domain and 
evaluator; F(1,90) = 4.26, p = .04, η2 = 0.05 (see Figure 4.2), indicating that 
participants who were evaluated by an ingroup member showed significantly less 
bias in the morality than in the competence condition; M(morality) = 0.10, SD = 
0.32; M(competence) = 0.43, SD = 0.33; F(1,90) = 9.82, p < .01, η2 = .10, while 
                                                 
4 Consistent with previous research (Van Nunspeet et al., 2014), this difference was 
related to increased response latencies on congruent trials in the morality compared to the 
competence condition; M(morality) = 494.85, SD = 20.10; M(competence) = 480.65, SD 














this was not the case when evaluated by an outgroup member; M(morality) = 0.26, 
SD = 0.34; M(competence) = 0.29, SD = 0.44; F < 1. These findings extend 
previous research by showing that moral impression management is particularly 
important in an intragroup context (even if the broader significance of the ingroup 
is relatively minimal). In Study 4.2 we examine what cognitive processes are 
associated with the tendency to conform to moral values in group contexts. 
 




Participants and design.  
Sixty-seven non-Muslim, right-handed, healthy students (18 males, Mage = 20.6 
years, SD = 2.1) participated for money or course credits. Three participants were 
excluded from all analyses because they responded too late on more than 25% of 
the trials, indicating lack of attention. Two other participants could not be included 












four participants had to be excluded from the ERP analyses, because of technical 
problems during the EEG acquisition. Remaining participants were randomly 
distributed across conditions of the 2 (domain: morality/competence) X 2 
(evaluator: ingroup/outgroup member) between-participants design.  
Procedure.  
The procedure and measures were similar to Study 4.1, with the following 
exceptions. Participants completed the questionnaire to ostensibly determine 
personality style before they came to the EEG lab. The feedback screens in the 
IAT consisted of a photograph of the confederate instead of a movie display. 
Finally, to elicit a sufficient number of errors to reliably estimate the ERN, the 
maximum duration of the stimulus presentation was reduced from 680ms to 
550ms, and the total number of test trials increased to 600 (300 congruent and 300 
incongruent trials).  
EEG acquisition.  
The EEG was recorded from 19 Ag/AgCl scalp electrodes mounted in an 
elastic cap, and from the left and right mastoids, using a 19-channel Biosemi active-
electrode recording system (sampling rate 256 Hz). To assess horizontal and 
vertical eye movements, electrodes were placed on the outer canthi of the eyes and 
approximately 1 cm above and below the participant’s right eye. EEG activity was 
recorded using ActiView software, offline data analyses were performed using 
Brain Vision Analyzer, and the experiment was presented with E-prime software. 
The EEG signal was referenced off-line to the average mastoid signal, corrected for 
ocular and eye-blink artifacts using the method of Gratton, Coles, and Donchin 
(1983), and filtered (1-15 Hz). Single-trial stimulus-locked and response-locked 
epochs were extracted, ranging from -300ms to 1000ms after the event. These 
epochs were subjected to artifact rejection, then averaged and baseline-corrected by 
subtracting the average signal value between 200-0ms pre-stimulus or between 300-
50ms prior to the response. Separate stimulus-locked ERP epochs were created for 
correct congruent and incongruent trials with pictures of Muslim and non-Muslim 
















ERP analyses.  
Visual inspection of the data indicated that the N1, P150, and ERN 
components were most evident at midline electrode sites FCz and Cz. The N450 
was most evident at CPz and Pz. The stimulus-locked ERP components were 
quantified as the peak amplitude within a time window post-stimulus (N1: 90-
110ms; P150: 100-250ms; N450: 325-500ms), whereas the ERN was quantified as 
the peak amplitude of the signal between -50 and 150ms around the response. Each 
average ERN was based on at least 10 trials5. Peak amplitude values of the N1, 
P150, and N450 were submitted to a 2 (electrode site: FCz/Cz or CPz/Pz [N450]) 
x 2 (target: Muslim/non-Muslim women) x 2 (congruency: congruent/incongruent) 
mixed-model ANOVA. Peak amplitude values of the ERN were submitted to a 2 
(electrode site) x 2 (accuracy: correct/error) x 2 (congruency) mixed-model 
ANOVA. In every analysis, domain (morality/competence) and evaluator 
(ingroup/outgroup) were included as between-participants factors6.  
Results and Discussion 
Behavioral results.  
Checks. As intended, identification with the ingroup (2 items, r = .50, p < 
.001) was equal across experimental conditions (grand-average M = 3.53, SD = 
1.36), F(1, 58) < 1, as was the perceived validity of the test; M = 3.58, SD = 1.56; 
F(1,58) < 1. Again, participants in the morality condition indicated more concern 
about impression management than in the competence condition; Mmorality = 5.25, 
SD = 0.83; Mcompetence = 4.63, SD = 0.82; F(1,58) = 8.39, p = .01, η2 = .13. 
IAT effect. Overall, participants showed the standard IAT effect, indicating a 
negative implicit bias towards Muslim women; t(63) = 5.46, p < .001. IAT effects 
were not systematically affected by evaluator or task domain; F’s < 1, p’s > .1, 
indicating that the emphasis on morality or competence and the group membership 
of the evaluator was not visible in task performance. This likely is due to the 
changes we made to optimize the task for ERP recordings: To ensure enough 
                                                 
5 Some participants made less than 10 errors, explaining different degrees of freedom 
between the stimulus- and response-locked ERP analyses. 
6 Electrode site was not of interest for the current research, see Appendix B for 












errors to reliably estimate the ERN, the maximum response time was reduced. In 
Study 4.1 –and in previous research (Van Nunspeet et al., 2014)– participants 
controlled their bias by delaying responses on congruent trials, which may have 
been impossible in this study, given the tight response deadline. A follow-up study 
corroborates this explanation. When we examined behavioral effects of task 
instruction and ingroup/outgroup evaluators using a response window of 680 ms 
(as in Study 4.1 and prior research), the IAT bias was significantly lower in the 
morality compared to the competence condition, when participants were evaluated 
by a minimal ingroup member (Van Nunspeet, Ellemers, & Derks, manuscript under 
review).  
Nonetheless, the identity of the evaluator did affect behavioral responses in 
the current data. Besides the fact that more errors were made on incongruent (M = 
34.4, SD = 18.4) than congruent trials (M = 25.6, SD = 15.5); t(63) = 4.87, p < 
.001, participants in the ingroup evaluator condition made fewer errors (M = 50.3, 
SD = 24.9) than participants in the outgroup evaluator condition (M = 70.4, SD = 
33.4); F(1,60) = 7.28, p = .01, η2 = .11. This is consistent with our reasoning that 
participants are generally more motivated to perform well when evaluated by an 
ingroup member. 
ERP results.  
Perceptual attention.  
N1. The N1 results revealed the expected evidence of categorization: The N1 
was larger for pictures of Muslim women (M = -7.18 µV, SE = 0.35) than non-
Muslim women (M = -6.91 µV, SE = 0.35); F(1,56) = 3.52, p = .07, η2 = .06 (see 
Figure 4.3). The predicted interaction between target, domain and evaluator was 
significant; F(1,56) = 4.36, p = .04, η2 = .07. Separate analyses for ingroup vs. 
outgroup evaluators revealed a marginally significant interaction between target and 
task domain in case of an ingroup evaluator; F(1,29) = 3.53, p = .07, η2 = .11, but 
not in case of an outgroup evaluator; F(1,27) = 1.02, p = .32. Separate analyses per 
task domain revealed a significant target by evaluator interaction in the moral 
domain; F(1,31) = 6.69, p = .02, η2 = .18, but not in the competence domain; F<1. 














condition (F[1,56] = 11.35, p = .001, η2 = .17), but not in the other conditions 
(F‘s<1; see Figure 4.4).  
P150. Analyses of the P150 only revealed the expected main effect of target: 
The P150 was larger for pictures of Muslim women (M = 5.44 µV, SE = 0.48) than 
non-Muslim women (M = 3.77 µV, SE = 0.43); F(1,56) = 93.13, p < .001, η2 = .62 
(see Figure 4.3).  
This suggests that enhanced social categorization of (non-)Muslim women in 
case of moral task performance under ingroup evaluation, only occurs in initial 
stages of perceptual attention (N1). 
 
Figure 4.3. Differences in N1 and P150 amplitudes for pictures of Muslim and non-
Muslim women. Only the N1modulation interacted with task domain and evaluator.  
 
 
Conflict- and response-monitoring.  
N450.Results showed the anticipated effect of congruency: The N450 was 
larger for incongruent (M = -0.13 µV, SE = 0.33) compared to congruent (M = 
















Figure 4.4. The mean differences in N1 amplitude between Muslim vs. non-Muslim targets 
for each condition. 
 
 
There was also a main effect of target: The N450 was larger for non-Muslim 
(M = -0.28 µV, SE = 0.37) compared to Muslim women (M = 0.79 µV, SE = 0.33); 
F(1,56) = 24.06, p < .001, η2 = .30. Importantly, both main effects were qualified 
by a significant four-way interaction between congruency, target, domain and 
evaluator; F(1,56) = 5.75, p = .02, η2 = .09. Separate analyses for the task domain 
conditions revealed a significant interaction between congruency, target and 
evaluator in the morality condition; F(1,31) = 5.36, p < .03, η2 = .15, but not in the 
competence condition; F(1,25) = 1.30, p = .27.  
Furthermore, in the morality condition, there was an interaction between 
congruency and target in the ingroup evaluator condition; F(1,16) = 10.26, p = 
.006, η2 = .39, but not in the outgroup evaluator condition; F<1. The N450 
modulation on incongruent compared to congruent trials in the morality/ingroup 














6.45, p = .02, η2 = .29, and not when viewing Muslim women; F<1 7,8 (see Figure 
4.6). These results suggests that conflict-monitoring was enhanced (on non-Muslim 
trials) when moral test implications were stressed and participants were evaluated 
by an ingroup member.   
 
 
Figure 4.5. Differences in N450 amplitudes for incongruent and congruent trials. 
 
 
ERN. As anticipated, results showed that the ERN was larger for incorrect (M 
= -6.90 µV, SE = 0.69) than correct trials (M = 2.95 µV, SE = 0.46); F(1,44) = 
173.52, p < .001, η2 = .80. There was a marginally significant interaction effect 
between accuracy and task domain; F(1,44) = 3.37, p = .07, η2 = .07, indicating that 
the ERN modulation was somewhat larger in the competence (Mdifference = -1.22 µV, 
SE = 1.12; F[1,44] = 100.07, p < .001, η2 = .70) than the morality condition 
(Mdifference = -8.48 µV, SE = 0.99; F[1,44] = 73.49, p < .001, η2 = .63). More 
importantly however, the ERN modulation in the morality and competence 
                                                 
7 Findings of N450 modulations for targets can be found in Appendix B. 
8 This may reflect the specific nature of our paradigm, in which these trials confronted 
participants with pictures of a non-Muslim target, while receiving feedback from a non-












conditions differed depending on evaluator type: There was a marginally significant 
between-subjects interaction effect of task domain and evaluator; F(1,44) = 3.59, p 
= .07, η2 = .089. Even though the simple contrasts were not significant (F’s < 2.32, 
p’s > .14), the means pattern indicates a reversal of the effect. Response monitoring 
was enhanced under ingroup evaluation in the morality (M = -2.67 µV, SE = 0.83) 
compared to the competence condition (M = -1.36 µV, SE = 0.94), but enhanced 
in the competence (M = -2.96 µV, SE = 0.98) compared to the morality condition 





Figure 4.6. The mean differences in N450 amplitude between incongruent vs. congruent 








                                                 
9 To clarify this marginally significant effect, we conducted separate analyses for FCz and 
Cz. Results showed that both interaction effects were only significant at Cz 
(accuracy*domain: F[1,44] = 3.98, p = .05, η2 = .08; domain*evaluator: F[1,44] = 4.07, p 



















Figure 4.7. The error-related negativity in the morality and competence conditions in case 













The current studies extend previous research on the motivation to comply 
with moral ingroup norms (Ellemers et al., 2008; Pagliaro et al., 2011). We 
discovered that participants controlled implicit bias when the moral implications of 
an IAT were emphasized and when they were evaluated by a (self-relevant) ingroup 
member. In Study 4.1, participants responded more slowly on congruent IAT trials, 
suggesting inhibition of prepotent reaction tendencies possibly revealing prejudice. 
Complementing prior research (Van Nunspeet et al., 2014), ERP results in Study 
4.2 revealed that this was associated with enhanced perceptual attention and social 
categorization of the target women in the IAT (as indicated by the N1). 
Participants were thus more focused on the identity of the different targets 
presented, which is needed to control biased responses. Thus, emphasizing the 
moral implications of the IAT does not make people insensitive to social 
categorizations. Instead, it triggers increased perceptual attention in order to adjust 
behavior. Indeed, previous ERP research has revealed that similar early attentional 
processes can be moderated by motivational states (e.g., Amodio, 2010; 
Cunningham, Van Bavel, Arbuckle, Packer, & Waggoner, 2012). Thus, our findings 
help understand how people control their prejudice towards Muslim women, to 
show they are moral in front of self-relevant others. Note however that this is 
different from the attempts to appear unprejudiced towards target group 
representatives, as revealed by Lowery et al. (2001) and Richeson and Ambady 
(2003). Complementing this prior work, we reveal that bias control can also be 
affected by the importance of sharing moral norms with one’s ingroup. 
Conflict- and response monitoring (indicated by the N450 and ERN) were 
also affected by the moral or competence implications of the IAT and the ingroup 
vs. outgroup evaluator. That is, the detection of incongruent compared to 
congruent trials (N450 modulation) was enhanced when participants in the 
morality/ingroup condition viewed non-Muslim women. Moreover, whereas 
response monitoring (ERN on correct and incorrect trials) seemed to be enhanced 
in the morality compared to the competence condition when the evaluator was an 
ingroup member, this pattern was reversed when the evaluator was an outgroup 














control (Amodio, et al., 2004), this suggests increased motivation to control bias 
towards Muslim women in the moral ingroup condition. We did not anticipate 
participants to be particularly sensitive to competence task instructions when 
evaluated by an outgroup member. However, a similar (non-significant) reversal of 
the importance of competence vs. morality depending on the group membership of 
the evaluator was observed in the behavioral results of Study 4.1 and the N1 results 
in Study 4.2: Whereas behavioral bias on the moral IAT was reduced in the ingroup 
evaluation condition, bias on the competence IAT was diminished in the outgroup 
evaluation condition. Likewise, the N1 modulation was greater in the 
morality/ingroup than in the morality/outgroup condition, while it was somewhat 
larger in the competence/outgroup than the competence/ingroup condition. 
Although (probably due to limited statistical power) these effects did not reach 
significance, they could suggest that whereas moral impression management is 
more important in the ingroup, displaying competence is more relevant towards the 
outgroup. Future research could further examine this. The current findings 
demonstrate the importance of morality for self and social identity, by revealing 
that people are especially motivated to adjust their moral task performance when 
monitored by a self-relevant group; this is associated with increased perceptual 
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Controlling implicit prejudice:  
The effects of moral implications, and 


















This chapter is based on: Van Nunspeet, F., Ellemers, N., & Derks, B. Reducing implicit 
prejudice against Muslim women: The effects of moral concerns, intra- and intergroup 















The study of attitudes, stereotypes and prejudice is often complicated by social 
desirability issues: People sometimes adjust their explicit attitudes to appear 
unbiased (e.g., Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980). The development of implicit 
measures of prejudice that capture more automatic biases against social (out)groups 
was seen to offer a solution to this problem. People may display implicit biases 
even while they explicitly endorse egalitarian views (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, & 
Beach, 2001), and this is why it is often suggested that implicit prejudice captures 
the ‘automatic’ evaluative associations with other groups.  
A popular and widely used implicit measure of prejudice is the Implicit 
Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT is based on 
the idea that it is easier to associate your ingroup with positive attributes and an 
outgroup with negative attributes than vice versa. As a result, participants tend to 
respond faster on trials in which pictures of ingroup members are associated with 
positive stimuli (using the same response key) and outgroup members with negative 
stimuli (congruency). By comparison, they respond more slowly on trials in which 
ingroup members are associated with negative stimuli and outgroup members with 
positive stimuli (incongruency). The difference between response latencies on 
incongruent and congruent trials is taken to assess the degree of implicit bias 
against a social outgroup. 
Although the IAT is frequently presented as a measure of automatic bias, by 
now several studies have shown the malleability of ‘automatic prejudice. This 
suggests that implicit biases can be influenced too, for example by self-concerns 
and social motives (for an overview see Blair, 2002). Effects of self-concerns are 
shown in research were the induction of stereotype threat among Whites –by 
triggering the stereotype that they are racists– increased implicit biases towards 
Blacks (Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, & Hart, 2004; Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 
2007). Other research has revealed that implicit biases can also be affected by 
intergroup concerns: When a Black experimenter was present during participants’ 
performance on an IAT, Whites were able to inhibit their pro-White bias (e.g., 
Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001). Additionally, Richeson and Ambady (2003) 
showed the significant effect of the role of such a Black person present: Their 














partner in the experiment was a superior (instead of a subordinate). Furthermore, 
Van Nunspeet, Ellemers, Derks, and Nieuwenhuis (2014) revealed that 
emphasizing the moral implications of performance on an IAT –compared to 
implications concerning individual competence– led participants to show a smaller 
bias against Muslims. In a follow-up study, this effect was particularly strong when 
people were evaluated by minimal ingroup (rather than outgroup) members, thus 
suggesting effects of intragroup concerns (Van Nunspeet, Derks, Ellemers, & 
Nieuwenhuis, under review).  
Current research 
Although different motives and contexts have been shown to affect people’s 
evaluative bias, to our knowledge they have not been directly compared in one 
study. It is thus unclear which concern or motive would benefit the control of bias 
against an outgroup when for example, interpersonal contact with a person from 
the target group is not feasible. In the current research, our aim is to examine the 
effects of three different interventions on people’s ability to control their evaluative 
bias against an outgroup in one IAT experiment: (1) Personal concerns about moral 
implications of displaying bias; (2) intergroup motives (i.e., concerns about 
displaying bias in front of a representative of the devalued group) and (3) 
intragroup concerns about displaying bias in front of self-relevant others. 
Specifically, we demonstrate how people’s evaluative bias against Muslims is 
affected by (1) emphasizing the moral (compared to competence) test implications 
of the IAT; (2) having participants be observed by either a Muslim or a non-
Muslim evaluator (first ingroup/outgroup dimension); and (3) presenting this 
evaluator as either a minimal ingroup or outgroup member (second 
ingroup/outgroup dimension, resulting in cross-categorization). In the current 
study we combined these interventions to directly compare their effects on 
reducing implicit evaluative bias and to examine whether and how they may 
influence one another. 
Additionally, we aimed to examine the underlying processes associated with 
reducing implicit bias. In studies concerning the effects of personal and social 
motives on people’s evaluative biases, little attention has been devoted to how such 












diminishing the difference between response latencies on stereotype-incongruent 
and stereotype-congruent trials. However, this can be accomplished in two ways: 
Either by becoming quicker on incongruent trials (and thus becoming better in 
associating the outgroup with positive attributes), or by responding more slowly on 
congruent trials (and inhibiting negative associations with the outgroup and 
positive associations with the ingroup). Interestingly, the smaller IAT effect in 
research of Richeson and Ambady (2003) was due to slower responses on 
congruent trials. In a similar vein, Van Nunspeet et al. (2014) revealed that an 
emphasis on morality caused participants to show a smaller IAT bias, caused by 
their slowed down responses on congruent trials. In addition, these researchers 
showed that stressing the moral test implications was associated with enhanced 
response-monitoring (measured using EEG). results suggested that participants’ 
reduced bias was related to the inhibition of prepotent responses on stereotype-
consistent (i.e., congruent) trials (Van Nunspeet et al., 2014). In the current 
research, we therefore examined the pattern of response latencies on congruent and 
incongruent trials separately to see how exactly the three types of interventions 




Only female, non-Muslim, students (N = 225; Mage = 20.5 years, SD = 2.6) 
participated in the study and received either money or course credit for their 
participation. Two participants were excluded from analyses: One due to technical 
problems, another because she responded too late on all IAT trials, indicating lack 
of attention. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental 
conditions of the 2 (Task Domain: morality/competence) x 2 (Evaluator’s Minimal 
Group: ingroup/outgroup) x 2 (Evaluator’s Religion: Muslim/non-Muslim) 
between-participants design. Note that the evaluator was the same individual in all 
conditions, but that she did or did not wear a headscarf (see Figure 5.1). 
Procedure. 
Participants were seated in an individual computer room with a webcam on 














cubicle. They were told that they would be working together with another 
participant. They then completed a (bogus) questionnaire that was said to assess 
whether they had either a so-called ‘P’- or ‘O’- personality style. After a short 
waiting period, participants learned about their own alleged personality style and 
the styles of the other participants and they were informed whom they would be 
working with during the experiment. The other person either was said to have the 
same personality style as the participant (to convey this individual was a member of 
the same minimal group as the participant), or she allegedly had the other 
personality style (to indicate this individual belonged to a different group). 
Participants then read that they would perform a computer task. During the first 
part of the experiment, the other person would supposedly observe and give them 
feedback after every trial and the roles would be reversed in the second part. 
Thereafter, a webcam connection was simulated: The other person introduced 
herself and said that she would observe and provide visual feedback on every trial. 
Then, participants read either the morality or competence instruction and started 
with the IAT. In reality, all participants were said to have a ‘P’- personality style and 
were introduced to a confederate whose movies were prerecorded. Feedback 
displays during the IAT were related to participants’ actual responses (i.e., positive 
feedback when they responded correctly, negative feedback when they responded 
incorrectly). After the IAT, participants completed some self-report items and were 
properly debriefed. 
Task domain manipulation. Before the start of the IAT, half of the 
participants read that the computer task they were going to perform could indicate 
their endorsement of moral values concerning egalitarianism and discrimination (the 
morality condition). The other half of the participants was informed that the test 
could indicate their ability to process new information and to learn new tasks (the 
competence condition). All participants were instructed to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible and the test implications were repeated before the start of 
















Figure 5.1. Example of an (incongruent) IAT trial. The (same) evaluator resembled either a 

















The Implicit Association Test. Participants performed the five blocks of 
the IAT as designed by Greenwald et al. (1998). Stimuli representing the target 
concepts consisted of 10 pictures of Muslim women (wearing a headscarf) and 10 
pictures of non-Muslim women (not wearing a headscarf). Stimuli that represented 
positive and negative attributes consisted of 5 pictures of positive scenes, and 5 
pictures of negative scenes, selected from the International Affective Picture 
System (Lang et al., 2005).  
In (training) block 1, participants were asked to respond to the pictures of 
women by pressing a left key for Muslim women and a right key for non-Muslim 
women. In (training) block 2 they were asked to use the same two keys to respond 
to the negative and positive pictures. In block 3 (a test block) both picture types 
were presented and participants responded with one key to pictures of both 
Muslim women and negative scenes and with the other key to pictures of both 
non-Muslim women and positive scenes (i.e., congruent trials). In (training) block 
4, the response keys for the pictures of (non-)Muslim women were switched and in 
block 5 (a test block), participants had to respond to pictures of both non-Muslim 
women and negative scenes with one key and to pictures of both Muslim-women 
and positive scenes with one other key (i.e., incongruent trials). Blocks 1, 2 and 4 
consisted of 20 trials, blocks 3 and 5 of 70 trials each. Every trial started with a 
fixation point (500 ms), followed by stimulus presentation (680 ms), a blank screen 
(500 ms) and a feedback screen (1400 ms). The feedback screen consisted of a 
movie clip of the evaluator showing either positive (smiling and holding ‘thumbs 
up’) or negative (frowning and pointing ‘thumbs down’) feedback. To ensure that 
participants were aware of the minimal group membership of their evaluator, we 
inserted a text display below the movie indicating the personality type of the 
evaluator, and a text display at the bottom of the screen indicating the personality 
type group of the participant (see Figure 5.1). In case participants did not respond 
in time, they saw the words “too late”. 
The IAT effect. The dependent measure was the IAT effect, indicated by the 
D score, and measured as the difference in reaction times on incongruent and 












scoring algorithm described by Greenwald et al. 2003). We included all trials, 
replaced error latencies with a replacement value (M + 2 SDcorrect) and replaced 
latencies exceeding the maximum response time with the maximum response time 
of 680 ms. The resulting positive D scores are an indication of people’s evaluative 
bias against Muslim women.  
Checks. Directly after the IAT, we checked the task domain manipulation: 
Participants were asked to indicate what the IAT intended to measure. They could 
indicate that the test either measured how well they were able to process 
information and to learn new tasks, or that it assessed their moral values 
concerning egalitarianism and discrimination. Second, we checked the evaluator’s 
minimal group manipulation by asking participants to indicate whether their 
evaluator was a member of the same or another minimal group. Furthermore, we 
tested participants’ perceptions of the validity of the test (i.e., “My test score can 
assess what kind of person I am”), and their overall impression of their evaluator 
(“I think the participant who gave me feedback is competent/kind/moral”, 3 
items). Participants could respond on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = completely 
disagree, 7 = completely agree).  
Results 
Checks. 
Results concerning the manipulation of task domain showed that 96% (N = 
105) of participants in the morality condition indicated that the test measured their 
moral values concerning egalitarianism and discrimination. Moreover, ninety-seven 
percent (N = 110) of participants in the competence condition indicated that the 
test measured their ability to quickly process information and learn new tasks. 
Results concerning the evaluator’s minimal group manipulation showed that 95% 
(N = 103) of participants whose evaluator was an ingroup member correctly 
answered that their evaluator was a member of their own group. One hundred 
percent (N = 115) of participants whose evaluator was an outgroup member 
answered correctly that their evaluator was a member or the other group. 
Excluding the participants who answered one of the checks incorrectly (N = 10) 
did not alter the pattern of the means. We therefore included those participants in 














The perceived validity of the IAT and participants’ impression of their 
evaluator showed that, as intended, there were no reliable effects of experimental 
condition on participants’ perceived validity of the test (overall M = 3.32, SD = 
1.48; F’s ≤ 2.71, p’s ≥ .10) or their impression of their evaluator, which was quite 
positive overall (Mcompetent = 5.17, SD = 1.14; Mkind = 5.70, SD = 0.87; Mmoral = 5.24, 
SD = 0.97; all F’s ≤ 3.87, p’s ≥ .06). 
IAT effect (D score). 
An ANOVA with task domain, evaluator’s minimal group and evaluator’s 
religion as independent factors revealed a significant main effect of evaluator’s 
religion, F(1,215) = 11.68, p = .001, ηp2 = .05. Whereas participants whose evaluator 
was a non-Muslim woman showed significant bias against Muslim women (M = 
0.16, SD = 0.45; t[108] = 3.73, p < .001), this bias was reduced to non-significance 
when participants were evaluated by a Muslim woman (M = -0.04, SD = 0.45, 
t[113] = -0.90, p = .37). Additionally, the interaction between task domain and 
evaluator’s religion was marginally significant, F(1,215) = 2.88, p = .09, ηp2 = .01. 
Analysis of simple main effects indicated that when evaluated by a Muslim woman 
there was no difference in IAT bias between the morality and competence 
condition (M = -0.03, SD = 0.50, M = -0.04, SD = 0.41 respectively; F < 1). 
However, when evaluated by a non-Muslim woman, participants for whom the 
moral implications of the test were emphasized showed a significantly weaker 
negative bias (M = 0.07, SD = 0.46) than participants for whom the implications of 
the test concerning their competence were emphasized (M = 0.27, SD = 0.42), 
F(1,215) = 4.99, p = .03, ηp2 = .02. These results show that having a Muslim 
evaluator present is an impactful way of reducing non-Muslims’ implicit anti-
Muslim bias. However, even in the absence of an evaluator from the target group, a 
focus on morality rather than competence also reduces implicit bias significantly10. 
                                                 
10 A prior study (Van Nunspeet et al., under review) showed that emphasizing morality 
rather than competence reduced implicit bias in the presence of a (non-Muslim) evaluator 
belonging to a minimal ingroup, but not when this evaluator belonged to a minimal 
outgroup. Although this interaction effect was not significant in the current study (F < 1), 
the effect of task domain was indeed stronger when participants thought they were 












Inspection of reaction times. 
To examine whether the effects of evaluator’s religion and task domain on 
implicit bias were due to enhanced positive associations with the Muslim outgroup 
(reduced RTs on incongruent trials) or the inhibition of prepotent biased responses 
(increased RTs on congruent trials), we analyzed response latencies on correctly 
answered congruent and incongruent trials separately. 
Congruent trials. The analysis of response latencies on correct congruent trials 
(reflecting the speed of making stereotype-congruent associations) revealed 
significant effects of our manipulations in line with the observed pattern of implicit 
bias reduction reported above. Parallel to the effect of evaluator’s religion on the 
implicit bias score, evaluator’s religion significant affected RTs on congruent trials, 
F(1,215) = 7.09, p = .008 ηp2 = .03. Participants whose evaluator was a Muslim 
woman responded more slowly on congruent trials (M = 503.97, SD = 24.24) than 
participants whose evaluator was a non-Muslim woman (M = 495.45, SD = 27.13). 
Moreover, replicating previous work (Van Nunspeet et al., 2014), participants 
working under moral task instructions responded significantly more slowly on 
congruent trials (M = 502.81, SD = 24.33) than participants in the competence 
condition;(M = 496.88, SD = 27.30), F(1,215) = 3.92, p = .05, ηp2 = .02. Finally, 
participants responded marginally slower on congruent trials when their evaluator 
was a minimal ingroup member (M = 502.89, SD = 26.64) than when she was a 
minimal outgroup member (M = 496.91, SD = 25.14), F(1,215) = 2.73, p = .10, ηp2 
= .01.  
Although there were no significant interaction effects; F’s ≤ 1.84, p ≥ .18, to 
enable a more direct comparison with the analyses for overall implicit bias, we 
analyzed RTs on congruent trials per evaluator’s religion condition. Replicating the 
pattern for implicit bias, when participants were evaluated by a Muslim woman 
there were no significant effects of task domain or evaluator’s minimal group on 
congruent response latencies (F’s ≤ 2.44, p’s ≥ .12). However, when evaluated by a 
non-Muslim woman, participants responded significantly slower on congruent trials 
                                                                                                                                                        
= 0.52; F[1,105] = 3.73, p = .06, ηp2 = .03), compared to a minimal outgroup member 














in the morality condition (M = 500.61, SD = 23.66) than in the competence 
condition (M = 489.36, SD = 29.83), F(1,105) = 4.67, p = .03, ηp2 = .04. 
Incongruent trials. Analysis of response latencies on the correct incongruent 
trials (reflecting the stereotype-incongruent combinations of Muslims/positive and 
non-Muslim/negative) revealed no main effects of task domain, evaluator’s religion 
or evaluator’s group type, nor the interaction between evaluator’s religion and task 
domain found for the overall D-score (all F’s ≤ 1.04, p ≥ .31). Thus, the 
experimental manipulations that resulted in a reduction of implicit bias did not 
cause participants to respond faster on incongruent trials11. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 5.1 showed that participants reduced their anti-Muslim 
bias in case of presence of a Muslim evaluator or, in the absence of a Muslim 
evaluator, the emphasis on their morality instead of their competence. Moreover, 
this bias reduction was associated with the inhibition of stereotype conforming 
responses rather than with increased positive associations with the Muslim 
outgroup. Although these findings are consistent with previous research (Richeson 
& Ambady, 2003; Van Nunspeet et al., 2014), we wanted to test whether they are 
dependent upon the duration of the experiment: If positive associations have to be 
learned, they may only develop over a longer period of time.  
We examined this possibility in Study 5.2, in which we increased the exposure 
to participants’ evaluator while using the same cross-categorization dimensions as 
in Study 5.1. If participants share their minimal group membership with their 
Muslim evaluator, they may become to perceive their evaluator as a partial ingroup 
member when the duration of the interaction is increased (see also Crisp & 
Hewstone, 1999; Crisp, Hewstone, & Rubin, 2001, for effects of cross-
categorization). Moreover, perceiving the evaluator as a partial ingroup member 
                                                 
11 We also found an unexpected interaction between task domain and evaluator’s group 
type, F(1,215) = 4.02, p = .05, ηp2 = .02. Whereas there was no difference between the 
minimal group types of the evaluator in the morality condition (Mingroup = 495.28, SD = 
24.98; Moutgroup = 498.33, SD = 22.66, F < 1), participants in the competence condition 
responded faster on incongruent trials when the evaluator was a minimal outgroup (M = 
490.10, SD = 21.74) instead of a minimal ingroup member (M = 499.61, SD = 22.78), 












may facilitate positive associations with the Muslim outgroup. In Study 5.2, we thus 
significantly increased the number of IAT trials to enable participants to develop 
new (positive) associations with Muslims during the task (resulting in reduced RTs 




Only female, non-Muslim, students (N = 102; Mage = 21.3 years, SD = 3.1) 
participated in the study for money or course credits. One participant was excluded 
from the analyses because she responded too late on more than 25% of the IAT 
trials, suggesting lack of attention to the experimental task. 
Procedure.  
The IAT and the procedure were similar to those described in Study 5.1. 
However, in Study 5.2, all participants received feedback from a Muslim evaluator. 
Thus, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental 
conditions of the 2 (Task Domain: morality/competence) x 2 (Evaluator’s Minimal 
Group: ingroup/outgroup) between-participants design. Moreover, the amount of 
trials in the two test blocks of the IAT was increased: From 70 trials per block in 
the previous study to 120 trials per block in Study 5.2. 
Results 
Checks. 
Ninety-eight percent (N = 49) of participants in the morality condition and 
96% (N = 49) of participants in the competence condition correctly reported the 
task domain. Moreover, 92% (N = 47) of participants whose evaluator was an 
ingroup member and 98% (N = 49) of participants whose evaluator was an 
outgroup member reported their evaluators’ minimal group correctly. Because 
exclusion of the participants who answered one of the checks incorrectly (N = 6) 
did not alter the pattern of means, we included those participants in all analyses. 
As intended, participants in all four conditions indicated that the test was able 
to assess what kind of person they are to a similar degree; overall M = 3.44, SD = 
1.57; F’s ≤ 1.23, p’s ≥ .27. Moreover, there were no effects of our task domain or 














evaluator, which was quite positive overall (Mcompetent = 5.36, SD = 1.09; Mkind = 
5.85, SD = 0.84; Mmoral = 5.54, SD = 0.98; all F’s ≤ 1.68, p’s ≥ .20). 
IAT effect (D score).  
Consistent with Study 5.1, now that all participants were evaluated by a 
Muslim woman, on average they did not show implicit bias against Muslim women, 
M = -.02, SD = .32, t(100) = -.53, p = .60. Additionally, an ANOVA with task 
domain and evaluator’s minimal group type as independent factors revealed a main 
effect of evaluator’s minimal group type: Participants whose Muslim evaluator was 
presented as a minimal ingroup member showed significantly less bias against 
Muslim women (M = -0.08, SD = 0.27) compared to participants who thought they 
were evaluated by an outgroup member (M = 0.05, SD = 0.35), F(1,97) = 5.02, p = 
.03, ηp2 = .05. The effect of task domain was marginally significant, F(1,97) = 2.89, 
p = .09, ηp2 = .03: In line with the previous findings the means show that implicit 
bias was reduced under moral task instructions (M = -0.07, SD = 0.33) compared 
to competence instructions (M = 0.03, SD = 0.29). 
We proceeded by examining whether RTs on correct congruent and 
incongruent trials differed across experimental conditions. Interestingly, the general 
tendency to slow down on congruent trials indicating the inclination to inhibit 
prejudice conforming responses did not depend on the evaluator being an in- or an 
outgroup member or on task domain (F’s ≤ 2.66, p’s ≥ .11). Additionally, and as 
expected, we found evidence in line with our reasoning that increasing the number 
of trials in which participants are exposed to a Muslim evaluator who is presented 
as an ingroup member can facilitate the ability to associate positive stimuli with 
Muslim targets. That is, participants responded faster on incongruent trials when 
the Muslim evaluator was presented as a minimal ingroup member (M = 478.87, 
SD = 23.90) than when she was an outgroup member (M = 493.26, SD = 23.08), 
F(1,97) = 9.47, p = .003, ηp2 = .0912. This suggests that the decrease in implicit bias 
                                                 
12 To directly test the effect of the increase in trials, we combined the data of Study 5.2  
(N = 101) with the data of participants who were evaluated by a Muslim evaluator in 
Study 5.1 (N = 114). Results of an ANOVA with RTs on incongruent trials as dependent 
variable and amount of trials, task domain and evaluator’s minimal group type as 
independent factors showed a main effect of amount of trials: Participants responded 












observed when the Muslim evaluator was a minimal ingroup member reflects that 
the ability to associate Muslim individuals with positive stimuli is facilitated under 
these conditions. 
General Discussion 
In the current research we directly compared the effects of three different 
interventions on people’s implicit evaluative bias against Muslims: (1) People’s 
personal motives to appear moral; (2) their intergroup motivation to perform well 
towards a Muslim evaluator, and (3) their intragroup-based motives to perform well 
in front of self-relevant others (categorized on a second, minimal, group 
dimension). We tested these effects by introducing a Muslim/non-Muslim IAT as a 
measure of participants’ moral values or of their competence. Moreover, 
participants performance was evaluated by either a non-Muslim or Muslim 
individual who was presented as a minimal in- or outgroup member. Results of 
Study 5.1 revealed the significant effect of target presence: In line with previous 
research (Lowery et al., 2001), participants showed no sign of anti-Muslim bias 
when they their evaluator was Muslim. Moreover, the significant reduction in bias 
was associated with the inhibition of prejudice: Instead of decreased response times 
on incongruent trials (indicating rapid associations between Muslims and positive 
attributes and non-Muslims and negative attributes), participants slowed down their 
responses on congruent trials, suggesting that they aimed to inhibit their prepotent 
responses to rapidly associate Muslims with negativity and non-Muslims with 
positivity.  
In case participants’ evaluator was not Muslim, we did find the same pattern 
of inhibition of prejudice-conforming responses when the moral implications of 
the test were emphasized: When participants were told that their test score could be 
perceived as an indication of their moral values concerning egalitarianism, this 
helped them to show a smaller bias against Muslims than when they were told that 
                                                                                                                                                        
M120trials = 485.99, SD = 24.47, M70trials = 496.90, SD = 22.66, F(1,207) = 11.82, p = .001, 
ηp2 = .05. Moreover, there was a significant interaction effect between amount of trials 
and evaluator’s minimal group type (F[1,207] = 7.50, p = .007, ηp2 = .04), indicating that 
participants only responded faster on incongruent trials while they were evaluated by a 
minimal ingroup member in case of the increased amount of trials; M120trials = 478.86, SD 














their test could reveal their competence. Emphasizing one’ morality thus seems to 
be an effective way to facilitate bias reduction and may be an alternative 
intervention when intergroup contact is not feasible.  
Furthermore, in line with previous research (e.g., Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, 
Hermsen, & Russin, 2000), results of Study 5.2 revealed that new (positive) 
associations can also be induced. First of all by increasing the amount of exposure 
to a Muslim evaluator and thus by emphasizing that one’s intergroup behavior is 
evaluated by an outgroup member. And second, by introducing cross-
categorization and focusing people on what they have in common with someone 
who they perceive as an outgroup member on another social dimension: Presenting 
a Muslim (outgroup) evaluator as a minimal ingroup member helped participants to 
developed positive associations with the Muslim outgroup. Importantly, our results 
extend prior research which revealed that shared (minimal) group membership(s) 
can override people’s explicit evaluative bias against outgroup members (e.g., Crisp 
et al., 2001; Urada, Stenstrom, & Miller, 2007), by showing similar findings for 
people’s implicit bias. 
Our findings indicate that there are different ways in which implicit prejudice 
can be reduced. The presence of a member of the target outgroup may have the 
greatest impact on the control of prejudiced responses and can even activate new 
(positive) associations with the outgroup. However, we should not overestimate 
this effect in everyday interactions: Social groups that are the focus of prejudice 
research are generally minority groups in society that are often segregated from the 
majority in education, housing, and work, preventing extensive intergroup 
interactions. The current research thus offers a contribution to insights on 
prejudice reduction by demonstrating again the potential impact of emphasizing 
one’s morality and the presence of others who share the same ingroup norms, even 
when no outgroup member is present (see also Van Nunspeet et al., 2014). 
We note that specific circumstances were in place in the current research as it 
remains unclear which aspect of our manipulations concerning the Muslim 
evaluator caused the effect of faster positive associations with Muslim women. Our 
participants received feedback on every trial and since they made few errors, they 












approving Muslim woman who was presented as someone like them (an ingroup 
member). It is less likely that similar effects will be obtained when participants were 
provided with as much or more negative rather than positive feedback.  
Nevertheless, we have shown that evaluative bias against Muslims can be 
reduced by several means. Presence of a Muslim evaluator causes people to inhibit 
their prejudiced responses and, provided there is enough exposure, presenting her 
as a self-relevant other may strengthen positive associations. Moreover, besides this 
form of intergroup contact, prejudice control can also be instigated by emphasizing 
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A general principle in psychology is that bad is stronger than good (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Although applicable to many types of 
judgments and situations, this is also an essential mechanisim in judging someone 
else’s moral integrity. This was established by Skowronski and Carlston (1987), who 
examined positive and negative extremity biases for morality and competence 
judgments during impression formation. Their findings revealed that negative 
rather than positive behaviors are perceived as more diagnostic for someone’s ‘true 
character’ when these refer to the moral domain. In contrast, however, positive 
rather than negative behaviors are perceived as more diagnostic for someone’s 
personality when these behaviors relate to their competence. In other words, we 
assume that everyone can act in a moral way, for instance when criminals pretend 
to be upright citizens - so this is non-diagnostic. However, only immoral people 
should do immoral things. Conversely, we tend to think that everyone can do 
something incompetent once in a while – even a professor can be confused or 
forgetful - but only competent people should be able to behave competently. 
This negative extremity bias concerning morality (e.g., Lupfer, Weeks, & 
Dupuis, 2000) and the differential diagnosticity of moral and competent behaviors 
(e.g., Martijn, Spears, Van der Pligt, & Jakobs, 1992) have been observed in 
empirical research. However, prior studies have focused on impression formation 
about others – examining this from a perceiver’s perspective. Thus far, it has 
remained unclear whether a similar asymmetry in the value attached to moral vs. 
competent behaviors is also evident in impression management – in the concerns 
people have about the image of the self in the eyes of others (from an actor’s 
perspective). To the extent that positive and negative extremity biases for morality 
and competence are also associated with impression management about the self, 
people should be strongly preoccupied with avoiding to display any behavior that 
might indicate their immorality, and focus on providing confirmation of their 
competence. Because it is not always possible to act in line with one’s ambitions 
and ideals, people are likely to be confronted from time to time with others who 
provide negative evaluations of their moral or competent behavior. We argue that 
the asymmetrical implications of person information concerning morality vs. 














That is, they should suffer increased negative states when being confronted with 
negative information concerning their own morality (as compared to their 
competence). Conversely, they should experience increased positive states when 
they receive information about their own competence (as compared to their 
morality). Previous research concerning people’s self-perceptions and impression 
management has revealed evidence offering partial support for this reasoning, as it 
has established that people tend to attach greater importance to moral information 
about the individual or group self then to competence information. That is, overall 
people indicate they perceive moral traits as more important characteristics of their 
personal and social identity than traits referring to their competence (and 
sociability; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). They indicate being motivated to 
display behavior that is seen as moral as a way to secure inclusion in a group 
(Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto & Leach, 2008) and to earn respect from fellow 
ingroup members (Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011). Moreover, this motivation 
to display moral behavior is also evident at a less explicit level as people tend to 
inhibit their social bias against Muslims (i.e., display a moral task performance) 
when the test used to assess this was said to be indicative of their morality instead 
of their competence (Van Nunspeet, Ellemers, Derks, & Nieuwenhuis, 2014). 
Prior research thus underlines the importance of morality over competence in 
impression management about the self. This is the case when people have to 
explicitly state their preference or when they are assigned to a task condition that 
emphasizes either moral or competence implications of task performance. As yet, it 
still needs to be examined whether the greater value attached to moral information 
about the self relates to the desire to avoid appearing immoral, or stems from the 
ambition to demonstrate one’s ability to behave morally. The aim of the present 
research was to directly compare the impact of these different types of information 
related to the self, as a way to establish whether people differentially welcome 
information that might confirm their morality or competence in a positive way, or 
are disturbed by negative information depending on whether it threatens to reveal 
their lack of morality or competence.  
One way of examining the impact of different types of information 












receiving this information. Such a method relies on the introspective capabilities of 
participants and may be affected by people’s explicit preferences for a particular 
type of information over the other, as well as their willingness to reveal these to the 
experimenter. Thus, such self-report measures do not necessarily provide a reliable 
picture of their internal states. Psychophysiological measures seem to offer a 
solution for these difficulties associated with self-report measures. For example, 
electrodermal activity, often measured as skin conductance, is an automatic 
response from the sympathetic nervous system caused by arousing stimuli (for an 
overview see Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2000). Indices of skin conductance can thus 
not easily be adapted by the participant for self-presentational reasons, and can be 
measured online (i.e., to monitor changed states while participants receive relevant 
information, instead of relying on retrospective reports). Combining self-reports 
with skin conductance data can thus elucidate how people respond to information 
about their own behavior and compare this to what they report when thinking back 
about the information.   
In addition, previous neuroscientific research has been able to disentangle 
different cognitive processes associated with processing self-relevant information 
(most often using functional magnetic resonance imaging; fMRI). That is, processes 
associated with the detection of self-relevant information seems to be associated with 
different parts of the brain (i.e., the ventral medial prefrontal cortex, vMPFC) than 
the evaluation of self-relevant information (i.e., the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, 
dMPFC; for reviews, see for example Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Van der Meer, 
Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010). Comparing fMRI responses observed in these 
two areas allows us to establish the extent to which people detect information as 
being self-relevant, and separate this from their tendency to relate this to their 
actual self-views. In the current research, we thus combined these different 
indicators of the way participants process self-relevant information: We measured 
participants’ self-reported affective reactions after having received either positive or 
negative feedback about their scores on a measure of their morality and 
competence. In addition, we measured their skin conductance to assess 
physiological arousal (Study 6.1) and used fMRI to examine mental processing 














Mental Processing of Self-relevant Information 
Previous neuroscientific research has examined the neural networks involved 
in processing information relevant for the self. Prior research has addressed the 
brain regions involved in the assessment of self-relevant information (i.e., 
processing information that people perceive as related to the self; Northoff & 
Panksepp, 2008; Schmitz & Johnson, 2007), and reported networks including both 
subcortical and cortical regions (e.g., caudate nucleus, amygdala, Insula, and 
anterior singulate cortex [ACC]; Schmitz & Johnson, 2007). Moreover, there is high 
consensus on the role of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) in processing such 
self-relevant information (e.g., Abraham, 2013; Ochsner et al., 2005; Northoff & 
Bermpohl, 2004; Schmitz & Johnson, 2007). In fact, Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, 
Wyland, and Kelley (2006) showed that MPFC activation during self-referencing 
was affected by self-relevance. That is, activation in the MPFC was greater when 
participants judged personality characteristics (i.e., traits words such as “honest”) as 
high self-relevant as compared to low self-relevant. In line with these findings, and 
given that we expect that information concerning morality is more self-relevant 
than information concerning competence, we will examine whether receiving 
feedback about one’s morality is associated with greater activation in the MPFC 
than receiving feedback about one’s competence. appraisal 
Although activation in the MPFC is found in many studies concerning self-
relevance in general, subregions within the MPFC seem to be associated with more 
specific processes. For example, in their review, Amodio and Frith (2006) discuss 
that whereas the posterior rostral region of the MFC is activated during action-
monitoring tasks, the anterior rostral MFC is activated during tasks involving self-
knowledge, person perception and mentalizing. Moreover, Van der Meer et al. 
(2010) made a distinction between the ventral and dorsal part of the MPFC and 
argued that the vMPFC is associated with detecting and labeling self-relevant 
information, and the dMPFC with evaluation and decision-making processes in 
self-referential thinking. In the current research, in which participants are only 
asked to passively view their scores on a measure indicative of their moral and 












perceived as more self-relevant than information concerning competence which 
could thus be associated with activation in the ventral MPFC. 
Current Research 
The current research aims to investigate whether the differential diagnosticity 
of morality and competence that is found in impression formation of others is also 
evident when people are informed about their own morality and competence. Based 
on social psychology research, which has shown that people perceive moral traits as 
more significant for their social and personal identity than traits concerning 
competence (e.g., Leach et al., 2007; Ellemers et al., 2008), we predict that receiving 
information concerning one’s own morality (as compared to one’s competence) is 
associated with increased self-reported emotional responses, arousal (assessed by a 
measure of skin conductance) and greater activation in the MPFC. In addition, 
impression formation research (e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1987) has revealed 
that negative, rather than positive, information is perceived as a better indication of 
someone’s moral integrity. Conversely, positive rather than negative, information 
tends to be perceived as a better indication of someone’s competence. Drawing on 
these findings relating to impression formation of others, we predict parallel effects 
when people receive evaluative information about the self. This is why we 
anticipate the valence of self-related information to interact with the dimension 




Thirty three students (six males, Mage = 18.9, SD = 1.45) from Leiden 
University participated in the study in return for course credits or money. Five 
participants were not included in the SCR data analyses because of technical 
failures in the equipment or software; three other participants were excluded from 
the SCR data analyses because the signal was extremely noisy, and one other 
participant was excluded from the SCR data analyses since we could not measure a 
skin conductance signal. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: They either received positive or negative feedback (i.e., measured 














within-participants factor). To enhance the credibility of the feedback provided, in 
both experimental conditions the valenced feedback was interspersed with 
evaluatively neutral feedback. 
Procedure. 
The feedback participants received was said to be based upon their 
performance on an Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) which 
participants completed in the first part of the experiment. The (non-) Muslim IAT 
in the current study has previously been used to examine whether people adjust 
their performance when the test is presented as indicative of their morality (i.e., by 
informing participants that the test can assess their moral values concerning 
egalitarianism and discrimination) or of their competence (i.e., by informing 
participants that the test can assess their ability to process information and learn 
new tasks; Van Nunspeet et al., 2014). Moreover, since this previous research has 
shown that participants indeed perceive the test as a credible measure of both 
properties, we implemented the IAT in the current research as a task on which we 
could present participants with feedback about their moral values as well as their 
competence in displaying accurate responses. Importantly, in the current study, 
participants were informed about these test implications after they had finished the 
IAT, right before they received their feedback to keep task motivation and effort 
constant across experimental conditions. 
The IAT included pictures of female faces with and without a headscarf that 
had to be associated with positive and negative images (International Affective 
Picture System; Lang et al., 2005). Congruent IAT trials were trials on which 
participants were asked to press one response key when viewing both female faces 
with a headscarf and negative pictures and another key when viewing female faces 
without a headscarf and positive pictures. Incongruent trials were trials on which 
the same response key had to be pressed for pictures of female faces with a 
headscarf and positive pictures and another key when viewing female faces without 
a headscarf and negative pictures. In order to present participants with several 
instances of feedback (i.e., necessary for reliable skin conductance data), they 












After the IAT participants were informed about the implications of the test. 
That is, they were led to believe that the test is able to assess both their level of 
competence (tested as their ability to quickly process new information and to learn 
new tasks), as well as their level of morality (i.e., their moral values concerning 
egalitarianism and discrimination). Moreover, participants read that their scores on 
these two test domains would be provided relative to the scores of other university 
students and could thus give an indication whether they had scored above average 
(positive feedback, indicating relatively high moral values or competence), below 
average (negative feedback, indicating relatively low moral values or lack of 
competence), or whether their scores were average for the student population 
(neutral feedback). Neutral feedback was included to enhance credibility of the 
cover story, and as a control - to be able to check whether above or below average 
scores affected participants more than average (evaluative neutral) scores. The 
valence of the feedback was manipulated between-participants - since we did not 
think it would be credible to provide participants with both above and below 
average scores on a single measure.  
Scores were preprogrammed and represented by colored bars in a normal 
distribution in which the right hand side displayed above average scores related to 
morality (or competence) and the left hand side below average scores related to 
immorality (or incompetence). The participant’s score was indicated by a red 
(negative), green (positive) or yellow (neutral) bar in the normal distribution and the 
text “your score” right above it (see Figure 6.1).  
Participants either received positive (and neutral) or negative (and neutral) 
feedback. Each round of feedback was provided in two blocks in which one block 
concerned feedback related to one’s morality and the other block feedback related 
to one’s competence. Before each block, participants read the information 
concerning the nature of the task domain under examination (competence or 
morality). The order of the feedback blocks was counterbalanced between 
participants. Each block consisted of ten rounds of valenced (positive or negative) 
feedback interspersed with ten rounds of neutral feedback. Every feedback round 
consisted of a screen stating that participants’ next test score (concerning their 














providing the presentation of the feedback (3 sec.). After viewing their test score 
for three seconds, participants could press a key to go to the next round of 
feedback (see Figure 6.1).  
Skin conductance was assessed during the IAT as well as the feedback phase 
to enable participants to get used to the equipment that was attached and to avoid 
drawing particular attention to a particular part of the experiment as being of 
special interest. After completing the IAT and before the feedback was provided, 
the waiting time was used to derive a baseline measure for skin conductance. After 
having received all the feedback, participants were asked to complete some self-
report questionnaires (see details below). The experiment lasted approximately 
thirty minutes in total, after which participants were properly debriefed about the 
bogus feedback and the actual goal of the study. They were then thanked and 

















Skin conductance acquisition and processing. 
Skin conductance was measured using two pregelled disposable Ag-AgCl 
electrodes attached to the medial phalanx surfaces of the middle and index fingers 
of the non-dominant hand. The transponder unit relayed skin conductance data to 
a host computer running AcqKnowledge software, which logged every feedback 
stimulus-onset on the skin conductance signal. The data were filtered online with a 
low pass filter of 2 Hz and offline with a low pass filter of 0.33 Hz. The data was 
processed in two ways: We measured whether the feedback resulted in an elevated 
skin conductance level (SCL) compared to baseline, and we determined whether 
each feedback trial resulted in elevated skin conductance responses (SCRs). For the 
first measure, we computed difference scores between the average SCL in a 0-6 
seconds time window after stimulus-onset in comparison to the average SCL in the 
final 30 seconds of the baseline measure, separately for each type of feedback (i.e., 
neutral and valence feedback concerning morality and competence). For the second 
measure we detected SCRs with a minimum amplitude change of 0.01 µS after 
stimulus-onset, and measured the number of SCRs in a time window between 1 
and 6 seconds after each stimulus-onset. When there was no SCR associated with 
the feedback-stimulus, “0” was recorded. The mean number of SCR’s was then 
calculated separately for feedback indicating scores on morality and competence 
and separately for neutral and valenced feedback. It should be noted that since 
many participants failed to generate SCR’s related to the feedback, the mean 
number of fluctuations was below 1.0 (which is in line with previous research; e.g., 
Lawrence et al., 2006).  
Self-reports. 
Checks. We first checked whether participants had experienced the task in a 
similar way and were equally uncertain about their performance, regardless of 
whether they had received positive or negative scores. For this purpose, after 
having received all of their feedback, we asked participants to answer two questions 
about their experience while performing the IAT (i.e., “I was insecure about my 
performance on the test” and “During the test, I had the feeling I was able to 
perform very well” [recoded], r = .44, p = .011). They could indicate their answers 














Self-reported negative emotional response. We then asked participants to 
reconsider how they felt while receiving the feedback, and to indicate the emotional 
response this raised. Items asked participants to indicate their general feelings (i.e., 
“Seeing my scores gave me a bad feeling”; “My scores gave me the idea that I don’t 
have good qualities”; “Seeing my scores gave me a good feeling”; “My scores made 
me feel good about myself”) as well as a number of specific emotions (i.e., “When I 
received feedback concerning the morality/competence domain of the test, I felt: 
discouraged / nervous / guilty / ashamed / threatened / frustrated / happy / 
relaxed / motivated / proud / enthusiastic / challenged”). All answers were 
assessed using 7-point Likert scales (1 = completely agree – 7 = completely 
disagree). All these questions were asked twice: Once to indicate emotional 
responses to morality feedback and once to convey emotional responses to 
competence feedback. Items concerning positive feelings and emotions were 
recoded so that higher scores always indicated a more negative emotional response. 
We then combined the items concerning general feelings and specific emotions for 
each type of feedback, resulting in two overall indicators. One combined score 
indicated the degree to which participants reported a negative emotional response 
when viewing their scores on morality (α = .94) the other indicated negative 
emotional responses when viewing their competence scores (α = .91). 
Results 
Checks.  
To check whether participants were equally uncertain about their task scores 
so that the feedback they received seemed credible regardless of experimental 
condition, we asked participants to indicate their thoughts about their performance 
during the IAT. Results of a one-sample T-test with the mean of the scale (4) as the 
test value showed that, overall, participants reported to be quite insecure about 
their performance (M = 4.77, SD = 1.29; t[32] = 3.45, p = .002). There were no 
differences between experimental conditions, suggesting that below or above 
average test scores would seem equally plausible. 
Skin conductance data.  
Skin conductance level (SCL). To test whether the feedback presented 












or task domain), we first tested the difference between the average SCL following 
the feedback (i.e., 0-6 seconds after stimulus-onset, across all types of feedback) 
and the average SCL during the final 30 seconds of the baseline. Results of a paired 
sample T-test revealed that, as intended, the feedback significantly increased SCL as 
compared to baseline, Mdifference = 0.64, SD = 1.38, t[23] = 2.26, p = .03.  
To examine any differences in SCL between the types of feedback, we 
conducted a repeated measures ANOVA on the difference scores of SCL (0-6 
seconds after stimulus-onset minus baseline) with the type of feedback 
(valenced/neutral) and task domain (morality/ competence scores) as repeated 
measures, and the context in which feedback was provided (positive/ negative 
feedback condition) and order (morality/competence block first) as between-
groups factors. Results revealed a significant main effect of feedback type; F(1, 20) 
= 11.45, p = .003, η2p = .36, indicating that SCL was greater after valenced (M = 
0.68, S.E. = 0.31) compared to neutral feedback (M = 0.56, S.E. = 0.30). This main 
effect was however qualified by a significant feedback type*order interaction effect; 
F(1, 20) = 7.46, p = .01, η2p = .27, revealing that the difference between valenced 
and neutral feedback was only significant when the scores concerning morality 
were presented first; F(1, 20) = 16.33, p = .001, η2p = .45. The other simple main 
effects were not significant; all F’s < 1. There were no interaction effects with task 
domain, indicating that there were no differences in average SCL between 
positive/negative or neutral feedback related to morality and competence.  
Skin conductance responses (SCRs).To examine whether the different 
types of feedback affected skin conductance directly after stimulus-onset, we also 
analyzed SCRs. We assessed differences in SCRs during the feedback round with a 
repeated measures ANOVA with the type of feedback (valenced/neutral) and task 
domain (morality/ competence scores) as repeated measures, and the context in 
which feedback was provided (positive/ negative feedback condition) and task 
domain (morality/competence scores) as repeated measures, and valence (positive 
vs. negative feedback) and order (morality vs. competence block first) as between-
groups factors. Results revealed no difference in SCR´s between valenced and 
neutral feedback; F(1,20) = 2.32, p = .14. However, we found evidence in support 














impact than feedback referring to competence: We observed a marginally 
significant main effect of task domain; F(1,20) = 3.90, p = .06, η2p = .16, indicating 
that there were more SCRs when participants were confronted with their morality 
(M = 0.36, S.E. = .03) than competence scores (M = 0.29, S.E. = 0.04). This effect 
was qualified by a significant interaction effect between task domain and order; 
F(1,20) = 5.19, p = .03, η2p = .21, indicating that a significant difference in SCRs 
between morality and competence feedback only emerged when the morality scores 
were presented first (i.e., increased SCR’s in the morality [M = 0.40, S.E. = .05] 
compared to the competence block [M = 0.21, S.E. = .08], F[1,20] = 7.90, p = .01, 
η2p = .28). When competence scores were presented first there was no difference in 
responses to the different task domains ([Mmorality = 0.31, S.E. = .04; Mcompetence = 
0.32, S.E. = .07]; F < 1). Additionally, we observed a trend towards a three-way 
interaction between task domain, order and valence; F(1,20) = 2.99, p = .10, η2p = 
.13. Examination of the repeated measures ANOVA separately for the positive and 
negative feedback conditions revealed that the task domain x order interaction 
effect could only be traced to the negative feedback condition; F(1,11) = 7.36, p = 




Figure 6.2. Average skin conductance responses (SCRs) in each condition. Whereas there 
were no differences in SCRs for positive feedback (right), negative feedback concerning 
morality was associated with increased physiological arousal –in case morality scores were 












Self-reported negative emotional response.  
After participants had received all of their feedback, we asked them to think 
back about the moments they received feedback about their morality and 
competence and to recall and report their emotional response. A repeated measures 
ANOVA with task domain (morality/competence) as the repeated measure and 
valence (positive/negative feedback)13 as between-participants factor, revealed 
evidence in support of our reasoning. We observed a significant interaction effect 
between task domain and valence; F(1,31) = 4.00, p = .05, η2p = .11. The relevant 
means and analysis of simple main effects confirmed that the difference between 
positive and negative feedback conditions in self-reported emotional response was 
more pronounced when participants received feedback regarding their morality; M 
difference= 1.82, S.E. = 0.24; F(1,31) = 60.02, p < .001, η2p = .66, rather than their 
competence; Mdifference = 1.44, S.E. = 0.22; F(1,31) = 42.37, p < .001, η2p = .58. 
Specifically, when participants had received negative feedback they reported a more 
negative emotional response when the feedback was related to their morality (M = 
3.45, S.E. = 0.17) rather than their competence (M = 4.07, S.E. = 0.16); F(1,31) = 
6.95, p = .01, η2p = .18. There was no difference between responses to positive 
feedback depending on whether this pertained to the morality or the competence 
domain (F < 1).  
Taken together, the findings of Study 6.1 offer evidence in line with our 
reasoning, as they suggest that receiving information related to one’s morality has 
more impact on participants’ responses than feedback related to their competence, 
in particular when people are confronted with negative feedback. To examine 
whether feedback concerning one’s morality (as compared to competence) is also 
processed differently in the brain, we conducted an fMRI study in which we 
examined the neural network involved in processing self-relevant information. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Note that we did not include a factor distinguishing between valenced and neutral 
feedback in this analysis, because we asked participants how they felt about their feedback 
overall, which was predominantly negative (negative and neutral) in the negative feedback 


















Forty right-handed students (12 males, Mage = 21.7 years, SD = 3.1) from 
Leiden University participated in the study in return for course credits or money. 
None of the participants reported a history of psychiatric or neurological disorders, 
and current use of any medications. One participant was excluded from the analysis 
of the behavioral data because she failed to detect the color change of the fixation 
cross (whereas all other features of the stimuli were clear). Three other participants 
could not be included in the fMRI analyses because of technical problems. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the positive or negative feedback condition. 
All procedures were approved by the medical ethical committee of the Leiden 
University Medical Center (LUMC) and all participants gave informed consent for 
the study. 
Procedure. 
Before the scanning session, participants performed the (non-)Muslim IAT 
without receiving any information about the implications of the test, similar to 
Study 6.1. During the scanning session, participants were first informed that the 
test was able to assess both their level of competence, as well as their level of 
morality. In contrast to Study 6.1, participants thus read about both types of 
implications before they received any of the feedback stimuli. Participants were 
presented with the same feedback stimuli as used in Study 6.1.  
Participants were informed about both types of test implications at once 
because the current study used an event-related block design: Feedback was 
provided in one run in which 6 blocks of feedback concerning morality were 
alternated with 6 blocks of feedback concerning competence. Each block consisted 
of 5 feedback trials of which two or three trials provided valenced feedback ( 
positive or negative, depending on experimental condition) and two or three trials 
provided neutral feedback. The reason for presenting the competence and morality 
trials in mini blocks was to ensure direct repetition of each task domain, in order 












design used in Study 6.1). In total there were 15 trials per feedback type (morality-
valence/morality-neutral/competence-valence/competence-neutral)14.  
Each feedback round consisted of a screen stating that participants’ next test 
score concerning their morality or competence was being computed (2 sec.), a 
fixation cross (jittered duration, 4-8 sec.), and the feedback stimulus (3 sec., see 
Figure 6.3). To ensure that participants were attentive, they were asked to press a 
key (with their right index finger) whenever the fixation cross changed color, which 
happened randomly after 1 to5 seconds.  
As part of a larger study, the scanning session lasted approximately one hour. 
After the scanning session had ended, participants were asked to fill out some 
questionnaires. The complete study lasted approximately 2 hours, after which 
participants were properly debriefed, thanked and given their incentive. 
fMRI data acquisition and processing.  
Scanning was performed at the Leiden University Medical Centre (LUMC) 
with a standard whole-head coil on a 3.0 Tesla Philips Achieva scanner. Using E-
prime 2.0 software, the task instructions and feedback was projected onto a screen 
at the back of the scanner bore, which participants could view via a window 
attached to the top of head coil. Participants could respond by pressing a button 
(using their right index finger) on a box attached to their right leg. The feedback 
was provided in one run, lasting approximately 15 minutes. Functional data were 
obtained using T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging ([EPI], repetition time (TR) = 
2200 ms, echo time (TE) = 30 ms, slice matrix = 80 x 80, slice thickness = 2.75 
mm, slice gap = 0.28 mm, field of view [FOV] = 220 mm). A high-resolution T2-
weighted anatomical scan (same slice prescription as EPI) was collected at the end 
of the scanning as well as a high resolution 3D T1-weighted anatomical image (TR 
= 9.751 ms, TE = 4.59 ms, flip angle = 8°, 140 slices, 0.875 mm x 0.875 mm x 1.2 
mm, and FOV = 224.000 x 168.000 x 177.333). 
                                                 
14 The order of the blocks of feedback was not counterbalanced between participants (i.e., 
the first five feedback trials always concerned participants’ morality and the following five 
participants’ competence), which could have affected the results. We therefore also 
analyzed the data without the first ten trials to control for the possible high impact of 
these initial scores. Results of this analysis were similar to the ones described in the 














Data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM8 software (Welcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London) implemented in MATLAB 
(Mathworks, Sherborn, MA). The functional time series were realigned to 




Figure 6.3. Example trial of feedback presented in Study 6.2.   
 
 
Translational movement parameters never exceeded 1 voxel (< 3 mm) in any 
direction for any subject or scan. Functional volumes were spatially normalized to 
EPI templates. The normalization algorithm used a 12 parameter affine 
transformation together with a nonlinear transformation involving cosine basis 
functions and resampled the volumes to 3 mm cubic voxels. Functional volumes 
were spatially smoothed using an 8 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel. 
Templates were based on the MNI305 stereotaxic space (Cocosco, Kollokian, 
Kwan, Pike, & Evans, 1997), and the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) atlas 












To analyze the data, a canonical hemodynamic response function was 
convolved at the onset of the feedback stimulus and modeled as a zero-duration 
event. We distinguished between four conditions within participants: Valence versus 
neutral feedback and feedback related to morality or competence. Whether the 
valence was positive or negative was a between-participants manipulation. These 
conditions resulted in four 2 X 2 full factorial designs. Two designs were used to 
examine the effects of valenced and neutral feedback for the positive and negative 
feedback conditions separately, resulting in two 2 (Feedback: Valence/Neutral) X 2 
(Task Domain: morality/competence) ANOVAs which were run separately for the 
positive feedback condition and the negative feedback condition. Two other 
designs were used to directly compare the effects of positive versus negative 
feedback, resulting in a 2 (Valence Feedback: positive/negative) X 2 (Task Domain: 
morality/competence) ANOVA and a 2 (Neutral Feedback: positive/negative 
condition) X 2 (Task Domain: morality/competence) ANOVA. These ANOVAs 
concerned a comparison between groups.  
The analyses were carried out using the general linear model in SPM8. For 
each individual, contrast parameter images were computed and the resulting 
contrast images were submitted to second-level group analyses. Only effects of at 
least 10 continuous voxels that exceeded a False Discovery Rate (FDR) corrected 
threshold of p < .05 are reported.  
Moreover, since we were interested in the –perhaps more subtle– difference 
between receiving feedback about morality or competence, we extracted parameter 
estimates from the regions of interest (ROI) that were identified in the whole brain 
analyses to explore the pattern of the activation across our conditions. We 
extracted the mean parameter estimate within each ROI for each condition, 
reducing the ROI to a single data point. This is a common approach in cognitive 
neuroscience which has two advantages: (1) it reduces the number of comparisons, 
and (2) collapsing across voxels within the region decreases noise (Poldrack, 2007). 
We focused specifically on the MPFC in the contrast positive versus negative 
feedback. However, activation in MPFC was part of a larger network (see Table 
6.1). To isolate the activation cluster within the MPFC, we adjusted the threshold 














was used to gain functional specificity in the regions that were already a priori 
defined as regions of interest. This region was used to test the hypothesis that 
valenced feedback would be associated with differential activity in the morality 
versus competence condition. These regions were extracted using the Marsbar 
toolbox (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) for SPM8. 
Self-reported negative emotional response. 
To examine participants’ negative emotional response related to the moment 
they received their feedback, we used the same scales as described in Study 6.1: A 
scale measuring participants negative emotional response concerning their scores 
on morality (α = .90) and a scale measuring participants negative emotional 
response concerning their scores on competence (α = .89). These self-reports were 
administered after the scanning session. 
Results 
Behavioral data.  
Since we asked participants to press a key whenever the fixation cross 
changed color (primarily to keep them attentive during the scanning session), we 
could test whether their response latencies differed between morality and 
competence trials. Indeed, a 2 (Feedback Type: positive/negative between-
participants factor) x 2 (Task Domain: morality/competence within-participants 
factor) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant interaction effect; F(1,37) 
= 9.54, p = .004, η2p =.21. This indicated a significant reversal in the direction of 
the effects in the morality condition compared to the competence condition (see 
Figure 6.4). As a result, participants who received negative feedback responded 
significantly slower on morality (M = 474.82, SD = 115.81) than on competence 
trials (M = 450.39, SD = 105.35); F(1,37) = 6.08, p = .02, η2p =.14. In contrast, 
participants in the positive feedback condition responded somewhat more slowly 
on trials concerning competence (M = 464.86, SD = 95.41) than morality (M = 



















Figure 6.4. Interaction effect between reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) on morality 
and competence trials: Whereas participants who received negative feedback responded 
more slowly on morality as compared to competence trials, participants who received 




Whole brain level. To examine neural activation associated with receiving 
positive or negative and neutral feedback about one’s morality and competence, we 
conducted four ANOVAs. First, we examined the effects of valenced and neutral 
feedback about morality and competence separately for the positive and negative 
feedback conditions. The results of these two 2 (Feedback: Valence/Neutral) X 2 
(Task Domain: morality/competence) full factorial ANOVAs revealed no 
significant effects. Second, we examined neural differences between receiving 
positive versus negative feedback, by selecting only valenced trials. This 2 
(Valenced Feedback: positive/negative) X 2 (Task Domain: morality/competence) 
ANOVA resulted in a main effect of valence (see Table 6.1): Activation in the 
amygdala, insula, bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, and ventral and dorsal MPFC was 
greater for participants who received positive feedback than for participants who 
received negative feedback. There was no main effect of Task Domain, nor an 
interaction effect. Third, we examined neural activation associated with receiving 
neutral feedback (i.e., only trials with neutral feedback were selected). This 2 














morality/competence) full factorial ANOVA did not show any relevant significant 
activation (see Table 6.3). 
Taken together, the contrast positive versus negative feedback resulted in 
activation in the expected brain network associated with processing self-relevant 
information. At the whole brain level the neural activation was not different for 
morality versus competence trials. In the next section, we describe the results from 
more fine grained ROI analyses, using the contrast positive > negative feedback as 
a functional localizer. 
Regions of interest. To examine the difference between feedback related to 
morality and competence, we conducted ROIs analyses of the ventral MPFC 
(vMPFC), a target brain area showing increased activation for positive compared to 
negative feedback. Results revealed an interaction effect between feedback and task 
domain in the vMPFC (F[1,35] = 4.06, p = .05, η2p =.10). Consistent with our 
hypothesis that information concerning one’s morality has a greater impact than 
information concerning one’s competence, we found that the difference between 
positive and negative feedback was more pronounced for scores concerning 
morality; F(1,35) = 14.90, p < .001, η2p =.30, than for scores concerning 
competence; F(1,35) = 7.53, p = .01, η2p =.18 (see Figure 6.5). Moreover, within the 
positive feedback condition, activation in the vMPFC was greater when participants 
viewed their scores concerning morality as compared to competence; F(1,35) = 
3.48, p = .07, η2p =.09. This difference was not significant in the negative feedback 
condition; F(1,35) < 1. 
Self-reported negative emotional response. Results of a repeated measures 
ANOVA with task domain (morality/competence) as the repeated measure and 
valence (positive/negative feedback) as between-groups factor, supported our 
reasoning and were consistent with Study 6.1: We observed a significant interaction 
effect between task domain and valence; F(1,38) = 4.84, p = .03, η2p = .11. The 
relevant means and analysis of simple main effects confirmed that the difference 
between positive and negative feedback conditions in self-reported emotional 
response was more pronounced when participants received feedback regarding 
their morality; M difference= 1.45, S.E. = 0.22; F(1,38) = 44.24, p < .001, η2p = .54, 












.003, η2p = .21. Specifically, when participants had received negative feedback they 
indicated a more negative emotional response when the feedback was related to 
their morality (M = 4.14, S.E. = 0.15) rather than their competence (M = 3.59, S.E. 
= 0.18); F(1,38) = 7.98, p = .01, η2p = .17. There was no difference between 
responses to positive feedback when comparing the morality with the competence 





Brain regions revealed by the main effect of Valence in the 2 (Valenced feedback: positive/negative 
feedback) x 2 (Task Domain: morality/competence) ANOVA at whole brain level. 
 
Anatomical Region L/R voxels Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
       
Medial Orbital Prefrontal Cortex R 51 3.43 30 47 -5 
   3.27 36 29 -14 
   3.12 27 53 1 
Dorsal Medial Prefrontal Cortex L 97 4.01 -12 26 34 
   3.26 -5 38 31 
Dorsal Lateral Prefrontal Cortex L 164 4.53 -36 35 13 
   3.09 -45 14 19 
   2.72 -57 11 22 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L 27 3.34 -18 26 55 
Supplementary Motor Area R 16 2.85 3 8 61 
Middle Temporal Gyrus R 11 2.74 48 -58 19 
ParaHippocampal Gyrus L 18 3.11 -24 -37 -8 
Calcarine/Linual Gyrus R 5575 5.66 15 -88 10 
   5.26 18 -55 -2 
   5.07 15 -64 16 
Middle Occipital Gyrus L 44 3.73 -30 -88 19 
   3.47 -27 -91 10 
   2.74 -33 -73 28 
       
 
MNI coordinates for main effects, peak voxels reported at p < .05, FDR corrected, at 




















Brain regions revealed by the main effect of Valence in the 2 (Valenced feedback: positive/negative 
feedback) x 2 (Task Domain: morality/competence) ANOVA at whole brain level. 
 
Anatomical Region L/R voxels Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
       
Ventral Medial Prefrontal Cortex R 88 4.34 0 59 -2 
   4.29 -12 59 10 
   4.09 9 59 -2 
Dorsal Lateral Prefrontal Cortex L 27 4.53 -36 35 13 
 R 12 3.97 48 20 28 
Rolandic Operculum/Precentral Gyrus R 108 4.74 51 -13 19 
   4.37 48 5 37 
Pre-/Postcentral Gyrus L 19 4.40 -54 2 40 
   3.81 -51 -10 37 
Superior Temporal Gyrus R 23 4.17 57 -4 4 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 19 3.91 -45 -67 19 
Superior Parietal Lobule L 72 4.72 -24 -58 55 
Superior Parietal Lobule / Cuneus L 72 4.72 -24 -58 55 
  R 130 4.77 12 -85 31 
   4.51 15 -64 55 
   4.29 18 -58 46 
Precuneus L 16 3.78 -6 -58 37 
   3.49 -12 -58 31 
Calcarine/Linual Gyrus R 379 5.66 15 -88 10 
   5.26 18 -55 -2 
   5.07 15 -64 16 
Middle Occipital Gyrus R 16 4.46 30 -79 31 
Insula L 52 4.12 -33 -16 16 
   3.82 -24 -19 19 
 R 13 3.93 39 -28 22 
Amygdala R 10 4.13 30 2 -14 
Hippocampus R 21 3.96 24 -34 -5 
       
 
MNI coordinates for main effects, peak voxels reported at p < .01, FDR corrected, at 













Brain regions revealed by the main effect of Valence in the 2 (Neutral feedback: positive/negative 
condition) x 2 (Task Domain: morality/competence) ANOVA at whole brain level. 
 
Anatomical Region L/R voxels Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
       
Superior Parietal Lobule R 21 4.52 18 -61 55 
   3.95 18 -58 46 
   3.68 21 -55 43 
Calcarine Gyrus (Occipital Lobe) R 47 4.30 24 -61 19 
   4.22 15 -64 16 
       
 
MNI coordinates for main effects, peak voxels reported at p < .05, FDR corrected, at 




Figure 6.5. Activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (ROI cluster based on a peak 
voxel, MNI coordinates: x = 0, y = 59, z = -2; p < .01, FDR corrected, p < .01, at least 10 
continuous voxels) revealing the significant interaction between feedback and task 















The aim of the present research was to compare the impact of receiving 
different types of self-relevant information. Specifically, we compared behavioral, 
self-reported, skin conductance and fMRI responses to information regarding an 
individuals’ own morality and competence. Previous research revealed that when 
receiving information about another person’s morality, negative behaviors are 
perceived as more informative than positive behaviors. Conversely, in the 
competence domain, positive information is perceived as more informative than 
negative information (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). Importantly, however, this 
differential diagnosticity has been demonstrated when people form an impression 
of others. Thus, it is as yet unclear whether a similar asymmetry in the perceived 
importance of positive and negative information regarding competence and 
morality is also evident when people process information related to the self.  
We examined this in the present research, by confronting participants with 
information either attesting to or undermining their moral and competent self by 
giving them positive or negative feedback about their performance on a task that 
was supposedly indicative of both domains. After having received the feedback, we 
asked participants to recall their affective responses (i.e., positive and negative 
emotions) related to the moment of feedback. Additionally, we assessed 
participants’ physiological arousal by assessing their skin conductance levels while 
they received their feedback (in Study 6.1) and (in Study 6.2) we used fMRI to 
examine how activation in the neural network involved in processing self-relevant 
information, was associated with receiving the feedback. 
Participants self-reported emotions gave insight into how people reflect upon 
the information they received about their moral and competent self and thus 
whether this self-reflection mirrors the asymmetry that has been observed in 
impression formation of others. The evidence obtained provided partial support 
for our reasoning regarding the differential diagnosticity of (im)moral and 
(in)competent information about the self. That is, compared to information 
concerning competence, information concerning morality had a greater impact 
upon participants’ self-reported emotional response. Especially participants who 












feedback concerned their morality rather than their competence. These findings 
extend research about the importance of morality over competence for people’s 
personal and social identity (e.g., Leach et al., 2007; Ellemers et al., 2008).  
Interestingly, the results of our (neuro)physiological measures offered 
additional support for the pattern of differential diagnosticity of (im)moral and 
(in)competent behaviors found in impression formation research. That is, results of 
analyses of skin conductance responses revealed that physiological arousal was 
increased when participants received feedback about their morality as compared to 
their competence, and this was the case in particular when this feedback had a 
negative content. (Negative) information about one’s own morality thus seemed to 
be more impactful than information concerning one’s competence. These findings 
thus extend prior research which established the explicit motivation to be 
(perceived as ) moral (e.g., Leach et al., 2007; Ellemers et al., 2008) as they reveal 
that automatic affective responses are increased when people are confronted with 
information that calls their morality into question.   
In addition, results of the fMRI experiment showed that positive (rather than 
negative) feedback was associated with greater activation in the amygdala, insula 
and MPFC. The MPFC has previously been associated with the processing of self-
relevant information (e.g., see Abraham, 2013; Moran et al., 2006; Northoff & 
Bermpohl, 2004; Schmitz & Johnson, 2007). The relative increase in activation in 
this region for participants who received positive feedback (as compared to 
participants who received negative feedback) is in line with research showing that 
people are positively biased when they receive self-relevant information. 
Specifically, people tend to think they are better than average (especially when the 
other is a non-specified average student, like in our study; Alicke, Klotz, 
Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995), and expect to receive positive rather 
than negative feedback in social interactions (Hepper, Hart, Gregg, & Sedikides, 
2011). Moreover, prior research has established that positively biased feedback 
processing is associated with activation in the MPFC (Korn, Prehn, Park, Walter, & 
Heekeren, 2012). Extending this prior research, our findings thus reveal that 
positive information concerning one’s own behavior is processed as more self-














results revealed that participants showed more activation in the ventral MPFC 
(vMPFC) when they received positive feedback concerning their morality as 
compared to their competence. In line with research suggesting that the vMPFC is 
associated with the detection and labelling of information relevant to the self (Van 
der Meer et al., 2010), these findings thus suggest that people detect of the 
confirmation of one’s morality as more self-relevant than confirmation of one’s 
competence. 
The findings concerning the impact of negative feedback on affective 
responses and arousal complement the observed effects of positive feedback in the 
fMRI results. That is, the skin conductance data in combination with the self-
reports suggest that people are emotionally moved by negative feedback concerning 
their own moral behavior. Additionally, they process positive feedback concerning 
their own moral behavior as more self-relevant. Across the board, people thus 
seem more likely to attend and respond to information regarding their morality 
rather than their competence, which suggests that this process is more complex 
than the process of impression formation of others: Consistent with impression 
formation, negative information about the self also has a greater impact when it 
concerns one’s own morality as compared to competence. However, people also 
seem to be more attentive to positive information concerning their own morality 
and what this means for their self-view, than that they are focused on possible 
implications of negative information concerning their own morality. In other 
words, people are thus particularly attentive to moral information that may help 
establish a positive self-view. Again, such positive information is most relevant 
when it concerns one’s morality rather than one’s competence. At the same time, 
although people seem to attend less to negative information concerning the self, 
being confronted with such negative information induces increased arousal and 
negative emotion. Unfortunately, we cannot directly relate the findings concerning 
the skin conductance to the fMRI data since we assessed these measures in two 
separate studies. In order to examine this relation more directly, a measure of skin 
conductance should be taken while participants are being scanned. Nevertheless, 
different from how we respond to information about others – when negative 












observations suggest that we seem to perceive positive information as most 
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In this dissertation, I examined three different research questions. In Part I, I tested 
whether people tend to act in ways that are considered moral. In Part II, I 
addressed the question how important is it for people to be perceived as moral by 
others. In Part III, I examined how much people care about whether or not they 
succeed in behaving according to their moral values. Additionally, I aimed to 
unravel the cognitive processes associated with these motivations. In this final 
chapter, I will discuss the conclusions that can be drawn from the research 
reported in the previous five chapters. First, I will review the behavioral findings 
observed in the three different parts of the dissertation. Then I will elaborate on 
evidence revealing the underlying processes associated with these behavioral 
results. 
Behavioral Findings 
Part I: Moral Concerns Cause Inhibition of Intergroup Bias 
Previous research has revealed that people explicitly report that they think it is 
more important to be perceived as moral than as competent (Ellemers, Pagliaro, 
Barreto, & Leach, 2008). One aim of the current dissertation was to examine 
whether people not only explicitly report this motivation, but actually tend to 
behave more according to their moral than competence values. To assess this, I 
presented native Dutch, non-Muslim, research participants with an implicit 
association test (IAT). This test is a measure of one’s (implicit) prejudice towards a 
particular outgroup –in my research these were Muslim women. I framed this test 
as being able to show how moral or how competent people are. Specifically, 
participants were either informed that “this task can give an indication about your 
moral values concerning egalitarianism and discrimination”, or that “this task can 
give an indication about your ability to learn new tasks and to quickly process new 
information”. I thus examined whether the implicit bias people showed in their 
task behavior would be reduced to a greater extent when they were motivated to be 
moral than when they were motivated to show their competence. Results in 
Chapters 2, 4 and 5 (Studies, 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, and 5.1) revealed that people indeed are 
more motivated by their moral than their competence values. In case of an 
emphasis on the moral (as compared to the competence) test implications, 



















In this dissertation research, no specific norms were made salient when the 
moral implications of the task were emphasized, nor were participants explicitly 
informed on how they might avoid displaying bias while working on the IAT. In 
the moral motivation condition, participants only read that the test could give an 
indication of the value they attached to egalitarianism vs. discrimination. 
Furthermore, participants’ performance was assessed when they performed the test 
in private and anonymously. The findings obtained with this procedure extend 
previous research as they make it possible to exclude a number of alternative 
explanations relating to self-presentation and displays of socially desirable response 
patterns. Thus, the data reported here reveal that people act upon their own moral 
values, presumably because this is important for how they see themselves. 
Part II: Moral Motivation is Affected by the Social Context  
In the second part of this dissertation, I examined whether it is also important 
for people to be perceived as moral by others. To examine this I introduced a 
procedure that led participants to believe that their performance on the IAT was 
monitored by another individual present in the lab. My findings reveal that people 
are particularly motivated to act according to their moral values in the presence of 
people who belong to the same group as they do (i.e., ingroup members). In my 
research, these groups were created according to very minimal criteria (i.e., a 
minimal group paradigm; Tajfel, 1970). Before participants started with the IAT, 
they completed a questionnaire that ostensibly assessed their personality type. After 
that, they were told that they were coupled with their evaluator based on both their 
questionnaire scores. It was explained that when the evaluator was assessed to have 
the same personality type as the participant, they shared this particular group 
membership. In other words, this made them ingroup members. When the 
evaluator was assessed to have another personality type, s/he differed from the 
participant. This distinction in their personality types thus made the evaluator an 
outgroup member. This type of paradigm allowed me to exclude the possibility that 
alternative concerns (such as prior liking, familiarity or value similarity) might 
induce participants’ responses to different evaluators. Thus, I was able to establish 
that people are more motivated to act morally in front of others who are relevant 















nationality, gender, religion, or occupation. The current findings thus extend 
previous research that demonstrated that people explicitly report the importance of 
being seen as a moral ingroup member (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007) by 
showing that they actually are more likely to act in accordance with their moral 
values when their behavior is monitored by an ingroup member.  
One could wonder how meaningful the situation created in this experiment is, 
as a minimal group paradigm is unrelated to the intergroup associations examined 
with the IAT. That is, in the IAT participants are asked to make associations 
between non-Muslims and Muslims and pictures of positive and negative scenes. 
Group memberships based on personality type may thus be seen as irrelevant to 
the task. However, exactly because of the use of a minimal group paradigm, I was 
able to reveal the importance of being perceived as moral for people’s social 
identity. Introducing two experimentally created groups, which had no meaning or 
known moral values outside of the laboratory, was sufficient to increase people’s 
motivation to appear moral towards an ingroup rather than an outgroup member. 
This finding can thus not be attributed to factors other than the categorization 
allegedly based on personality types introduced in the experiment. 
Nevertheless, the importance of being perceived as moral by self-relevant 
others may go beyond a shared minimal group membership. In fact, introducing a 
group membership that does interfere with the intergroup associations made in the 
IAT may reveal additional motivations to adhere to moral norms. In Chapter 5 I 
accordingly established that being perceived as unprejudiced is even more 
important when a representative of the social target group is present. That is, when 
participants thought that their performance was monitored by a Muslim woman, 
they inhibited their bias against Muslims to an even greater extent than in the 
presence of a minimal ingroup member. Although this finding is consistent with 
previous research on intergroup bias (e.g., Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001; 
Richeson & Ambady, 2003), the current results extend this research in an important 
way. The way my study was set up allowed me to show that the moral implications 
of one’s behavior can be emphasized in many different ways – that all can be 
effective. The results of Study 5.1 show that simply mentioning the moral 



















the actual presence of a Muslim evaluator. That is, my research demonstrated that 
participants inhibited their bias to a similar extent when they were being monitored 
by a non-Muslim woman during a task of which the moral implications were 
emphasized as when they were being monitored by a Muslim woman. Taken 
together, these findings thus reveal that signaling the moral implications of one’s 
performance can instigate moral behavior to a similar extent as explicitly 
confronting people with others who depend on them for moral treatment (i.e., 
Muslims). 
The Underlying Processes 
Parts I and II 
Apart from showing behavioral effects of emphasizing the moral implications 
of one’s behavior, I also examined the cognitive processes underlying people’s 
motivation to be and to appear moral. More specifically, by applying measures 
borrowed from the field of neuroscience, I was able to show how focusing on 
people’s morality changes their attention to ingroup and outgroup members, as well 
as the degree to which they monitor their own moral behavior. 
Moral motivation changes people’s focus of attention.  
In Studies 2.2, 3, and 4.2, I examined brain activation associated with the 
motivation to be moral using event-related brain potentials derived from EEG (i.e., 
ERPs, derived from activation recorded at the scalp) and functional MRI (i.e., to 
localize activation in the brain) while they were performing moral behavior. Results 
showed that emphasizing the moral implications of people’s behavior causes them 
to increase their attention towards the faces of the different group members 
presented in the IAT. People thus attended more to the difference between 
ingroup and outgroup members when they were motivated to approach this task in 
a moral way compared to when they were concerned with being competent at the 
task. At first sight this increased attention to group membership may seem to 
contradict moral intentions. That is, performing in line with moral values –not 
revealing intergroup bias– might also be expected to result in less differentiation 
between groups evident in increased similarity of cognitive responses when looking 
at members of ingroups and outgroups. Nevertheless, while participants were more 















instructions, we found in Study 2.2 that people were more able to respond in an 
unbiased way. This combination of effects seems to suggest that the increased 
social categorization of ingroup as distinct from outgroup members was needed in 
order for participants to inhibit their bias against the outgroup and thus to adhere 
to their moral values. This explanation is in line with the notion that in order to 
deal with one’s upcoming thoughts, these must first be recognized and accepted 
(Wegner, 2011). Likewise, in order to suppress the tendency to reveal bias, one 
must first acknowledge the difference between group members. 
The investigation of the cognitive processes underlying moral motivation also 
extend our findings on the behavioral measures revealing the importance people 
attach to being perceived as moral by their ingroup members in particular. That is, 
complementing the behavioral effects observed in Study 4.1, the results of Study 
4.2 revealed that participants’ increased cognitive attention to the ingroup and 
outgroup faces when the implications of the test were formulated in terms of their 
moral values, only emerged when they were evaluated by someone of their own 
(minimal) ingroup, and not when they were being monitored by a member of 
another (out)group. In other words, the adjusted cognitive approach towards the 
task –arguably to make it possible to adhere to moral group norms– was especially 
apparent in an intragroup context.     
Moral motivation enhances response-monitoring. 
Besides the increased perceptual attention to the difference between faces of 
ingroup and outgroup members, participants to whom the moral (rather than the 
competence) implications of the task were emphasized also showed enhanced 
error-monitoring. That is, when participants were motivated to show their morality, 
they paid more (automatic) attention to their responses than when they wanted to 
show their competence. Consistent with previous ERP findings (e.g., Gehring, 
Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993), the error-related negativity (ERN) 
modulation was evident when participants made incorrect (as compared to correct) 
responses. Importantly, this enhanced response to errors was greater when the 
moral rather than competence implications of the task were emphasized. Previous 
research has revealed that increases in the ERN are associated with how important 



















they care about making errors on the task (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005). 
The enhanced ERN modulation in case of an emphasis on one’s moral values thus 
implies that people are more concerned about making mistakes when the task 
supposedly indicates their morality than when it ‘merely’ indicates their 
competence. Additionally, these findings suggest that the motivation to be moral 
can in part be explained by an increased concern about not appearing moral. In 
comparison, the prospect of appearing incompetent seems to be less distressing. 
Importantly, the effect concerning participants’ error-monitoring also 
depended on the social context. Results of Study 4.2 showed that the emphasis on 
moral implications in combination with being monitored by an ingroup member 
increased response-monitoring on both incorrect as well as correct responses. Thus, 
when people are evaluated by another ingroup member, they show a general 
increase of attention towards their own moral behavior. The ERN findings in Part 
I thus reveal that people are primarily concerned with making mistakes that can be 
perceived as an indication of immoral behavior. In addition, the results in Part II 
show that when people show their moral behavior to their fellow group members, 
it seems equally important to detect any mistakes as it is to monitor their correct 
responses. 
Moral motivation increases detection of task-relevant characteristics. 
The emphasis on the moral implications of the task and being monitored by 
an ingroup member also affected participants’ detection of the different types of 
trials in the IAT. The IAT consists of incongruent and congruent trials. As 
participants who took part in the research described in this dissertation were non-
Muslim, the congruent trials consisted of associating faces of non-Muslim women 
(i.e., ingroup members) with pictures of positive scenes, and faces of Muslim 
women (i.e., outgroup members) with pictures of negative scenes. By contrast, the 
incongruent trials consisted of associating outgroup members with positive pictures 
and ingroup members with negative pictures. Previous ERP research has shown 
that the detection of the difference between such congruent versus incongruent 
trials (i.e., ‘conflict-monitoring’) is visible in the N450 modulation, which is 
typically larger for incongruent than congruent IAT-trials (e.g., Williams & 















modulation was increased in case of an emphasis on morality and when an ingroup 
member was evaluating participants’ performance. The detection of the different 
types of IAT trials was thus enhanced under these circumstances. A possible 
explanation for this finding may be that the moral implications of the test, and the 
presence of an ingroup member, made the meaning of the difference between 
congruent versus incongruent trials more evident. It suggests that participants may 
have understood that the ease with which they responded on congruent as 
compared to incongruent trials was related to possible signs of prejudice. These 
participants may have realized that the relatively easy part of the task consisted of 
associating the outgroup with negativity and the ingroup with positivity. And that 
the relatively difficult part meant associating the outgroup with positivity and the 
ingroup with negativity. In contrast, participants who thought the task was 
indicative of their competence may only have noticed the difference in the level of 
difficulty between the two types of trials, without taking a notion of the social 
meaning of the associations they were asked to make. 
Overall, the findings of Parts I and II are important as they extend prior 
research that used self-reports (e.g., Leach et al., 2007; Ellemers et al., 2008) as well 
as our own research showing actual moral behavior on an IAT to examine the 
importance of being moral. By incorporating the examination of unconscious 
cognitive processes with ERP measures, the current findings reveal how people’s 
motivation to be (perceived as) moral leads to more moral behavior. Results 
concerning the underlying cognitive processes reveal that moral concerns affect 
how people perform the task and to what kind of aspects they pay attention during 
the task (i.e. “Is this person a Muslim or non-Muslim?”; “Is this particular trial 
more or less difficult?” and “Am I succeeding in being unbiased?”), affecting their 
actual moral behavior (in this case implicit bias against Muslims). 
Part III: People Show a Positivity Bias Concerning Their Own Morality 
Overall, the behavioral, ERP and fMRI results of the first two parts of this 
dissertation indicated that emphasizing the moral implications of one’s behavior 
(either while being evaluated by an ingroup member or in private) causes people to 
become more vigilant during their performance on a test of implicit prejudice. The 



















it is to avoid committing moral transgressions. A possible explanation could be that 
the motivation to be moral is accompanied by a fear to appear immoral, whereas 
the possibility of appearing incompetent may be less distressing. That is, in our 
mind even competent people may sometimes do incompetent things, but people 
who do something immoral once are unlikely to be seen as moral persons. In Part 
III of this dissertation, I therefore examined how much people care about whether 
they succeed or fail in behaving according to their moral values – compared to how 
much they care about their success or failure in the competence domain.  
In Chapter 6, I assessed people’s affective and cognitive responses after and 
while they received information about their own moral and competent behavior. 
Participants first performed a task (the IAT), but in contrast to the procedure in 
previous chapters, this task was said to be indicative of their moral values as well as 
their competence. Thereafter, they were either informed that they had performed 
above (positive feedback) or below (negative feedback) average on the moral and 
competence dimensions of the task. This allowed me to directly compare how 
positive versus negative feedback concerning one’s own moral and competent 
behavior impacted upon people’s state of mind and emotional well-being. 
Results of Study 6.1 revealed that people feel bad when they are confronted 
with information indicating that they are not that moral as compared to others. 
Such information causes increased levels of physical arousal (measured using skin 
conductance responses) and people also report to experience more intense negative 
emotions. Crucial to my predictions, receiving information that one is less moral 
than others makes people feel worse than receiving information indicating that they 
are less competent than others. These findings thus confirm the notion that people 
care more about whether they succeed in behaving according to their moral values 
rather than behaving competently.  
Additionally, results of the fMRI study in Chapter 6 seem to suggest that 
when people receive positive information indicating that they are more moral 
compared to others, they perceive this information as highly relevant to their self-
concept. Previous neuroimaging studies showed that activation in the (ventral) 
medial part of the prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) is associated with ascribing personal 















David, 2010). In line with the notion that people want to be moral, I thus examined 
whether viewing information indicative of one’s own moral behavior is associated 
with activation in the vMPFC. Indeed, results of Study 6.2 showed that activation 
in the vMPFC was greater when participants viewed feedback about their moral 
behavior as compared to their competent behavior. Interestingly, this was only the 
case when this feedback consisted of positive information. The results of Chapter 6 
thus reveal that people seem to perceive positive indicators of their moral behavior 
as particularly self-relevant. A tentative explanation for this finding could be that 
participants in this study protected themselves from negative feedback by 
processing it as relatively less self-relevant. This is in line with my observation that 
the confrontation with negative indicators of one’s own morality has a highly 
negative impact upon people’s emotional well-being. Hence, discarding such 
information as less self-relevant might be part of a self-protective strategy to cope 
with such threatening information. Taken together, the findings thus confirm how 
much people care about succeeding in behaving in line with their moral values, and 
how they respond to information that may indicate this. 
The Added Value of Different Research Methods 
In this dissertation, I addressed three research questions related to people’s 
motivation to be (perceived as) a moral individual and group member. A primary 
aim of the dissertation was to examine the underlying processes associated with this 
motivation. I thus combined behavioral observations with psychophysiological and 
neuroscientific research tools throughout the empirical chapters to go beyond 
observing what people do, and examined how and why they do this in terms of 
specific underlying processes.  
The behavioral task used in the empirical chapters provided reaction times 
and error rates. It showed us that people inhibit their bias against Muslim women 
by slowing down their responses on prejudice-congruent trials. This measure thus 
revealed what people do, but it remains unclear how they are able to do this. 
Likewise, self-report measures are often administered after a particular behavior is 
displayed. Such measures rely upon the ability and willingness of research 
participants to report on their psychological state while performing the task, and 



















research concerning the motivation to appear moral. This is why it was important 
for me to assess the psychophysiological and neuroscientific measures online, that is, 
while participants were actually performing the task. The neural and physiological 
reactions I assessed occur unconsciously and are less sensitive to the intention to 
respond in socially desirable ways. 
Using ERPs, I was able to disentangle different cognitive processes associated 
with the control of prejudice. In this way, I revealed three different mechanisms 
that help participants inhibit their (behavioral) bias against Muslims. They did this: 
(a) By (unconsciously) increasing their perceptual attention to categorize target 
faces as Muslim versus non-Muslim women; (b) by distinguishing between 
prejudice-congruent and –incongruent trials; and (c) by monitoring their responses 
during the task. Recording skin conductance responses allowed me to reveal that 
receiving information about people’s own moral behavior causes instant automatic 
arousal that is different from how they respond to information concerning their 
competence. These findings thus underscored participants’ explicit reports of their 
negative affective states. Furthermore, based on fMRI-results –and particularly the 
knowledge of the functional properties of activation in the ventral medial part of 
the prefrontal cortex– I have suggested that people perceive positive information 
indicating their morality as particularly relevant to their self-concept. 
To give a concrete example of the added value of the different research 
methods combined in the current dissertation, let’s consider the findings in 
Chapters 2 and 4. Here, I discovered that an emphasis on the moral implications of 
one’s behavior affects people’s approach towards a task. Using a behavioral 
measure of implicit prejudice, I showed that non-Muslim participants inhibited 
their negative bias against Muslims when they were told that the test could assess 
their moral values concerning egalitarianism (as compared to how competent they 
are; Studies 2.1 and 4.1). The weaker negative bias when the moral test implications 
were stressed was caused by a smaller difference in response times between 
incongruent and congruent trials. This means that when morality was emphasized, 
non-Muslim participants responded equally slowly to congruent trials (associating 
non-Muslims with positivity and Muslims with negativity), as to incongruent trials 















sense, people thus made less of a distinction between their associations with 
ingroup and outgroup targets, and this is what resulted in the reduction of bias. 
However, interestingly, examination of brain activation during task performance 
revealed a significant difference between viewing pictures of ingroup and outgroup 
targets. That is, ERP modulations associated with differentiating between viewing 
in- and outgroup targets were increased rather than decreased (Studies 2.2 and 4.2). 
Additionally, activation in the occipital face area was greater for viewing faces of 
ingroup compared to outgroup targets when morality was emphasized (Study 3).  
At first glance, the behavioral and neuroscientific research findings thus seem 
to be contradictory. On a behavioral level, emphasizing morality resulted in more 
equal responses to members of different groups, whereas emphasizing morality 
actually increased differentiation between groups at the neural level. However, it is 
important to understand that both measures assessed different cognitive processes 
which occur at different stages in the process. That is, behavioral bias was 
estimated based on reaction times and the accuracy of responses on all trials within 
the task. This includes trials with pictures of faces of in- and outgroup targets, and 
on trials with pictures of positive and negative scenes. By contrast, perceptual 
attention was assessed from early visual processing of faces alone, irrespective of 
the response given on these types of trials. This may imply that the salience of 
morality increased people’s perceptual attention towards the faces of in- and outgroup 
members, and this is what enabled participants to behaviorally respond with decreased 
bias, in line with their moral values. It also suggests that participants actually 
attended differently to specific task stimuli when its moral implications were 
emphasized, rather than merely correcting their behavioral responses to these 
stimuli. This combination of observations thus suggests that the adjustment in 
participants’ behavior may at least in part depend on early cognitive processes that 
are crucial for preparing these responses.  
Another example of the added value of the new approach I followed in the 
current dissertation concerns the examination of the behavioral IAT effect. Across 
the different studies reported in Parts I and II, I found the same effect of 
emphasizing the moral implications of participants’ IAT performance. Participants 



















performance was monitored by an ingroup member) showed a relatively weak 
negative bias against Muslims. Interpreting this finding based only on the strength 
of the bias does however not inform us about how this reduction in bias is 
achieved. For example, the emphasis on morality may have caused participants to 
develop stronger positive associations with Muslims. On the other hand, it could 
also have helped them to control their negative associations with the Muslim 
targets. Either way this might have increased perceived equality between the two 
target groups, resulting in the smaller negative bias against Muslims that was found. 
Nevertheless, I set out to examine which process actually resulted in these 
behavioral findings. 
Previous research concerning the malleability of implicit bias can be seen to 
represent two distinct approaches. There are studies (such as the ones described in 
this dissertation) that examine what kind of motives or contextual factors affect 
displays of prejudice (i.e., the dependent measure of social bias such as the IAT 
effect). There are also studies that focus on how people’s performance on such 
measures of prejudice can be influenced (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003; Olson & Fazio, 
2003). In this second type of research different models have been introduced to 
examine responses on reaction times and error rates to disentangle the processes 
underlying automatic evaluations and control. Examples are the process-
dissociation model (e.g., Jacoby, 2001; Payne, 2001); the Quad-model (Conrey, 
Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005); the diffusion-model analysis 
(Klauer, Voss, Schmitz, & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007); and the ReAL model 
(Meissner & Rothermund, 2013). In my research, I did not follow any of these 
particular models, but adopted a more general strategy to examine the underlying 
processes associated with the reduced bias in case of an emphasis on moral values. 
I more closely examined participants’ response times on correct congruent and 
incongruent IAT trials, to be able to distinguish between two different routes 
towards bias reduction.  
In theory, bias measured using an IAT can be diminished in two ways. Either 
by reducing response times on incongruent trials, or by increasing response times 
on congruent trials. The first strategy implies that participants try to respond faster 















ingroup members with negative attributes. The second strategy implies that 
participants slow down their responses when they are asked to associate outgroup 
members with negative attributes and ingroup members with positive attributes. As 
described in each of the relevant chapters, the current results showed that the 
emphasis on morality (and being evaluated by an ingroup member) caused 
participants primarily to slow down their responses on prejudice-congruent trials. This 
suggests that stressing the moral implications of their performance made the 
meaning of congruent trials –as potentially revealing biased associations– more 
salient. That is, under moral task instructions participants were more likely to 
realize that congruent trials would reflect the ease with which they could associate 
Muslims with negative attributes and non-Muslims with positive attributes. My 
approach to examine how the emphasis on moral values affects people’s bias 
towards Muslims thus revealed that this may have led them to slow down and 
overthink these prepotent responses, to be able to act in line with (self-relevant) 
moral values. 
The Challenges of Different Research Methods 
In my research, I set out to combine procedures and measures that had been 
developed in different research traditions, to examine distinct research questions. 
Combining different approaches in this way certainly had an added value for my 
research and the conclusions I was able to draw. Nevertheless, I also had to face 
several complications relating to adjustments I had to make to experimental designs 
and standard procedures, to adapt the IAT for use of different neuroscientific 
research methods.  
In Study 2.2, I had a clear hypothesis about how the ERN modulation would 
be affected by the emphasis on the moral implications of the task. But in order to 
reliably estimate the ERN, a sufficient number of errors is needed. I thus doubled 
the amount of trials in the IAT in order to allow participants to reveal more 
mistakes during their task performance. Although prolonging the IAT did result in 
the intended increase in errors, it also caused a learning effect: After so many trials, 
regardless of condition, all participants responded in the same way to all types of 
IAT trials. This adaptation of the task to enable examination of the ERN 



















moral or competence task implications had been emphasized. As a result, the 
behavioral effect I had found in Study 2.1 was less clearly visible in Study 2.2. 
In Chapter 3, I faced a similar problem, when I did not find an effect of 
emphasizing moral test implications on the behavioral data at all. In this fMRI 
study, I used an event-related design to be able to detect brain activation associated 
with the presentation of the different types of stimuli. To be able to separate 
responses to different trials, this design requires that there is a certain waiting 
period in between each of the trials. The time delay between trials, required to 
reliably assess fMRI responses, slowed down the overall pace of the IAT, and may 
have helped participants to prepare for and focus their attention for each upcoming 
trial. As a consequence, when using this procedure, the response times of 
participants who read the moral implications of the test were similar to the 
response times of participants who read the implications concerning their 
competence. This aspect of the task procedure may explain why I was unable to 
demonstrate the previously presented behavioral effects of the emphasis on one’s 
moral values, in this particular study.  
Finally, the behavioral effect of reduced bias in case of the morality frame in 
combination with evaluation by an ingroup member (observed in Study 4.1) did not 
emerge in (ERP) Study 4.2 in which I examined the effects of morality framing and 
presence of ingroup versus outgroup members. In retrospect, this may be 
attributed to the limited response window we offered to participants. As was the 
case in Study 2.2, I adapted the IAT procedure in Study 4.2, because I needed 
enough erroneous responses to reliably estimate the ERN. A pilot study had 
however uncovered that participants responded more accurately as well as faster 
when their performance was being monitored. Thus, in addition to doubling the 
number of trials like I did in Study 2.2, in Study 4.2 I also tried to induce 
participants to make a sufficient number of errors by reducing the time available to 
respond on each trial. In Studies 2.1, 2.2, and 4.1, the decrease in behavioral bias 
against Muslims was associated with participants’ slowed down responses on 
congruent trials. Slowing down was however no longer possible in Study 4.2 
because of the limited response window. This might explain why no evidence of 















confirmed that the underlying cognitive processes were affected when the moral 
implications of the task were emphasized and when participants were monitored by 
an ingroup member.   
Unfortunately, such difficulties are inherent to the choice of combining 
different research methods –while using the same behavioral paradigm–, to obtain 
triangular evidence as a way to examine complex psychological questions (see also 
Scheepers, Ellemers, & Derks, 2013). However, importantly, the fact that these 
adaptations had to be made and affected the results also extended current insights 
in the processes underlying the influence of (moral) motivation on IAT 
performance. For example, in Study 5.2, I also extended the number of trials 
included in the IAT. This time, I examined whether increased exposure to an 
apparent outgroup member (i.e., a woman with a headscarf) who was presented as 
a partial ingroup member on another dimension (i.e., in terms of her personality 
type) might increase positive associations with Muslim women. As in Study 2.2 –
where the IAT effect was extinguished over time– the prolonged IAT caused a 
learning effect once again. But this time extending the number of IAT trials 
enabled participants to develop new associations, by learning to combine positive 
stimuli with the outgroup target. The evidence that it is possible for participants to 
do this is important beyond its methodological implications, as it offers scope for 
developing very practical and concrete strategies that may help reduce the 
emergence of implicit negative biases by learning to make new associations (see 
also Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000). 
Extending Previous Literature 
The research presented in this dissertation extends existing insights in many 
ways. Importantly, this research is the first to show that morality not only induces 
people to say that they want to behave in a certain way, but that it actually motivates 
them to change their behavior. Extending previous research that focused on people’s 
explicitly reported moral motivation and stated preferences in hypothetical moral 
dilemmas, I was able to reveal that people adjust their implicit behavior (i.e., their 
IAT performance) in line with their moral values when the moral implications of 



















The findings reported in the current dissertation also have important 
implications for neuroscientific research. Previous research has examined the brain 
regions involved in the ability to behave in line with moral standards by studying 
patients with brain lesions who –as a result– exhibit immoral behavior or 
psychopathological characteristics (e.g., Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 1999; for a review see also Moll, Zahn, De Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & 
Grafman, 2005). In other cognitive research there has been a focus on moral 
decision making. There, it is examined which parts of the brain people need (i.e., 
need to be activated) to consider what one would do in a hypothetical situation. The 
findings in this dissertation thus extend those insights by revealing the cognitive 
processes involved when healthy participants behave (i.e., perform) in line with their 
own moral values. Moreover, by studying the brain regions involved in the 
motivation to appear unprejudiced in a situation that resembles common 
interactions (when first viewing faces of people representing different social 
groups), I was able to examined a kind of moral motivation that is part of social 
interactions and thus of everyday life.  
Societal Implications 
Besides the theoretical implications of the current dissertation, the findings 
presented here also have some important practical implications. In Part I, I revealed 
that emphasizing moral implications of people’s behavior caused them to inhibit 
their behavioral prejudice towards outgroup targets. This could imply that in real 
life settings, people may also adjust or control their behavioral or verbal 
expressions of prejudice when they are made aware of what such expressions might 
say about their own moral values. Consider for example a situation in which an 
employer rejects an applicant, merely because she indicates she wants to wear a 
headscarf at work. In this situation, the employer will probably only be aware of the 
consequences for the applicant rather than thinking about what the rejection of 
such applicants may reveal about himself and the company more generally. 
Awareness of the implications of his behavior in terms of his own morality and 
what it says about his values regarding equality and intercultural respect may make 















The findings reported in Part II of this dissertation also reveal that people 
care whether they are perceived as moral by others, especially by members of their 
own group. Motivating people to inhibit their prejudice towards outgroup targets 
by emphasizing moral values instead of competence, will thus be particularly 
effective within a group context. This finding speaks to debates about how to best 
promote diversity policies in work settings. In the literature, it has been suggested 
that, rather than emphasizing that diversity is the right thing to do, organizations 
should emphasize the ‘business case for diversity’. In essence, this is a focus on 
competence that may persuade the executive board of a company to work towards a 
more diverse organization, and promotes ethnic and gender diversity in order to 
improve the organization’s profit and success. In addition, the ‘business case for 
diversity’ is proposed to increase motivation and efficiency among employees (e.g., 
European Commission, 2005; Robinson & Dechant, 1997). However, in terms of 
diversity climate within the company, based on the results of this dissertation, I 
question the effectiveness of this measure in motivating employees to embrace 
diversity and treat colleagues from other ethnic backgrounds with respect. Instead, 
a better way to achieve this might be by emphasize that striving for a diverse 
organization is the moral thing to do. 
Presenting policies in terms of moral principles, to motivate members to act 
accordingly may be a strategy that can actually be adopted by any kind of company, 
department, or team. Consider for instance organizations in the financial sector. 
Here, norms and performance targets also tend to be presented in terms of 
competence. In order to make a profit, close a successful deal, or attract new clients 
one should first and foremost be clever and skilled. Although this may sound 
intuitively convincing, my findings imply that it might be even more motivating for 
employees to be part of and work for an organization that emphasizes its moral 
character, for instance by focusing on fair treatment of employees, or showing 
honesty towards clients. Indeed, there is some correlational evidence in line with 
this reasoning, documenting that perceptions of organizational morality relate to 




















The notion that evaluations by other ingroup members are particularly 
effective in helping people to display moral behavior is also relevant in the context 
of the financial sector. In the Netherlands, organizations in this sector are being 
supervised and controlled by an external agency, the Authority of Financial 
Markets. This is an independent institution assigned to check and sanction the 
proper business conduct of financial markets, accountants or other financial service 
providers. However, an important consequence of this independent supervision is 
that evaluations of ethical business conduct are made by an external source. In the 
terminology used in my research, this would represent an outgroup judgment. That 
is, a judgment from a group that people tend to consider less self-relevant, which 
may for this reason alone be less effective in influencing their moral behavior. In 
view of the findings reported in this dissertation, it may be questioned whether 
supervision from such a source provides an optimal way to guide adherence to 
moral standards. If the goal is to improve morality in the financial sector, it might 
be more effective when moral norms are emphasized within a company and by its 
own board. Having moral business conduct as a core company value, is more likely 
to stimulate employees to perform their work in line with ethics guidelines.  
Although emphasizing moral rather than competence norms may be 
particularly effective within one’s own group, the findings of Part II of this 
dissertation also show that concerning people’s control of prejudice, moral 
behavior can be influenced when this is evaluated an outgroup member. That is, 
people will generally be inclined to inhibit the expression of their negative bias 
when they are being monitored by a member of the group that is the target of such 
bias. This implies that diversity in a setting where people cooperate or evaluate one 
another may prevent displays of prejudice and discrimination. For example, having 
a Muslim employee as a member of an evaluation committee and who will thus 
observe the decision-making process concerning candidates for the job, may thus 
help the committee to create equal opportunities for Muslim as well as non-Muslim 
applicants. Likewise, having women present in the board of directors of a company 
















Importantly, my research also revealed that emphasizing the moral 
implications of people’s behavior can be just as effective in reducing prejudice as is 
the presence of a representative of the group that is the target of prejudice. This is 
important for contexts in which intergroup contact is not feasible. This is the case 
for instance, when employees do not yet have any colleagues with a different ethnic 
background or religion, but might be induced in this way to be more open and 
welcoming to such a colleague. Likewise, emphasizing moral implications of being 
unbiased might be of benefit in the integration of newcomers in neighborhoods 
that primarily consist of people from the same social class or ethnicity. Within 
these contexts, people may be motivated to control their prejudice when this is 
emphasized as the right or moral thing to do, giving the new colleague or neighbor 
a fair chance to reveal their personal qualities rather than relying on biased 
expectations. Standard communications regarding company policy or national 
campaigns to encourage equal treatment of minority members tend to focus on the 
negative implications for the targets of prejudice, as a way to prevent people from 
expressing bias. My research suggests that there is likely to be added value in 
communicating about moral values and equality goals of the perpetrators, as a way 
to help diminish prejudice.  
The research reported here not only elucidates how people adapt their moral 
behavior, it also reveals some very concrete and practical ways in which moral 
behavior can be stimulated. However, in real life, we have to take into account that 
even with the best of intentions people may sometimes deviate from what is 
considered moral, or be unable to always live up to their moral standards. The 
findings in Part III of this dissertation reveal how people are affected when 
confronted with their own moral slips. Because of the motivation to do what is 
morally right, confronting people with their moral failures has a negative impact 
upon their emotional well-being. If this negative response is sufficiently severe, it is 
likely to induce feelings of inadequacy and stress, which people are likely to cope 
with through denial or motivational withdrawal. Indeed, some of the fMRI 
evidence seems to suggest that negative moral information tends to be seen as less 
relevant to the self, even if skin conductance responses and self-reports indicate 



















emphasizing their moral failures may not be the best way to motivate people to 
change or improve their behavior. Importantly however, people also seem to be 
especially attentive to positive information about their moral behavior which they 
seem to perceive as particularly relevant for their self-concept. This is relevant for 
instance to leaders who have to monitor and sanction the behavior of their 
subordinates. The natural tendency might be to confront an employee with moral 
failures, such as unethical decision making, as a way to prevent similar behavior in 
the future. However, due to the negative emotional impact this has, this might not 
be the best way to achieve behavioral change. Instead, it might be more effective to 
encourage the employee to succeed in their motivation to be moral by emphasizing 
moral achievements, or praising them for compliance with moral norms or 
company values while doing their job. 
Thus far, I have mainly focused on the practical implications of the current 
findings in business settings. However, in principle, emphasizing the moral 
implications of people’s performance can also be effective in stimulating moral 
behavior in other contexts. For example, similar mechanisms might be effective in 
sectors such as sports where moral behavior may be enhanced by emphasizing the 
importance of fair play and proper competition instead of focusing on winning 
outcomes alone. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The results of the empirical chapters outlined in Parts I, II, and III offer new 
insights in people’s moral motivation. However, there are also some limitations in 
the studies described in Chapter 2-5 that need to be addressed and which may 
provide directions for future research.  
A possible point of critique concerning the current dissertation is the repeated 
use of the implicit association test (IAT). In fact, this was the only (implicit) 
measure used to examine moral behavior in this thesis. In this research, the IAT 
was chosen because this measure lends itself rather well for framing its implications 
in terms of morality and in terms of competence. Also, the use of multiple trials 
makes it a measure of moral behavior that is also viable for the examination of 
cognitive responses, which requires repeated behavioral displays to achieve a 















IAT made it possible to compare and combine the related results of different 
scientific measures of cognitive processes and brain activation. Nevertheless, in 
future research other experimental paradigms might be developed to examine the 
importance of revealing one’s motivation to be moral over one’s motivation to be 
competent. For example, it would be interesting to examine whether people’s own 
motivation to be moral rather than competent would also affect behavior in more 
economic type of situations, such as in bargaining games, where there is a clear 
trade-off between moral concerns (e.g., fairness, trust) and competence concerns 
(e.g., outcomes). That is, extending the current research as well as studies that 
examined the effects of knowledge about the moral character of the other player on 
the behavioral choices in such games (e.g., Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005; Frank, 
Gilovich, & Regan, 1993), it could be tested whether morality is a stronger 
motivator than competence for people’s own choices in situations where moral 
behavior may go at the expense of individual outcomes and ingroup norms trump 
individual gains. 
Additionally, I have examined the importance of being perceived as moral by 
others, by introducing intra- and intergroup contexts. The examination of 
individual differences in the motivation to adhere to specific moral norms was not 
the focus of the current research. Nevertheless, previous research concerning 
prejudice control and automatic evaluative associations has revealed that such 
individual factors do explain differences in the regulation of social bias. For 
example, people can be internally and/or externally motivated to respond without 
prejudice on particular assessments (Plant & Devine, 1998; Amodio, Harmon-
Jones, Devine, 2003; Amodio, Kubota, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2006). In some 
studies, participants are even preselected based on a measure of this motivation. 
For example, Amodio et al. (2006) recruited research participants who were 
previously found to score high on the internal motivation scale and low on the 
external motivation scale, to compare their responses with those of people who 
score high on both scales. In some of the chapters in this dissertation, an 
assessment of internal/external motivation to avoid prejudice was included as an 
additional background measure. In my research, participants generally showed 



















with the notion that I examined the motivation to be moral as a self-relevant goal. 
Future research might seek out research participants that are primarily externally 
motivated to appear unprejudiced. This might make it possible to examine for 
instance whether such individuals are less sensitive to feedback concerning their 
own morality, but might be more responsive to moral evaluations by others. Now 
that I have established these different concerns as relevant to the adaptation of 
moral behavior, it might be of interest to specify whether certain groups of 
individuals might be more open to certain types of moral interventions than others. 
Conclusion 
Using different scientific research methods, the findings in this dissertation 
reveal that (1) people tend to act in ways that are considered moral; (2) it is 
important for people to be perceived as moral by self-relevant others; and (3) that 
people care about succeeding in behaving according to their moral values. The 
findings extend previous research by observing and measuring people’s actual 
behavior. Furthermore, automatic brain and physiological responses revealed how 
































Pretest: Testing the Target Stimuli 
Stimuli that represented the target concepts in our IAT consisted of 10 
pictures of female faces without a headscarf and 10 pictures of female faces with a 
headscarf. All pictures were pretested by 67 participants (11 males), none of whom 
participated in the main study. Participants were asked to rate the pictures – that 
were presented as two groups: i.e., pictures of women with a headscarf and pictures 
of women without a headscarf were presented all on one screen – on personal 
characteristics, and ingroup (women without a headscarf) vs. outgroup (women 
with a headscarf) resemblance on a 7-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “to a 
great extent”. Results showed that, although participants did not evaluate the 
women in the two groups differently concerning their perceived kindness, 
intelligence, competence, friendliness, genuinely, and trustworthiness, M(outgroup) 
= 5.00, SD = 0.63; M(ingroup) = 4.91, SD = 0.64; t(66) = -1.33, ns; they did report 
to perceive the women with headscarves to differ less from each other and to be 
more similar to each other than the women without headscarves; M(outgroup) = 
3.74, SD = 1.51; M(ingroup) = 2.81, SD = 1.22; t(66) = -5.41, p < .001. Moreover, 
as intended, participants reported that they identified more with women without 
headscarves (the ingroup) than with women with headscarves (the outgroup); 
M(outgroup) = 2.60, SD = 1.03; M(ingroup) = 3.94, SD = 1.16; t(66) = 7.96, p < 
.001. The results thus indicated that, as intended, participants identified more with 
the ingroup. Furthermore, we found a clear ingroup/outgroup differentiation for 
women with and without a headscarf that is consistent with existing insights that 
outgroups tend to be perceived as more homogeneous than ingroups. This 
confirms that the stimuli we developed are suitable for our IAT.  
A Pilot Study: Testing the IAT 
Using two different task instructions, we framed the IAT as either a test of 
participant’s morality or competence. However, although we argue that the IAT is 
an appropriate measure for the aim of our study, it is also possible that the test 
itself (without any additional information) raises morality concerns. After all, it 
could be evident for participants that a task concerning women with versus women 
without a headscarf has to do with prejudice or discrimination). We therefore first 














test is interpreted by participants. 
Method 
Participants. 
Twenty-six non-Muslim students from Leiden University (11 males, M age = 
23.2 years, SD = 4.8) participated in the pilot study for money or course credits.  
The implicit association test.  
Stimuli. Besides the stimuli that represented the target concepts of the IAT 
(i.e., pictures of women with and without a headscarf; described in the pretest), 
there were also stimuli that represented the attributes. These consisted of 5 pictures 
of positive scenes (e.g., sun flowers), and 5 pictures of negative scenes (e.g., a 
tornado), selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, Cuthbert, 2005). The stimuli were selected based on the scores for 
pleasure (i.e., negative pictures with scores < 4 and positive pictures with scores > 
7).  
Experimental design.  
The design of the IAT was identical to the design used by Greenwald, 
McGhee, and Schwartz (1998) in which the IAT consisted of 5 blocks. Congruent 
trials in test block 3 or 5 were trials for which female faces without a headscarf 
shared the same response key as positive pictures and female faces with a headscarf 
the same response key as negative pictures. Incongruent trials were trials for which 
female faces without a headscarf shared the same response key as negative pictures 
and female faces with a headscarf the same response key as positive pictures. The 
order of the congruent and incongruent trial blocks (3 and 5) was counterbalanced 
between participants. Blocks 1, 2, and 4 consisted of 26 trials and blocks 3 and 5 
consisted of 156 trials each. Each trial started with a fixation point (with a duration 
that varied between 500-1500 ms), followed by stimulus presentation to which 
participants were supposed to respond (680 ms), and a feedback screen (500 ms). 
The feedback screen indicated whether participants responded correctly (indicated 
by a green check mark), incorrectly (i.e., a red cross), or whether they responded 
too late. Stimuli alternated between female faces and positive or negative pictures 













block themselves and were thus able to take a short break in between. The 
experiment took approximately 25 minutes. 
The IAT effect (D score).  
The dependent measure was the IAT effect – indicated by the D score – 
calculated as the difference in reaction times on incongruent and congruent trials 
divided by a pooled standard deviation of all correct trials. This IAT effect was 
computed based on the scoring algorithm described by Greenwald, Nosek, and 
Banaji (2003). However, in contrast to IAT trials of Greenwald et al., where 
participants are asked to respond as quickly as possible but the stimuli only 
disappeared after a response was made, we used a limited presentation time of the 
stimuli (i.e., participants had to respond within 680ms after which the stimulus 
disappeared from the screen). We therefore did not have trials with extreme long or 
short latencies and we thus included them all, replaced error latencies with a 
replacement value (the mean plus two times the standard deviation of the correct 
latencies) and replaced zero latencies of the trials on which participants did not 
respond in time with the maximum response time of 680 ms.   
Interpretation of the IAT.  
After finishing the IAT we asked participants two questions (both positively 
and negatively formulated) concerning their interpretation of the IAT (i.e., “I think 
this test can assess my moral values concerning the equal treatment of different 
groups of people” / “I think this test cannot assess whether I am good in 
processing [new] information”). Participants could respond on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 “completely disagree” to 7 “completely agree”.      
Results and Discussion 
Interpretation of the IAT.  
Participants reported they were more inclined to think the test measured how 
well they are able to process new information (M = 4.27, SD = 1.34) than that the 
test measured their moral values concerning the equal treatment of different groups 
of people (M = 3.14, SD = 1.80); t(25) = 3.44, p = .002. This result thus negates 
















IAT effect.  
Participants showed the standard IAT effect (i.e., a negative implicit bias 
towards women with a headscarf); t(25) = 2.61, p = .015: Responding was more 
difficult on incongruent than on congruent trials (as was shown by increased 
reaction times and erroneous responses on incongruent compared to congruent 
trials). Our test thus revealed the typical IAT effect as it was first introduced by 
Greenwald et al. (1998). 
The Instruction Manipulation  
In the main manuscript, we shortly describe the difference between the two 
instruction conditions of our IAT. Here, we report the complete translation of 
these instructions.  
Morality instruction. 
“Is it important to you to treat people from different groups equally? Or do 
you have discriminating conceptions? Are you convinced that it is good to judge 
every individual, despite his or her gender, religion or ethnicity, in the same way? 
Or do you think it is right that some groups have a lower status in the Dutch 
society? People have different values concerning egalitarianism and discrimination. 
The test that you are about the do will show what kind of values you have and 
indicates whether your conceptions are discriminating against certain groups of 
people. The test is thus about important values you have and to what extent you 
strive for egalitarianism. The time to respond is limited, try to respond as quickly 
and as accurately as possible.” 
Competence instruction. 
“Are you able to quickly and accurately respond to new information? Can you 
asses things very rapidly? Or, are you not able to quickly evaluate and respond to 
new information? People differ in how well they are able to pick up new 
information and how easy they can learn new tasks. The test that you are about to 
do will show how well you are able to process new information en indicates 
whether you can rapidly and accurately sort different types of pictures. This test is 
thus about sorting different types of images, a good performance and fast reaction 

























Additional ERP results Study 4.2 
Effects of Electrode Site 
N1.  
A main effect of electrode site for the N1 revealed that the N1 was greater at 
Cz (M = -7.44 µV, SE = 0.37) than at FCz (M = -6.66 µV, SE = 0.35); F(1,56) = 
14.84, p < .001, η2 = .21. There was also a significant interaction between electrode, 
face and congruency; F(1,56) = 3.92, p = .05, η2 = .07. Separate follow-up analyses 
revealed that there was a significant interaction between electrode and face on 
incongruent (and not on congruent) trials; F(1,56) = 4.43, p = .04, η2 = .07, 
indicating that for incongruent trials the N1 modulation of viewing outgroup 
compared to ingroup faces was significant at Cz; Mdifference = -0.55, SE = 0.26, 
F(1,56) = 4.34, p = .04, η2 = .07, but not at FCz; Mdifference = -0.07, SE = 0.21, F <1.    
P150.  
The main effect of electrode site for the P150 showed that this ERP was 
greater at FCz (M = 5.13 µV, SE = 0.47) than at Cz (M = 4.08 µV, SE = 0.43); 
F(1,56) = 75.65, p < .001, η2 = .58. There was also a significant interaction between 
electrode, face, congruency, task domain, and evaluator; F(1,56) = 5.93, p = .02, η2 
= .10. Follow-up analyses showed that (1) on incongruent (and not on congruent) 
trials there was an interaction between electrode, face, task domain, and evaluator; 
F(1,56) = 7.04, p = .01, η2 = .11; (2) only at Cz (and not at FCz) there was a 
marginally significant interaction between face, task domain, and evaluator; F(1,56) 
= 3.57, p = .06, η2 = .06. Separate analyses per task domain revealed a marginally 
significant face*evaluator interaction in the moral domain; F(1,31) = 3.39, p = .08, 
η2 = .10, but not in the competence domain; F<1. Separate analyses per evaluator 
type revealed a marginally significant interaction between face and task domain in 
case of an outgroup evaluator; F(1,27) = 3.14, p = .09, η2 = .10, but not in case of 
an ingroup evaluator; F(1,27) = 1.02, p = .32. Simple main effects revealed that the 
P150 modulation of enhanced social categorization was significant in the 
morality/ingroup condition (F[1,31] = 12.84, p = .001, η2 = .29), but not in the 
morality/outgroup condition (F < 1). And significant in the competence/outgroup 
condition (F[1,27] = 9.91, p = .004, η2 = .27), but not in the competence/ingroup 














and incongruent trials, the increased P150 modulation in the morality/ingroup 
condition is consistent with our hypotheses and previous research (Van Nunspeet 
et al., 2014). 
N450. 
Results of the N450 also showed a main effect of electrode site; F(1,56) = 
86.49, p < .001, η2 = .61, indicating that the N450 was larger at CPz (M = -0.44 µV, 
SE = 0.37) than at Pz (M = 0.95 µV, SE = 0.31). There was also an interaction 
between electrode site and face; F(1,56) = 22.05, p < .001, η2 = .28, indicating that 
the difference in the N450 between viewing non-Muslim (ingroup) compared to 
Muslim (outgroup) women was greater at Pz; Mdifference = -0.77, SE = 0.24, F(1,56) 
= 39.27, p < .001, η2 = .41, than at CPz; Mdifference = -1.38, SE = 0.22, F(1,56) = 
22.05, p < .001, η2 = .16. Moreover, there was an interaction between electrode, 
congruency, and task domain; F(1,56) = 4.42, p = .04, η2 = .07. However, follow-
up analyses –separately for each electrode site and for each task domain condition– 
revealed no significant two-way interactions with congruency; F’s < 2.29, p’s > .14.  
ERN.  
For the ERN there was only a main effect of electrode site, revealing that the 
ERN modulation was greater at FCz (M = -2.95 µV, SE = 0.47) than at Cz (M = -
0.99 µV, SE = 0.46); F(1,44) = 76.20, p < .001, η2 = .63. There were no interaction 
effects with this factor.  
The N450 Modulation of Viewing (non-)Muslim Faces  
N450. 
As the described in the main manuscript, we found a significant four-way 
interaction between congruency, face, domain and evaluator; F(1,56) = 5.75, p = 
.02, η2 = .09. Since we were interested in the modulation of congruency, we 
included follow-up analyses examining this particular factor. However, we also 
found a main effect of faces: The N450 was larger for pictures of non-Muslim (M 
= -0.28 µV, SE = 0.37) compared to Muslim women (M = 0.79 µV, SE = 0.33); 
F(1,56) = 24.06, p < .001, η2 = .30. We therefore also conducted analyses for the 
N450 modulations of faces: Separate analyses for the task domain conditions 
revealed a significant interaction between face, congruency, and evaluator in the 













condition; F(1,25) = 1.30, p = .27. Furthermore, within the morality condition, 
there was an interaction between face and congruency in the ingroup evaluator 
condition; F(1,16) = 10.26, p = .006, η2 = .39, but not in the outgroup evaluator 
condition; F(1,15) < 1. Simple main effects revealed that the N450 modulation of 
viewing non-Muslim compared to Muslim women in the morality/ingroup 
condition was significant on incongruent trials; F(1,16) = 15.68, p = .001, η2 = .50, 
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Morele richtlijnen geven aan wat ‘juist’ en ‘onjuist’ gedrag is. Mensen vinden het 
belangrijk om moreel te zijn en moreel over te komen op anderen. Toch worden 
we allemaal wel eens geconfronteerd met mensen die immoreel gedrag vertonen; of 
doen we zelf wel eens iets waarvan we ons achteraf afvragen of dit wel het juiste 
was. In dit proefschrift heb ik onderzocht of, onder welke omstandigheden, en 
waarom mensen gemotiveerd zijn om zich moreel te gedragen. In voorgaand 
onderzoek werd voornamelijk het vermogen tot moreel redeneren en morele 
besluitvorming bestudeerd, om erachter te komen wat mensen denken dat een juiste 
handelswijze is. Ik bouw hierop voort, en richt mij op factoren die moreel gedrag 
stimuleren; wanneer, waarom, en hoe doen mensen wat ze juist vinden? Hierbij heb 
ik niet alleen het gedrag zelf onderzocht, of vertrouwd op wat mensen als redenen 
opgaven voor hun gedrag. Ik heb ook gekeken wat er gebeurt in het lichaam en in 
het hoofd van mensen die proberen moreel gedrag te vertonen. Hiermee kan ik 
meer informatie vergaren, zoals over gedachten en emoties waar mensen zelf geen 
zicht op hebben, of waarover ze mij niet willen vertellen. Ik heb hiervoor 
neurowetenschappelijke en psychofysiologische meetmethodes gebruikt om 
hersenactiviteit te meten (aan het schedeloppervlak met behulp van een 
elektrodencap, EEG; en in de hersenen met behulp van een MRI scanner; fMRI), 
en om te kijken of mensen het letterlijk ‘warm’ krijgen in bepaalde situaties 
(zweetreactie in huidgeleiding; SCR).  
Dit proefschrift is opgebouwd in drie delen waarin telkens een andere vraag 
centraal staat. In Deel I heb ik bestudeerd of mensen geneigd zijn hun gedrag aan 
te passen of te controleren wanneer wordt benadrukt dat zij iets doen wat hun 
morele waarden kan onthullen. In Deel II heb ik bestudeerd of de motivatie om 
moreel gedrag te vertonen wordt beïnvloed, wanneer mensen worden geëvalueerd 
door anderen. In Deel III heb ik onderzocht of mensen het belangrijk vinden om 
zich te gedragen naar wat als moreel wordt beschouwd door te kijken hoe zij 
reageren op informatie die een indicatie geeft over de mate waarin hen dat is gelukt. 
In Deel I heb ik onderzocht of mensen hun gedrag proberen aan te passen 
wanneer op voorhand wordt benadrukt dat de taak die ze doen iets zegt over hun 
morele waarden (in plaats van hun competentie). Dit heb ik onderzocht met behulp 

















deelnemers worden gevraagd zo snel en accuraat mogelijk te reageren op 
verschillende soorten foto’s en afbeeldingen. In mijn onderzoek liet ik foto’s zien 
van vrouwen met en zonder hoofddoek, en van positieve en negatieve afbeeldingen 
(bijvoorbeeld een zonnebloem of tornado). De IAT is in eerder onderzoek gebruikt 
om onbewuste negatieve associaties bij bepaalde personen in kaart te brengen, die 
vooroordelen ten aanzien van sociale groepen kunnen onthullen. In de instructie 
voorafgaand aan de taak heb ik bij de helft van de deelnemers benadrukt dat hun 
prestatie iets kan zeggen over hun competenties (hoe goed zij zijn in het snel 
verwerken van informatie en het leren van nieuwe taken). Bij de andere helft van de 
deelnemers heb ik benadrukt dat hun gedrag aangeeft wat hun morele waarden zijn 
(wat betreft sociale gelijkheid en discriminatie). Resultaten in Hoofdstuk 2 laten 
zien dat deze instructie invloed heeft op het gedrag van mensen. Nadat is 
benadrukt dat hun prestaties op deze taak iets kunnen zeggen over hun moraliteit 
(in plaats van hun competentie), waren de onderzoeksdeelnemers meer geneigd 
zich moreel te gedragen. Dat wil zeggen: ze lieten minder negatieve vooroordelen 
zien ten aanzien van Moslima’s bij het uitvoeren van deze taak. 
Deze zelfde onderzoeksopzet heb ik herhaald, terwijl mensen een 
elektrodencap droegen (ERP studie – Hoofdstuk 2), of terwijl ze in de scanner 
lagen (fMRI studie – Hoofstuk 3). Hiermee kon ik hun hersenactiviteit meten 
tijdens het doen van deze taak. Event Related brain Potentials (ERP-maten) zijn 
hersengolven die laten zien hoe sterk en hoe snel mensen reageren op bepaalde 
gebeurtenissen, zoals de foto’s die we ze laten zien, of de antwoorden die ze geven. 
Functionele hersenscans, gemaakt van het gehele brein terwijl mensen aan de taak 
werken (fMRI-maten) laten zien welke delen van de hersenen geactiveerd worden. 
Uit deze metingen van hersenactiviteit kunnen we dus afleiden waar mensen mee 
bezig waren tijdens de taak en welke cognitieve processen er (extra) worden 
geactiveerd om moreel gedrag te vertonen. Beide soorten metingen leveren dus ook 
aanvullende informatie over hoe en waarom mensen zorgen dat negatieve 
vooroordelen niet zichtbaar worden in hun gedrag, om te laten zien dat zij moreel 
zijn. Ik kan zo ook kijken of en hoe de hersenactiviteit tijdens de taak verandert, als 
mensen denken dat deze taak iets zegt over hun moraliteit, in plaats van hun 















aandacht hebben voor wie zij zien tijdens de taak (een Moslima of een vrouw zonder 
hoofddoek), als ze denken dat hun prestatie iets zegt over hun morele waarden. Dit 
wil zeggen dat ze meer geneigd zijn bij de foto’s die in de taak getoond worden een 
onderscheid te maken tussen gezichten van vrouwen met of zonder hoofddoek 
(sociale categorisatie). De verhoogde neiging mensen te categoriseren in groepen, 
lijkt in eerste instantie misschien tegen-intuïtief als manier om vooroordelen tegen 
te gaan en gelijke behandeling te stimuleren. De taakprestaties suggereren echter 
dat de verhoogde aandacht voor het groepslidmaatschap van de vrouwen op de 
foto’s de onderzoeksdeelnemers heeft geholpen om hun gedrag zodanig aan te 
passen dat zij beide groepen vrouwen gelijk konden behandelen. Ook laat de 
hersenactiviteit in de ERP resultaten van Hoofdstuk 2 zien dat mensen sterker 
reageren (wat betekent dat zij het erger vinden) als ze fouten maken tijdens de taak, 
wanneer zij denken dat hun prestatie aangeeft hoe moreel zij zijn. Tezamen tonen 
deze bevindingen dus aan dat mensen niet alleen zeggen dat zij het belangrijk vinden 
om moreel te zijn (zoals gebleken is uit eerder onderzoek), maar dat mensen ook 
moeite doen om zich daadwerkelijk te gedragen naar hun morele waarden. 
In Deel 2 van dit proefschrift heb ik bestudeerd of de motivatie van mensen 
om moreel te zijn wordt beïnvloed door de aanwezigheid van anderen. In 
Hoofdstuk 4 laat ik zien dat het vooral van belang is om je moreel te gedragen in 
het bijzijn van iemand die tot jouw groep behoort. In dit gedeelte van het 
proefschrift dachten deelnemers dat zij geobserveerd werden tijdens het maken van 
de computertaak. Telkens nadat zij een respons gaven zagen zij een andere 
deelnemer die aangaf of zij de correcte of incorrecte respons hadden gegeven. Deze 
evaluator werd gepresenteerd als iemand met hetzelfde groepslidmaatschap als de 
deelnemer (iemand met hetzelfde persoonlijkheidstype, en dus een lid van dezelfde 
‘groep’), of als iemand met een ander groepslidmaatschap dan de deelnemer 
(iemand met ander persoonlijkheidstype en dus een lid van een andere groep). De 
resultaten van dit onderzoek lieten, net als in Deel 1, zien dat mensen minder 
negatieve vooroordelen ten aanzien van Moslims toonden wanneer de morele 
implicaties van hun gedrag waren benadrukt. Maar belangrijker was de nieuwe 
bevinding dat dit vooral gebeurde wanneer mensen tijdens hun prestatie op de 

















wanneer zij werden geëvalueerd door iemand van een andere groep. Ook de 
hersenactiviteit die een rol speelt bij de motivatie om moreel gedrag te vertonen (en 
die ik eerder aantoonde in Hoofdstuk 2) was versterkt indien er een lid van de eigen 
groep meekeek tijdens de taak. Deze bevindingen laten dus zien dat moreel gedrag 
gestimuleerd kan worden door het benadrukken van de morele implicaties van dat 
gedrag, maar dat dit vooral effectief is wanneer er iemand meekijkt met wie we ons 
identificeren. 
Het gedeelde of afwijkende groepslidmaatschap van de evaluator in 
Hoofdstuk 4 was gebaseerd op (fictieve) persoonlijkheidstypen. Dit 
groepslidmaatschap had geen betekenis buiten de onderzoeksruimte en was dan 
ook niet heel relevant. Dit geeft echter wel aan hoe sterk de motivatie is om moreel 
gevonden te worden door mensen die zijn zoals wij: Mensen vinden het zelfs 
belangrijk om moreel over te komen op iemand die zij niet kennen maar over wie 
hen enkel is verteld dat zij lid zijn van dezelfde groep (omdat ze dus iets met elkaar 
gemeen hebben zoals een persoonlijkheidstrek). In de computertaak draaide het 
echter om vooroordelen ten aanzien van Moslima’s. De niet-Islamitische 
onderzoeksdeelnemers zullen zichzelf niet zien als lid van dezelfde groep als de 
Moslima’s in de taak. Toch vroeg ik mij af of het mogelijk is dat zij zich wél 
moreler gaan gedragen wanneer hun taakprestatie wordt bekeken en beoordeeld 
door een vrouw met een hoofddoek. Dit heb ik dan ook onderzocht in Hoofdstuk 
5. De resultaten lieten zien dat wanneer deelnemers werden geëvalueerd door een 
vrouw met een hoofddoek, zij minder negatieve vooroordelen ten aanzien van 
Moslims vertoonden. Sterker nog, wanneer deze evaluator was geïntroduceerd als 
iemand met hetzelfde persoonlijkheidstype als de deelnemer (en dus als een lid van 
dezelfde groep), konden deelnemers niet alleen hun negatieve associaties met 
Moslima’s onderdrukken, maar ook hun positieve associaties met Moslima’s 
versterken. De evaluatie door een vrouw met een hoofddoek was dus zeer effectief 
in het verminderen van negatieve vooroordelen over Moslims. Belangrijk is echter 
ook dat, zonder deze evaluator, negatieve vooroordelen verminderd werden als de 
implicaties van de prestatie van de deelnemers waren benadrukt in termen van 
moraliteit. Negatieve vooroordelen hebben vaak betrekking op 















gedrag door een lid van zo’n groep wordt beoordeeld. Het is dan dus van belang 
om te weten dat negatieve vooroordelen ook verminderd kunnen worden door het 
benadrukken van de morele implicaties van iemands gedrag. Tezamen tonen de 
resultaten van Deel 2 van dit proefschrift dus enkele manieren waarop negatieve 
vooroordelen ten aanzien van Moslims verminderd kunnen worden en hoe 
situationele factoren moreel gedrag kunnen beïnvloeden. 
Nadat ik in Deel 2 van dit proefschrift had onderzocht of de aanwezigheid 
van anderen moreel gedrag kan beïnvloeden, keer ik in Deel 3 terug naar de 
persoonlijke motivatie van mensen om moreel te zijn. In Hoofdstuk 6 heb ik 
namelijk onderzocht of mensen het belangrijk vinden om te slagen in het vertonen 
van moreel gedrag. En of dit belangrijker is dan dat het hen lukt om zich 
competent te gedragen. In dit hoofdstuk heb ik mensen opnieuw de computertaak 
(de IAT) laten doen. Na afloop van de taak heb ik hen verteld dat de taak iets kan 
zeggen over hoe moreel en hoe competent zij zijn in vergelijking met anderen. Ook 
heb ik hen hun scores op de taak getoond. Terwijl de deelnemers hun scores zagen 
heb ik de huidgeleiding op hun handen gemeten om te testen of zij zich (onbewust) 
meer opwinden wanneer zij zien dat zij beter of slechter hebben gepresteerd dan 
andere mensen. De resultaten van deze metingen lieten zien dat mensen meer 
fysieke opwinding vertoonden wanneer zij te horen kregen dat zij minder moreel 
zijn dan anderen, dan wanneer zij vernamen dat zij minder competent zijn dan 
andere mensen. Ook gaven de deelnemers naderhand aan meer negatieve gevoelens 
te ervaren als zij hadden vernomen dat zij minder moreel zijn dan anderen. Als het 
mensen dus niet lukt om moreel gedrag te vertonen dan geeft dit hen een slecht 
gevoel. 
In een vervolgstudie heb ik met behulp van fMRI onderzocht hoe de 
informatie over hoe moreel en competent mensen zich gedragen in vergelijking met 
anderen, verwerkt wordt in de hersenen. Dit keer heb ik mensen hun scores op de 
taak laten zien terwijl zij in de MRI scanner lagen. De resultaten toonden aan dat 
wanneer mensen hun testscores zagen, er een hersengebied werd geactiveerd 
waarmee we informatie detecteren die relevant is voor de vorming van ons 
zelfbeeld. Dit gebied werd tevens meer geactiveerd wanneer de deelnemers zagen 

















competenter zijn dan anderen. De bevindingen in Deel 3 van het proefschrift tonen 
dus aan dat het nastreven van morele waarden en het vertonen van moreel gedrag 
belangrijk is voor hoe we onszelf zien. Het is pijnlijk om te moeten vernemen dat 
we minder moreel zijn dan anderen, maar vernemen dat we moreler zijn dan 
anderen is relevant voor de bepaling van ons zelfbeeld. 
Conclusie 
De bevindingen in dit proefschrift laten zien dat mensen het belangrijk vinden 
om zich te gedragen naar hun morele waarden. Zij vinden het belangrijk om moreel 
over te komen op anderen, vooral op mensen met wie zij zich kunnen identificeren 
zoals mensen die deel uitmaken van dezelfde groep. Daarnaast vinden mensen het 
belangrijk dat het hen lukt om zich moreel te gedragen en vinden zij het erger om 
te moeten constateren dat zij minder moreel zijn dan anderen, dan dat zij minder 
competent zijn dan anderen. Mensen hebben de motivatie om moreel te zijn. De 
kennis over hoe deze motivatie versterkt kan worden kan dan ook helpen het beste 
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